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FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
by
Pedro Moura Costa, Jyrki Salmi, Markku Simula, and Charlie Wilson
Overview
The principal objective of the report is to outline a comprehensive global financing strategy for
the implementation of sustainable forest management (SFM). The core components of this
strategy include: the development of enabling conditions for the transition to SFM, including
appropriate policy frameworks at international and national levels; the targeted use of
concessionary finance in leveraging private investment; and the coordinated development of
widely applicable instruments for SFM financing.
In addition, a new financial mechanism is proposed to fill a significant gap that is identified in the
international forest financing architecture. This SFM Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) is
specifically designed to leverage private sector finance by using small amounts of seed capital
from the donor community to mitigate key investment barriers. The IPA's core activity would be
to package investment opportunities and structure financial deals through a range of financial-
and information-based services.
These recommendations are built up from a detailed analysis of the structural and operational
barriers restricting investment in SFM, including weak sectoral financial management and the
lack of mechanisms designed to recover value from the supply of forest services. Such barriers
are the root causes of a financial shortfall, which is characterised as both quantitative and
qualitative.
The financing strategy addresses the quantitative shortfall by more carefully targeting
conventional forest financing flows and channeling additional private sector resources through
innovative financing mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism and the proposed
IPA. These actions, however, are recognised as being dependent on structural reforms needed
both to create an 'enabling environment' for private sector investment and, crucially, to facilitate
the transition away from unsustainable short-term forestry to SFM. Thus, ways to address this
qualitative shortfall form an integral part of the financing strategy. Recommendations include
strengthening the international forest regime, building national-level sectoral capacity through the
national forest programme (nfp) process, and creating positive incentives for SFM. The
establishment of an international 'forest fund' is not being proposed because it would duplicate the
efforts of many existing institutions and financing mechanisms, and there would be great
difficulty foreseen in raising funds on a sustainable basis.
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In summary, the report contends that the question of how much additional financing is required
for SFM is answered by addressing issues of how to finance SFM, particularly in the context of
the private sector. The financing strategy therefore focuses on the structural reforms needed at
both international and national levels, and the conventional and innovative financing mechanisms
that can be used to this end.
Assumptions
The key assumption that underlies these conclusions is that any comprehensive financing strategy
must harness both public and private sector resources. Lack of coordination between the two is
identified as an important barrier to SFM, particularly in the context of innovative finance. An
attempt is therefore made to describe the roles that public and private finance can respectively
play in SFM investments and, where appropriate, delineate roles and assign responsibilities. In
particular, the leverage potential of concessionary finance in the early stages of SFM operations is
highlighted, as well as the role of the public sector in promoting and developing market-based
financing mechanisms.
It is further assumed that SFM has environmental, social, and economic benefits over prevalent
unsustainable forestry practices. In part, this relates to the report's focus on the forestry sector and
not wider land use practices or economic development considerations. Although this approach
has limitations, particularly with regards such issues as forest conversion, it does allow for a more
detailed study of how to improve the attractiveness of SFM investments.
It should also be noted that the remit of this study is global. Although due consideration is given
to national-level processes within the financing strategy, the analysis and recommendations
presented here are inherently general.
Sustainable Forest Management as an Investment
The report argues that current financial resource flows into forestry are significant but inadequate
to achieve SFM. Investment trends suggest the private sector to be the main source of additional
finance. Market and policy failures, such as the inadequate valuation of forest goods and services,
however, create perverse incentives for short-term unsustainable forestry. Another key constraint
concerns the uneven distribution of costs and benefits. In particular, forestry generates significant
non-market benefits at global, national, and local levels that have no recoverable value for
investors.
The problem of SFM financing can therefore be encapsulated in two closely interrelated
questions:
• How can existing financial flows be channeled into SFM rather than unsustainable forestry
activities?
• How can financing mechanisms and limited public sector resources be used to leverage
private sector investment into SFM?
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Structural and Operational Barriers to SFM
The enabling conditions for SFM investment require that prevailing structural and operational
barriers be reduced. The former fall principally to the public sector and are related to policy and
institutional frameworks and the creation of appropriate market conditions. Operational barriers
are specific to investment projects (such as technology, skills, marketing, etc.) and can be
addressed by both the private and public sectors.
Commoditisation of Forest Benefits
A key structural issue is the lack of recognition by forest owners, managers, and investors of the
full range of products and services supplied by SFM. Considerable scope exists to remove this
barrier by exploring ways to 'commoditise' non-market services so as to create additional financial
revenue streams for the forest owner or manager. In this way, commoditisation can play an
important role in meeting the incremental costs of shifting from single product-based production
(timber) to truly integrated multiple-objective forest management. Commoditisation can be
achieved at global, national, or local levels through structural adjustment in policies, development
of suitable instruments, and market development for products and services based on SFM.
Sources of Forestry Financing
Financing sources are classified according to a domestic-foreign and public-private typology. In
practice, these sources tend to be mixed through a range of combinations. As SFM should be (and
often is) self-financing, domestic sources could be the main funding source. In developing
countries, however, inappropriate policies and the lack of reinvestment of forestry revenue
undermine the role of the domestic public sector. Public sector resources can exert significant
leverage potential in removing structural barriers to investment specific to private sector needs
and interests. Real and perceived risk, lack of sector knowledge, and poorly marketed and
presented investment opportunities are examples of issues to be addressed.
Official Development Assistance (ODA) has an important complementary role to play but it has
remained ineffective for a variety of reasons - notably donor policies and the lack of an effective
link to good governance and recipient performance. While ODA is likely to be justified for low-
income countries, global targets for 'new and additional' funding appear unrealistic, particularly in
the revenue-generating forestry sector. ODA's effectiveness will largely depend on the extent to
which it can leverage private sector financing.
The private sector is the key player in the financing of SFM operations. In particular, well-
established debt, equity, and direct financing mechanisms will have a continuing role in activities
such as timber production and wood processing. Most private investment, however, still flows to
unsustainable forest management. The wider requirements of SFM will only be met by the
implementation and widespread use of innovative financing mechanisms and the removal of
structural and operational barriers.
Global Environment Facility (GEF) as a Source of SFM Financing
The GEF is a mechanism to finance the agreed incremental costs of measures to achieve global
environmental benefits in forestry-related areas of biodiversity, climate change, and international
waters. As regards forest ecosystems, The GEF's focus has been in protected areas while less
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attention has been given to sustainable use. The review of past GEF projects reveals that the
contribution to SFM financing outside protected areas has been significant but mainly covering
community participation and management of buffer zones around protected areas. Due to policy
constraints, however, the GEF cannot currently finance sustainable logging and related activities.
Thus, although the GEF is, and will continue to be, an important financing mechanism for forest
conservation, its potential contribution to the broader financing requirements of SFM will require
major structural changes.
Innovative Financing Mechanisms
The potential of 18 innovative financing mechanisms for SFM was analysed according to a
typology of direct commercial financing, direct concessionary financing, market development,
and structural development mechanisms. Conservation activities appear to have the greatest
potential access to innovative finance, but many other SFM-related activities can also benefit.
Many innovative financing mechanisms, however, like conventional finance, tend to be narrowly
focused, often failing to correspond to the needs of multipurpose SFM. In particular, commercial-
rate financing tends to be available only for late stage productive operations. Thus, there is a
clearly identifiable need to explore ways of integrating or adjusting existing instruments, or
developing new broadly applicable ones within the broad framework of SFM. Enhancing the
compatibility and coordination of market-rate and concessionary financing mechanisms will be
necessary to provide catalytic and operational support for private sector investments. Facilities to
bind or package different mechanisms or financing streams together are identified as another key
component of a comprehensive financing strategy.
Direct concessionary financing mechanisms tend to be poorly attuned to the needs and
characteristics of private sector forestry investors. Moreover, they are best directed towards
removing key structural barriers to SFM investment, complementing the role played by
conventional public sector finance.
Clean Development Mechanism
Innovative mechanisms that rely on the market by bringing recoverable financial value to
environmental forest services such as carbon sequestration and watershed protection, seem the
most promising. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), set up under the Kyoto Protocol to
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), has raised substantial expectations
for forestry financing. The ongoing process to develop the CDM will define the respective roles
of public and private sectors (i.e., the former will create market structures that facilitate the
investment of financial resources by the latter). Pertinent issues and problems with such
commodity-based approaches, including their inherent bias towards certain forestry types,
activities, services, and users, need to be addressed before conclusions can be reached on their
applicability for SFM financing.
SFM Financing Strategy
The proposed SFM financing strategy addresses the two fundamental issues identified: (i) the
redirection of additional and existing financing into SFM rather than unsustainable practices and
(ii) the leveraging of private investment into SFM through various financing mechanisms and
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using public sector resources. The overarching objective of the strategy is to mainstream SFM in
the investment strategies of both public and private sectors at national and international levels,
based on the recognition that SFM has to become a profitable and ethically attractive investment
target.
The key elements of the strategy are revenue generation by the sector itself, the removal of
structural and operational barriers, the commoditisation of environmental and social benefits of
forests, tying financial support with performance and aid reform, and the development of
mechanisms for leveraging private sector investment. Strategic interventions will be needed both
at international and national levels. Each country will have to work out its own strategy for which
the nfp provides a useful framework to ensure that barrier removal is comprehensive. At the
international level, the policy framework needs to be strengthened, together with more carefully
targeted concessionary funding, development of appropriate financing instruments, and improved
coordination and cooperation between financing actors. A global level IPA is proposed as a key
component of this strategy.
Investment Promotion Agency
The objective of the IPA would be to develop and manage a range of financial services designed
to facilitate private sector financial flows into SFM. Foremost of these activities would be an
investment packaging and marketing facility to disseminate information on, and provide
streamlined access to, the full range of financial resources, incentives, and mechanisms available
to forestry at the global level. Depending on the needs of the investor or the investment, the IPA
would bring these various funding lines together as part of a finance structuring service designed
to address specific barriers to SFM investment. Such a facility would seek to attract private sector
equity and debt financing from venture, institutional, or portfolio sources, using, where necessary,
catalytic public sector or other concessionary funding.
The IPA's activities would include: investment packaging and structuring, identification and
marketing of investment opportunities, promotion and development of innovative financing
mechanisms, and streamlined access to risk mitigation services. These activities are designed to
address the specific barriers to SFM investment identified in the study. In addition, three
alternative institutional structures for the IPA are identified and compared. Two options represent
a centralised approach; one option is decentralised, and suggests a series of franchises housed in
existing financing institutions.
The need for an international Forest Fund?
The IPA is not proposed as a panacea to the problems of forest financing. Its successful
functioning is conditional or even dependent on appropriate investment environments being in
place at both the international and national levels. This in turn entails addressing an array of
outstanding market and policy failures in the forestry sector, for which the potential direct
contributions of the IPA would likely be limited.
This raises the question of whether an international 'forest fund' is needed to channel and co-
ordinate the disbursement of existing or additional ODA in supporting national structural
development processes. Such a fund might also focus on countries and forestry types not covered
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by existing financing mechanisms, particularly when ensuring that forest-dependent people are
provided with alternative livelihoods and sources of income when needed. Furthermore, a forest
fund could exploit potential synergies with the IPA role by; for example, supporting the initial
steps of predominantly privately funded ventures within the framework of national forest
utilisation strategies and creating incentives for private sector adoption of market-based financing
mechanisms.
Despite these considerations, the analysis carried out suggests that a traditionally conceived
Forest Fund would largely duplicate the facilities and roles of institutions and financing
mechanisms already active at both international and national levels.
In any case, there is a clear need for better coordination and more careful targeting of available
concessionary financial resources, as well as substantial institutional reforms. Whether a new
forest fund could add value to this process should be carefully considered with regard to its
potential role in mobilising additional funding and in addressing potential caveats. By contrast,
the IPA's private sector orientation and horizontally integrated financial and information-based
services represent a potential institutional innovation in terms of how concessionary finance can
be more effectively used, in this case, to leverage significant private sector financial flows both
from domestic and external sources into SFM activities and operations.
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PART I. SETTING THE SCENE
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
1. Underlying causes for deforestation and forest degradation include the non-recognition of
environmental and social services value in terms of market prices and respective mechanisms to
compensate such services to forest owners and managers. In addition, with the exception of car-
bon offset trades, there have been no mechanisms designed to trade in the global non-market
benefits of forests. Recent developments in the international policy process under the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) and its successor body, the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests
(IFF), have opened up new horizons on how this fundamental problem can be addressed through
provisions related to climate change and biodiversity conservation.
2. The IPF, under its Programme Element II International Cooperation in Financial Assis-
tance and Technology Transfer for Sustainable Forest Management, invited UNDP and the Bret-
ton Woods Institute, together with other relevant international organisations, to explore innova-
tive ways to use both the existing financial mechanisms more effectively and to generate new and
additional public and private financial resources for the management, conservation and sustain-
able development of all types of forests. In addition the panel discussed a proposal to establish an
international fund for this purpose, particularly to meet the needs of developing countries. The
idea of such a fund was first presented in the World Forestry Congress, in 1985, in Mexico City,
and it was later taken up by the Food and Agricultural Organisation at the United Nations (FAO)
in 1990 as a follow-up of the Independent Review of the Tropical Forest Action Programme.
3. In its second session in August-September 1998, IFF initiated discussion of the need for
financial resources as one of the matters left pending by IPF under its Programme Element II.a.
The note prepared by the Secretariat (IFF 1998) highlighted that substantial financial resources
are needed for sustainable management of all types of forests, and that new and additional re-
sources are not seen as forthcoming, despite commitments from both international and domestic
public sources. Private capital flows are increasing, but it was noted that such flows might not
significantly contribute to sustainable forest management (SFM). The private sector also faces
problems in gaining access to start up capital and in overcoming risks and uncertainties associ-
ated with new operations. Various conventional and innovative financial mechanisms with po-
tential application in forestry were reviewed, including the possible establishment of a global for-
est fund.
4. One major financial mechanism, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), has been sup-
porting forest-related projects since its inception. Most of them have been implemented under the
Forest Ecosystems Operational Programme under the Biodiversity Focal Area, but some addi-
tional forest protection projects fall under the Mountains, and Arid and Semi-Arid Zone Opera-
tional Programmes. In fact, biodiversity in forest ecosystems is a main activity in the GEF’s
biodiversity portfolio, currently accounting for 17 percent of its portfolio (GEF 1998). Under the
climate change focal area, there is still no council guidance  for carbon sequestration and related
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forestry projects. The two existing initiatives of this nature were carried out during the pilot phase
and would not be eligible under the current guidance. There is no operational programme focus-
ing on carbon sequestration yet, but it is currently being developed.
5. The Third Conference of Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) held in Kyoto, Japan,  December 1997, agreed on reduction targets for a basket of six
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in industrialised countries (specified in Annex I of the FCCC) and es-
tablished emissions trading and a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to encourage jointly
implemented emissions reduction projects associated with sustainable development between de-
veloped and developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol also sets out the principle that forestry ac-
tivities may be used to offset industrial emissions: “net changes in greenhouse gas emissions
from sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land use change and
forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation since 1990, measured
as verifiable changes in stocks in each commitment period shall be used to meet the commitments
in this Article  of each Party included in Annex I” (Article 3(3), Kyoto Protocol). Although the
appropriate practical modalities remain to be defined, an action plan agreed to at the recent
Fourth Conference of Parties (CoP) held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 1998, has set out
a work programme for the completion of the required rules and methodologies by CoP6 to be
held at the end of the year 2000. It is apparent, however,  that this Kyoto Protocol provision po-
tentially opens up new opportunities for financing of sustainable forestry development, which
could be far beyond what is currently channeled from developed to developing countries.
6. These promising developments raise, however, some fundamental concerns that should be
addressed in the design of future implementation mechanisms for financing of SFM. Inappropri-
ately defined partial approaches in financing criteria and programme design (emphasising a par-
ticular goal, e.g., biodiversity, carbon sequestration, or another “global” benefit) risks leading to
sub-optimal solutions and unsustainable interventions not necessarily reflecting the national and
local priorities of the places where they are undertaken. An integrated approach is therefore
needed. It would combine socioeconomic development and environmental protection (including
climate change and biodiversity) within the framework concept of SFM. A key challenge is to
develop mechanisms to achieve global objectives with local demand-driven action. Global or na-
tional benefits should be received by individual land owners or users. Otherwise there needs to be
a way of channeling the national or global benefits down to those who pay for maintaining the
forests by foregoing exploitation of the land. The same argument also applies to private sector
investors (Rydén, pers.comm.).
7. The UNDP Programme on Forests (PROFOR) seeks to promote forest policies addressing
sustainable livelihoods and poverty eradication. Its objective is to promote SFM and related pub-
lic and private sector partnerships at the country level through a collaborative approach to SFM,
maximising the use of existing instruments and available resources for such financing. PROFOR
also supports new and innovative financial instruments and partnerships. The underlying as-
sumption is that SFM can contribute to poverty eradication and sustainable livelihoods.
8. Within its mandate and programme work, UNDP, as the lead agency for the IFF Pro-
gramme Element II.a on financing needs, and as one of the GEF implementation agencies, is ide-
ally positioned to develop strategies and modalities for how climate change and biodiversity
should be integrated in the sustainable development of forests in developing countries with par-
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ticular reference to new financing mechanisms and improving the effectiveness of the present
ones. This study has been designed with the purpose of assisting UNDP in these tasks, with par-
ticular emphasis given assisting the IFF.
1.2 Objectives
9. The purpose of the study is to develop operational concepts for financing of SFM inte-
grating environmental and socioeconomic goals in programme and project design. The work will
focus on improving the efficiency of existing financial instruments, and ways and means on how
instruments currently in the planning stage (such as the CDM) could be made to contribute to
SFM. The main attention is given to the international level, notwithstanding the importance of
national-level arrangements for effective financing of SFM.
10. The specific objectives of the assignment are as follows:
• review the financial needs and problems and issues related to forestry financing both
at national and international levels;
• review the conventional financing mechanisms seeking possibilities for their im-
provement;
• review the GEF’s forest-related work with regard to lessons to be learned on
sustainability, effectiveness, and efficiency from the viewpoint of financing SFM;
• identification and assessment of innovative financing mechanisms with regard to their
potential for SFM financing, with particular attention paid to various forms of for-
estry-based carbon offsets as a source of funds;
• propose viable strategic approaches for forestry-related international financing that
address the need for integration of developmental and environmental aspects in Pro-
gramme and project design;
• make action recommendations on the improvement of the existing, forthcoming, and
new financing instruments with regard to their forestry-related provisions considering
implementation both at national and international levels.
11. The team was also requested to assess the political viability of the proposed international
forestry fund as a possible element of strategic approaches to raise funds for SFM. This was not
explicitly done in the study as, based on the deliberations of IFF2, it was clear that it will not be
possible to raise financial resources for such a fund from ODA sources. As an option, the study
identified an Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) which could address the same goal but using a
different approach.
1.3 Methodology and Data
12. A considerable amount of scientific work has been carried out on the various issues re-
lated to the problem; this work was reviewed as the starting point. Also reviewed was gray lit-
erature on the subject, which has proliferated during the last few years. Interviews were carried
out among the representatives of international organisations, multilateral development financing
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institutions, bilateral donor agencies, and representatives of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), and the private sector (Annex 2). Based on the review, an analytical framework was de-
veloped and key issues were identified to be addressed during the analysis.
13. On the GEF instruments and programme work the current guidance documents were re-
viewed from the SFM perspective with the purpose of identifying areas which could be addressed
to improve efficiency and sustainability. A sample of forest-related GEF projects in biodiversity
and climate change was taken for a more detailed review based on project documents and plans,
monitoring, and evaluation reports, etc.
14. A number of international organisations and countries have been active in developing in-
novative mechanisms and instruments for joint implementation and specific forestry financing.
The different approaches and instruments, in various stages of implementation, were reviewed
and their strengths and weaknesses were assessed from the viewpoint of broader than national-
level application. Based on the available documentation, a review of the key proposed instru-
ments was carried out. A fact sheet was prepared on each of them and the results of the assess-
ment are included in Annex 4.
15. There are two parallel studies under way related to the work of IFF: one is a study of eco-
nomic instruments to promote SFM, and the other is an analysis of the valuation of forest goods
and services. All three of these exercises are closely related, and there will undoubtedly be some
overlap between them. This explains, however, why many economic instruments, particularly
those applied at the national level, have not been covered in detail in this study.
16. The work was carried out by a team of four consultants under close supervision by, and in
cooperation with, PROFOR.
1.4 Organisation of the Report
17. The report is divided in three main parts.
Part I – Setting the scene, which introduces the background, objectives, and methodology of the
study, and further defines the analytical framework used.
Part II – Status and present instruments of forest funding which first analyses the financial re-
quirements to achieve SFM, then studies the specific characteristics of financial needs and classi-
fies the main sources and beneficiaries. An overview of the conventional financial mechanisms is
provided, followed by a chapter on GEF. Finally, so-called innovative financing mechanisms are
described and briefly analysed. This section also includes the assessment of forest-based carbon
sequestration as a potential financing mechanism.
Part III – Proposed mechanisms for promoting SFM including a financing strategy and the de-
scription of a proposed IPA.
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2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Key Concepts and Definitions
18. This section provides definitions on selected concepts integral to this report. These con-
cepts are: sustainability, forests, forest management, SFM, unsustainable forest management
(UnSFM), deforestation, forest degradation, afforestation, reforestation, and forest values.
19. Sustainability is the capacity to last or continue. It is defined as the maintenance of pro-
duction capacities at levels which at least prevent depletion and which, at most, give future gen-
erations the opportunity to enjoy a measure of consumption equal to that of the present generation
(Jacobs 1991).
20. Forests are ecosystems dominated (at least 10 percent ground cover) by trees with climax
height of more than five meters (FAO/ECE 1993, p. 34). In addition to trees, forests include other
plants (shrubs, herbaceous plants, grasses, sedges, mosses and lichens), animals, fungi, bacteria
and viruses. The living organisms of a forest depend on their geophysical environment: soils (in-
cluding nutrients and trace elements), macro- and micro-climates, and hydrology. A forest, being
composed of living organisms, is a dynamic entity that is in a continuous process of change,
growth, and decay.
21. Forest management is defined here as the manipulation of forests to produce a deter-
mined set of forest products and services both material and immaterial, as demanded by society.
It is important to note that desired products and services are constantly changing along with the
values and well-being of the population at large. It is therefore assumed here that the task of de-
fining the goals of forest management should be left to political processes. An observable trend
has been that the “the set of forest products and services” explicitly demanded by society has
been expanding continuously.
22. Sustainable forestry or sustainable forest management (SFM) is the type of forest man-
agement that can be continued over time as defined as the result of the policy process. The word
“continue” implies here that the Total Economic Value (TEV) (see Figure 2.2) of the stock of
forest resources has to be at least constant through time, or, if the stock is capable of technologi-
cal augmentation, the TEV of the flow of goods and services produced by forests has to be con-
stant or rising through time (see Box 2.1).
Box 2.1 International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) Definition of SFM
Sustainable forest management is the process of managing forests to achieve one or more clearly speci-
fied objectives of management with regard to the production of a continuous flow of desired forest
products and services without undue reduction of its inherent values and future productivity and with-
out undue undesirable effects on the physical and social environment.
23. Factors that affect the ability to continue or sustain forest management can be classified as
economic, ecological, and social. The main economic principle of sustainability is for activities to
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create at least as many benefits as the costs they incur. This means that SFM must be profitable in
order to be continued. In traditional analyses, economic criteria have been maximised under the
constraints of ecological and social criteria. It should be noted that other criteria could also be
maximised under the profitability constraint. It is important to note again that the current defini-
tion of SFM (as with the concept of forest management) is ultimately assumed to depend on the
present values of society which are operationalised through political processes.
24. There have been several efforts to operationalise the concept of SFM. These include the
ITTO Criteria and Indicators, the Helsinki and Montreal processes (see Box 2.2), and the Ta-
rapoto proposal. These attempts have defined relevant and analytically feasible criteria and meas-
urable or descriptive indicators, commonly known as Criteria and Indicators or “C&I” for
SFM.
Box 2.2 Criteria for Sustainable Forest Management According to the Montreal Pro-
cess
• Maintenance of forest health and vitality
• Conservation of biological diversity
• Maintenance of forest productivity
• Conservation of soil and water resources
• Maintenance of forest contribution to global carbon cycles
• Maintenance of long-term socioeconomic benefits
• Legal, institutional, and economic framework for forest conservation and sustainable development
25. The ITTO criteria for SFM are presented in Figure 2.1. At the national level, generic C&I
are further specified to reflect local situations. In Finland, for example, some 160 quantitative and
descriptive indicators have been chosen to describe the status and changes in the sustainability of
forest management.
26. It is clear that SFM is a truly complex concept, with no panacea or simple solutions for
implementing it in practice. The multitude of products and services provided by forests imply that
there cannot be a single maximisation or optimisation criterion (e.g., wood production, biodiver-
sity conservation, or CO2 sequestration) that could be used in operationalising SFM. In maxi-
mising or maintaining the social net value of the forest, an optimum mix of products can be de-
fined, which is specific to particular local conditions.
27. UnSFM refers to forest management that fails to not reflect the current values of society,
and/or leads to a long-term decrease in the total value of products and services produced by for-
ests. Forest management that ignores some forest values can also generally be considered
UnSFM. This is typified by forest management regimes dedicated only to the production of tim-
ber. It is assumed here that the substitution products and services should be allowed, provided it
does not cause irreversible changes (e.g., species extinction). It is also assumed that the appropri-
ate spatial level for assessing any changes in total value is at the ecosystem level or an entire na-
tional territory and not, for example, a forest holding or forest management unit.
FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY. 
7
Figure 2.1 ITTO Criteria for Sustainable Forest Management
Criterion #1
Enabling conditions for
sustainable
forest management
Criterion #5
Biological diversity
Criterion #4
Flow of forest produce
Sustainable
management
of natural
tropical forests
Criterion #2
Forest resource
security
Criterion #6
Soil and water
Criterion #3
Forest ecosystem
health and condition
Criterion #7
Economic, social,
and cultural aspects
28. Deforestation refers to the change in land use from forests to other land uses or depletion
of forest crown cover to less than 10 percent (FAO 1995).
29. Forest degradation refers to changes that negatively affect the capacity of the forest to
produce products and services or reduce the values of the forest. In most cases, forest degradation
constitutes a gradual reduction of biomass, changes in species composition, and soil degradation,
rather than a decrease in the area of woody vegetation (FAO 1995).
30. Afforestation means planting of previously denuded or otherwise non-forested land with
trees.
31. Reforestation means replanting with trees an area which has been a forest but has been
cleared (e.g., due to logging).
32. Forest values are all the values attached to a forest. Economic value, also called actual
use value, is defined as the sum of the discounted present values of the flows of all the goods and
services (Freeman 1993). Economic valuation measures human preferences (Peterson and Brown
1995), i.e., the economic value is inherently anthropocentric. According to Pearce and Turner
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(1990), the total economic value includes the actual use values plus option value plus non-use
values. The non-use values also include existence values that measure the human preference on
the existence of, for example, species.
33. Not all values can be measured in economic terms. The total value of forestry includes
total economic value and so-called intrinsic values. Intrinsic value is the inherent value of some-
thing, e.g., species, regardless of any human preferences. It has also been argued that both exis-
tence and intrinsic values cannot be estimated or are claimed to be infinite. The only way intrinsic
value may be measured for the purposes of economic analysis is via nonuse values; i.e. a person's
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for forest conservation can readily be influenced by the view that a
"forest" has a right to exist. This is of course a narrow view of intrinsic value, particularly in view
of difficulties related to WTP studies.
34. This typology of values of natural resources, also applicable to forests, is summarised in
Figure 2.2. The associated costs related to various values are related either to the costs of produc-
tion or maintenance of these values or the opportunity costs for losing these values.
Figure 2.2 Typology of Values of Natural Resources
Tangible Nontangible
Direct use value Indirect use value
Actual use value
= economic value
Option value Bequest value
Use value
Existence value
Nonuse value
= passive use value
Total economic value
= secondary value
- based on human preferences
- anthropocentric approach
Intrinsic value
= primary value
- bio- or ecocentric approach
Total value
Adapted from Turner et al. 1994.
35. Based on the above typology an example of a set of forest products and services de-
manded by society is presented in Box 2.3.
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Box 2.3 Forest Products and Services (example)
1. USE VALUES
1.1 Direct use value = products and services with market value
1.1.1 Tangible products
1.1.1.1 Wood
1.1.1.1.2 Saw and peeler logs
1.1.1.1.3 Pulpwood
1.1.1.1.4 Firewood
1.1.1.1.5 Other timber
1.1.1.2 Game
1.1.1.2.1 Meat
1.1.1.2.2 Hides and skins
1.1.1.2.3 Other
1.1.1.3 Resin, gums, and other extracts
1.1.1.4 Fruits, nuts, berries, edible roots, edible leaves
1.1.1.5 Other non-timber forest products
1.1.2 Non-tangible services
1.1.2.1 Tourism and commercial recreation
1.1.2.2 Other
1.2. Indirect use value = products and services without market value
1.2.1 Tourism and recreation
1.2.2 Amenity (landscape)
1.2.3 Ground for research and education
1.2.4 Conservation of cultural heritage
1.2.5 Soil conservation
1.2.6 Ground water conservation
1.2.7 Surface water flow buffering (flood prevention)
1.2.8 Life support systems
1.2.9 Carbon sequestration
1.2.10  Conversion of waste and effluents
1.2.11  Noise reduction
1.3 Products and services with option value
2. NONUSE VALUES
2.1 Existence value
2.1.1 Biodiversity, species habitats
2.1.2 Wilderness areas
2.2 Forestry as a Multipurpose Activity
36. Most of the international debate on sustainable forestry or sustainable forest management
has been revolving around the question “What is forestry or what should it be: conservation or
production?” Traditionally, forestry was mainly about the production of wood, even though other
uses have also been locally important (e.g., hunting). Many forestry professionals and environ-
mentalists alike think that not much has changed in this respect. Many more foresters, however,
and society in general, seem to think that the forestry of today comprises much more than wood
and trees. To them it is a science, an art, and  an industry that deals with everything to do with the
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management of forests, as well as trees outside the forest proper. In short, forestry has increas-
ingly adopted multiple objectives.
37. In this report, it is assumed that forests are always multipurpose (or multiple-use) man-
agement units. The broad categories of forest functions are ecological, economic, and social. The
approach taken here is anthropocentric, however, acknowledging the existence of intrinsic values
of forest ecosystems and individual species.
38. The assumed multipurpose nature of forests means that both production and conservation
forests are simultaneously providing a wide array of products and services to people -  locally,
regionally, and globally. An example of the multiple products and services of typical conserva-
tion and production forests is presented in Table 2.1. The listing is only illustrative and, in prac-
tice, the multiple objectives have to be defined in detail, based on site-specific local conditions.
Different types of forests have different potentials to contribute to various goods and services
which is also influenced by the prevailing social and economic conditions.
Table 2.1 Examples of Multiple Products and Services of Typical Conservation and
Production Forests
Conservation forest Production forest
• Wood
• Recreation / amenity • Recreation / amenity*
• Biodiversity conservation • Biodiversity conservation*
• CO2 storage • CO2 sequestration and storage*
• Ground water retention • Ground water retention
• Surface water buffering • Surface water buffering
• Non-timber products (if allowed) • Non-timber products*
• Local income from tourism • Income from employment
• Existence value • Existence value*
*secondary products
39. Even the most intensively managed tree plantation produces products and services (at
least CO2 sequestration) other than just the main targeted product (e.g., pulpwood). Similarly, the
strictest possible conservation area also provides spin-off services to people outside the manage-
ment area (e.g., water retention).
40. In most cases there are tradeoffs between the various products and services. The impor-
tance of these tradeoffs and the substitutability of the products and services have been debated
intensively (Pearce & Turner 1990, Tietenberg 1994). For example, there is a tradeoff between
maximising production of wood fiber (e.g., in intensive monoculture eucalyptus plantations) and
at the same time maximising CO2 sequestration and biodiversity conservation or the production
of non-timber forest products. The quantification of such tradeoffs has proven to be difficult.
Furthermore, the tradeoffs are site specific, making general estimations problematic.
41. It is to be noted that forests, as a distinct land use category, are in a constant dynamic re-
lationship with other land uses, and involve synergies and conflicts. In particular developing
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countries have to meet their immediate needs often involves tradeoffs between alternative land
uses. The expansion of agricultural frontiers often takes place at the cost of forest conversion.
Part of such forest clearing, however,  may be necessary and appropriate to achieve national de-
velopment goals (Kaimowitz et al. 1998).
42. Such decision should be guided by the principles of sustainable development. At the same
time SFM addresses how to manage forests to meet their various multiple purposes
43. The notion of scale is important when considering forestry as a land-use option vis-à-vis
other uses that may offer higher apparent returns on investment. Forest areas are often so large
and their biological potential so varied that their large-scale conversion would not be forthcoming
through investment. The reasons are that the actual returns would gradually become lower, and
investment capital requirements would be too high to get funded, while the respective production
increase in agriculture would not necessarily be absorbed by the market at remunerative prices
due to excess supply. Much of deforestation takes place therefore, not because of capital inten-
sive investment but by extensive slash-and-burn practices, which are being applied as part of
policy outcomes. If forests were maintained, their sustainable management would be less capital
intensive than conversion into modern agriculture. Evidence suggests that when the opportunity
cost of both capital and labor can be increased, deforestation seems to slow down. In other places,
where alternative returns to labor and capital remain low, deforestation rates remain high (Kai-
mowitz et al. 1998).
2.3 Financing of SFM
44. Forestry has a number of well-known characteristics, which makes financing of invest-
ment more complex than in most other sectors. These characteristics include:
(a) long rotation periods (from 6 to more than 100 years), which represent a source of risk
and which mean that benefits are not necessarily reaped by the owner of the resource
but instead are passed to the next generations;
(b) uneven distribution of benefits and costs over time as initial investment outlays can be
large, annual management costs relatively small, and most of the revenue (if not all)
occurs at the end of the rotation period (typically in afforestation and reforestation);
(c) the importance of non-market benefits (public goods), particularly environmental
services, which have not been possible to capitalise by investors1; and
(d) the various use rights of forest resources (customary and formal) may be poorly de-
fined, or are in conflict with each other, which influences the rights of forest dwelling
people but which also makes investment a complicated and risky exercise.
45. These characteristics make forestry quite different from other land uses, particularly agri-
culture, where similar problems of long-term financing are not encountered. In particular, the link
between investor and beneficiary is direct in agriculture and non-market benefits play no or a
limited role. There are also important similarities, however,  such as maintenance of landscape
values.
                                                
1 Some investors may capture environmental services, e.g. through carbon trades.
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46. The perception of problems (a) and (b) changes when a departure is taken from the one-
hectare model of analysis and an entire forest management unit is considered as a going concern
or business entity. Such a unit typically has a forest structure, which allows regular (annual)
revenue that is partly reinvested. On the other hand, if a comparison is made between efficient,
capital intensive agriculture and forest activities under distorted market conditions with inappro-
priate pricing structures, it is clear that investors give a preference to agriculture. However, were
the market conditions and incentives appropriate, sustainable forestry can be an efficient and
profitable activity.
47. The problem of financing of SFM is not so much a matter of flows or instruments per se,
but rather:
• how the current flows could be directed from unsustainable to sustainable forestry,
and
• how the necessary preconditions for investment can be met reflecting the different
time preferences of investors and society related to various forest-based benefits.
48. Analyses of the tradeoffs between sustained yield logging and conservation in tropical
forests have revealed that traditional unsustainable logging, of one or a few highly valuable spe-
cies, is two to five times more profitable than logging in a way that would ensure sustained yield
supply of the same species (Rice et al. 1997, Bowles et al. 1998). The same authors drew the
conclusion that sustained yield logging would simply make logging company’s operational costs
unfeasible. A better strategy than sustained yield logging would therefore be to continue the se-
lective logging as before. At the same time, it would  persuade the logging companies to set aside
sizeable, mainly commercially inoperable areas, which could be preserved. It should be noted,
however, that the definition of SFM used in this analysis was narrow, focusing on sustained yield
logging and ignoring the downstream value chain. The suggestion by Rice et al. (1997) may have
merits in some specific conditions, but they also involve important implicit assumptions, which
are not met in reality (e.g., no demand for land for other uses, substitutability of growing timber
stock, and other forms of capital). Furthermore, limitations of stand-level analysis for broader
policy conclusions should be duly considered.
49. The trouble with the multipurpose approach is that it makes any quantitative analysis ex-
tremely complicated. Furthermore, the invisible hand of the market has not been very successful
in turning multiple use forestry into a sustainable and profitable venture. In a perfect market, the
market mechanism should be able to allocate and channel sufficient or optimal amount of re-
sources/financing to the forestry sector and in particular to SFM. However, there are at least four
main reasons why this is not happening:
(1) Policy failures (“poor” policies) at local, national, regional, and global levels.
(2) Market failures (externalities, missing markets, and a lack of information and knowl-
edge).
(3) By its nature, SFM is defined by political processes. Market requirements, however,
are increasingly considered in these processes.
(4) Time scale: tree growth and other biological processes of the forest take long periods
of time, such that there are different generations of people involved in making any in-
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vestment in forestry and in reaping the eventual benefits (or bearing costs) of the in-
vestment.
50. The policy and market failures have resulted in a situation where SFM is not profitable for
the resource owner or resource manager. Deforestation is occurring precisely because it has been
profitable (Douglas and Magrath 1996). The private benefits and costs are different from the
benefits and costs accrued to society at local, national, regional, or global levels. The traditional
means to correct or alleviate policy and market failures have been various public incentive
mechanisms, often through various forms of subsidy.
51. However, environmental externalities may be taken as the valid justification for long or
medium-term subsidies provided that their efficiency and impact on distribution are desirable or
acceptable. On the side of positive externalities, forests produce a wide array of non-marketable
public goods that are precisely the source of the most important environmental externalities in
forestry (e.g., ground water storage, surface water buffering, biodiversity conservation, amenity,
and  CO2 storage and sequestration). These services can be provided at local, national, regional,
or global levels implying that the payment for these services (financing of the subsidies) should
be arranged at similar scales. Such payments can be arranged administratively (GEF, pollution
abatement subsidies) or through market internalisation. People, however, are not usually willing
to pay for public goods (because they can enjoy them for free), so environmental regulations are
often needed to create the necessary WTP. Examples of market internalisation of externalities
include carbon trading, timber certification, and bio-prospecting contracts. Such market meas-
ures, however,  require adequate regulatory measures, too.
52. The non-marketable benefits of forestry can be observed at different levels: global (biodi-
versity, CO2, etc.), cross-border (watershed management, biodiversity, reduced land degradation,
etc.), national (water supply, flood control, etc.), or local (drinking water supply, erosion control,
recreation, etc.). Each individual forest (as a management unit) has its own possibilities to con-
tribute to these various benefits depending on the local environmental and socioeconomic condi-
tions. The necessary mechanisms to make these benefits marketable or valued in decision-making
have to be developed accordingly. There are many problems involved in this process, not least
due to difficulties in separating global from national or local benefits, which are often indivisible.
In order to quantify such benefits as biodiversity, CO2, or water supply, some methodologies al-
ready exist but further work in this area is needed (Pearce et al., forthcoming). In specific country
conditions the key issue is who should pay for these benefits and how should their pricing be ad-
dressed.
53. In the same way as benefits are difficult to separate, there are also problems of cost allo-
cation, i.e., how the costs of SFM should be allocated to various multiple benefits. As proper
costing can be one element in establishing appropriate values for benefits, this issue needs to be
duly addressed. There are both conceptual and practical problems to do this, but their detailed
discussion is beyond the scope of this study.
54. The values of various non-market products and services may be difficult to express in ab-
solute terms, as their definition is often relative to other land use alternatives. In addition to
tradeoffs between forest products and services, such tradeoffs also exist between land use types.
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In addition, market mechanisms are not necessarily specific to the forestry sector but encompass
the entire economic systems at different levels (local, national, global), including the markets for
other competing sectors (e.g., agriculture, energy, etc.). This increases the complexity of adjust-
ing structural barriers.
55. Transfer payments are normally used in the mitigation of existing policy failures. By
definition, they should be a temporary measure reducing the impact of a “poor” policy. Risks as-
sociated with transfer payments are:
• their tendency to “buy time” for the policy failure, i.e., they tend to prevent necessary
policy reforms rather than promote them;
• the difficulty in repealing them once they are established; and
• they may lead to further policy distortions, which are even more difficult to resolve
than the original distortion.
56. Examples of national level transfer payments include differential land use taxes, log ex-
port taxes, and tree planting subsidies. Examples of international transfer payments include ODA
grants, debt-for-nature swaps, and various trust funds.
57. One especially important policy failure relating to SFM in the case of tropical forests in
many countries is unclear property rights, which increase the risk and uncertainty of the resource
users and managers. Insecure property rights and open access result in short-term profit maximi-
sation instead of long-term planning and investment. This is particularly problematic in the case
of forestry, which is a long-term venture. The applicability of the property rights approach in
multipurpose forestry is limited since many of the services (values) are inherently non-rival
and/or nonexclusive in use. In other words, they are public goods for which the property rights
are difficult to establish and even more difficult to enforce. In addition to property rights, there
are of course many other sources of policy failure that increase investment risk, and many of
them are macro-level issues (taxes, currency fluctuations, etc.).
FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS TO ACHIEVE SFM
3.1 Assessment of Financial Needs; 3.2 Characterisation of Financial Needs;
3.3 Commoditisation of Forest Benefits;
3.4 Beneficiaries and Recipients of SFM Financial Flows
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PART II. FOREST FUNDING – STATUS AND INSTRUMENTS
3. FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS TO ACHIEVE SFM
58. This chapter seeks to assess the global financing requirements for implementing SFM,
focusing on the developing world. The issue is first approached quantitatively. No original
analysis is contributed in this context; rather, rough estimates from recognised sources are briefly
reviewed. Preliminary conclusions are then drawn to serve as the basis for the remaining
sections’ qualitative assessment. Particular attention is paid to the various barriers that currently
prevent or restrict financial flows into SFM. Possible solutions and strategies for removing these
barriers are also identified. Of these, the ‘commoditisation’ of forest goods and services is
considered in some depth. Finally, the different beneficiaries and recipients of SFM financing are
identified.
59. The context of this analysis of SFM financing is the forestry sector. In this sense, SFM is
examined in counterpoint to unsustainable forms of forestry, and not in relation to wider land use
and economic development considerations. Therefore, the financing requirements for SFM
presented here are principally targeted at meeting the incremental costs of forest operators
adopting SFM practices, creating value for the non-market benefits supplied by SFM, and
addressing the perverse structural incentives that favor unsustainable forestry.2
3.1 Assessment of Financial Needs
60. This section gives a generalised view of the evolution of current financial flows into SFM
activities, as well as estimates of the overall financial resources required for the widespread
adoption of sustainable forestry. Many of the figures presented are derived from the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) process (UNCED 1992) and
from the Pretoria Workshop on Financial Mechanisms and Sources of Finance for Sustainable
Forestry (UNDP 1996), both of which have been criticised by some commentators for over-
stating the deficiencies in SFM financing. Due attention is therefore given to other estimates, and
contending viewpoints.
61. In this light, particular attention should be drawn to the concluding section (3.1.5) in
which the case is made that any identifiable need for additional finance is inseparable from the
need for qualitative shifts in market and policy structures at both international and national level.
Without such structural reforms to underpin the transition to SFM, mobilising additional
financing will have limited impacts and may even exacerbate SFM deficiencies.
3.1.1 Overview of Financial Flows
62. Financial flows are used in this report as a broad term integrating all the main forms of
capital flows among the various actors involved in forestry. At the global scale, it comprises two
main categories (World Bank 1997):
(1) ODA – grants, concessionary loans, and human resources; and
                                                
2 Thanks to David Pearce for this clarification.
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(2) private sector capital – debt and equity flows, foreign direct investment (FDI)
flows.3
63. In 1996, global financial flows from developed to developing countries totaled US$284.6
billion across all sectors, a 184 percent increase since 1990 (see Figure 3.1). Over the same
period, levels of ODA decreased by 27 percent in absolute terms, or from a share of 56 percent to
fewer than 15 percent of the total (see Figure 3.2). The dominant trend is thus the strong
emergence of the private sector in financial flows during the 1990s. Amongst other factors, this
has been attributed to (World Bank 1997, Bouton et al. 1997, UNDP 1997a):
• maturing private capital markets and improving macroeconomic management in
developing countries;
• increased borrowing from commercial banks; and
• investment reforms taken to attract FDI (and also portfolio equity investments).
Figure 3.1 Net Resource Flows to Low and Middle Income Countries
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Source: World Bank 1997
                                                
3 There are obviously other categories of financial flows such as those from NGOs, which although quantitatively
less on a global scale, are often important for funding specific activities.
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Figure 3.2 Relative Shares of Net Resource Flows
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3.1.2 Estimates of Required SFM Financial Flows
64. A comprehensive assessment of the financial requirements for the worldwide
implementation of SFM was carried out as part of the UNCED process.4 It was estimated that
annual flows to the forestry sector required for the years 1993 to 2000 were approximately
US$31.25 billion, of which 18percent or US$5.67 billion was to be in the form of concessionary
funding from ODA budgets.
65. In 1996, these UNCED figures were revised upwards to US$33 billion per year in the
context of the Pretoria Workshop on Financial Mechanisms and Sources of Finance for
Sustainable Forestry (UNDP 1996). This new estimate principally reflected the requirements of
capital equipment and infrastructure (37 percent of the total), the protection of non-timber forest
services (18.5 percent), and institutional development and capacity building (17 percent)
(Chandrasekharan 1996a).
66. In addition, some commentators have argued that these figures ignore the investment
required to counter or compensate for the ongoing depreciation of the world’s forest resources
                                                
4 In the UNCED context, these requirements were specifically related to the implementation of Chapter 11
(“Combating deforestation”) of the Agenda 21 document. The forestry components of other Agenda 21 chapters such
as those on land resource management (Chapter 10) or rural development (Chapter 14) are not included (UNCED,
1992).
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through deforestation and degradation (Chandrasekharan 1996a).5 The estimates, therefore,
indicate the magnitude of the required net rather than gross investment in SFM (for 1992).6 This
argument, however,  has been countered as being overly concerned with forestry and not placing
SFM in the context of wider land use concerns and values.7
67. Other quantitative studies that have been carried out have revealed requirements well
below the UNCED figures presented above. A 1994 ITTO study, for example, put the total
additional financing required to achieve the necessary ‘minimum’ improvements for widespread
implementation of SFM in the tropics at US$11.2 billion (cited in Richards 1998). 8 An earlier
1992 ITTO study had concluded a lower figure of US$330 million per year. However, direct
comparability of these varying results is hindered by the widely different methodologies and
assumptions used.
3.1.3 Estimates of Current SFM Financial Flows
68. Accurate data on financial flows to the forestry sector (rather than specifically to
promoting SFM) are only available for up to 1993 (Joshi 1997). However, as mentioned above,
what is important in this context is not so much the actual figures but the trends, and there is little
evidence to suggest that these trends have significantly changed since 1993. Total gross annual
investment in developing countries’ forest sectors was estimated at US$20.4 billion
(Chandrasekharan 1996a).9
69. In 1993, bilateral and multilateral ODA devoted to forestry amounted to US$1.54 billion,
equivalent to 7.5 percent of this total (FAO 1995). Other estimates have put the private sector’s
contribution, both domestic and foreign, at US$8-10 billion, although targeted largely at
plantations and downstream forest-based industries (Chandrasekharan 1997). As such, the often
substantial ‘in kind’ inputs from small-scale operations at the community level in tree planting
and forest management may not have been duly considered. Nevertheless, as broad-brush
approximations these figures suggest that somewhere around US$10 billion can be attributed to
domestic public sector investments.
                                                
5 Although they did include the assumption that deforestation would be contained at 1992/3 levels. Note also that the
IPF debated on the valuation of deforestation as depreciation, and it was not included in the IPF’s own report.
6 The ‘disinvestment’ associated with depreciating forest stock was estimated to be in the order of US$36 billion per
year (though it should be noted that as capital depreciation is brought under control, the required investment will be
progressively reduced). The required gross investment for the implementation of global SFM was therefore estimated
to be of the order of US$69.3 billion every year (Chandrasekharan 1996a). It should be noted that these calculations
originally applied up to the year 2000.
7 For example, if forests are cleared for oil palm plantations, this equates to disinvestment. If forests are cleared for
pine plantations, this does not. This is irrespective of their impacts and externalities on local communities and the
broader economy (R. Persson, pers. comm.).
8 These relate to: policy & legislation; enforcement & boundary defence; improved logging, sustained yield
assessment and monitoring; training, research, public education, etc.
9 If the argument described earlier is followed, that in addition there is an annual disinvestment through loss of forest
capital by deforestation estimated at US$45 billion, current financial flows to the forestry sector in the developing
world would constitute a negative net investment of the order of US$25 billion per year (Chandrasekharan 1996a).
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3.1.4 Identifying a Shortfall
70. As the global estimates of required SFM financial flows vary so widely, it is difficult to
clearly identify a quantitative shortfall in levels of SFM financing, although the UNCED figures
do reveal some discrepancy between estimates of current and required resources.
Domestic Investment
71. Domestic financing is particularly problematic. If the UNCED figures are taken at face
value, together with the stipulation that 80 percent of total resources should be mobilised
domestically from both public and private sources (UNCED 1992), it seems probable that current
domestic financial flows in the developing world do reflect a substantial shortfall, particularly as
there is little evidence of SFM practices being adopted. 10
72. Further evidence suggests the domestic public sector share is likely to continue to fall as a
percentage of total investment, as governments’ role in forest management and related operations
is reduced or out-sourced to the private sector (Crossley 1998; Landell-Mills et al. 1998). The
degree to which localised private sector investment can be promoted both in addition to and
substituting for the state is uncertain, not least because quantitative data is hard to obtain.
73. Some commentators, however,  have argued that these deficiencies do not equate to an
insufficient level of funding in the forestry sector. Repetto & Sizer (1996), for example, contend
that “the forestry sector should not only be self-financing; it should generate resources to cover
development expenses in other sectors of the economy.” Their argument is that structural
deficiencies in the form of policy and market failures prevent governments from capturing
adequate levels of economic rent from their forest concessions. Indeed, the same structural
failures actively create incentives for private sector investors to derive windfall profits from
short-term unsustainable exploitation of natural forest resources.11
74. According to this argument, mobilising additional financing is not therefore the priority.
Attention should instead be concentrated on implementing policies, particularly at the national
level, to capture already existing financial resources, which can subsequently be reinvested into
SFM. In this sense, the need for additional financing is not quantitative but qualitative.
Foreign Investment
75. Also envisaged as part of the UNCED estimates on SFM financing was that over US$5
billion should come from bi- and multilateral ODA budgets (UNCED 1992). The US$1.54 billion
annual ODA flows (1993 figures) fall clearly below this suggested requirement, and, given
current trends (illustrated by Figure 3.3), it seems unlikely that this shortfall will be redressed.
                                                
10 In this context, the 80 percent stipulation refers to the implementation of Chapter 11 of the Agenda 21 document –
see earlier.
11 It is worth noting that some critics go a stage further in questioning whether even redressing these failures would
make SFM profitable. Conservation International, for example, has argued that a more effective conservation
strategy would be to allow natural forests to be logged over once so that they can then be bought cheaply by
conservationists and protected in perpetuity (Rice et al. 1997)
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76. Conversely, trends suggest that foreign private sector direct and portfolio investments in
the forestry sector have been rising sharply (World Bank 1997).12 However, it is difficult to make
a clear quantitative assessment of foreign private sector investment as flows are problematic to
track, so appropriate data remain scarce. Furthermore, as most foreign private direct investment is
still via transnational corporations, the distinction between foreign and domestic capital blurs as
many transnational corporations operate through partner or subsidiary national companies. There
are also issues relating to the type of forestry activities supported by the private sector and
whether or not they fall within the term SFM, as well as the unequal distribution of private sector
investments across the developing world (e.g., ODI 1997).
Figure 3.3 ODA Flows to Forestry
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3.1.5 Preliminary Conclusions
77. As Section 3.1.4 reflects, there is some controversy as to whether additional financing
needs to be mobilised for SFM, or whether efforts and resources should be focused on making the
sector self-supporting financially through structural reforms aimed at improving rent capture. It is
an underlying assumption of this report that the need for additional financing and the need for
structural reforms are, in fact, the two principal components of a single coherent and
comprehensive forest financing strategy.
78. There is a wealth of evidence and research (much of which is reviewed in following
sections) which supports the argument that insufficient resource capture and allocation by
                                                
12 This holds true for natural resource development activities in general (e.g., UNDP 1997).
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national forest administrations is one of the root causes behind the limited implementation of
SFM (e.g., Douglas & Magrath 1996). As a result of these and other perverse structural
incentives, private sector resources are being channeled into unsustainable operations and will
continue to do so as long as these incentives remain. There is also broad agreement that, for
whatever reason, the availability of public sector funds for direct investment into forestry is
declining at both national and international levels, and that additional financing for SFM at the
operational level is required as a consequence. This slack is being picked up by the private sector
and will continue to be.
79. With this in mind, and irrespective of the scale of the financing shortfall, the following
broad conclusions can be drawn:
(1) Private sector investments in forestry operations are rising relative to the
availability of public sector resources. As a result, it seems clear that any
quantitative shortfall in financing SFM operations will be redressed through the
mobilisation of private sector finance,
(2) In this regard, a key leverage role can be played by targeting ODA and domestic
public sector resources at removing international and national market barriers to
private sector engagement with SFM, and developing and promoting financial
mechanisms and instruments to this same end,
(3) In terms of the type of forestry activity engaged in, and particularly its
sustainability, the private sector’s operations generally respond to, and are
channeled by, structural conditions in the forestry sector. Currently, the investment
environment framed by government policies and institutions in the developing
world predominantly favors UnSFM relative to SFM,
(4) Qualitative changes are thus required both to redress market and policy failures so
as to facilitate private sector investment flows and to improve the revenue
generation capacity and hence financial sustainability of the forestry sector, 13
(5) In this light it would seem appropriate for the international donor community to
adjust its priorities so as to target financial and technical resources at the removal
of structural barriers to SFM investment at both national and international levels,
and at boosting the capacity of the forestry sector to manage private sector
financial flows. In this way ODA forestry budgets, which ultimately comprise a
relatively small slice of the estimated required financial resources for SFM, can
fulfill an essential leveraging function.
80. The basis of these conclusions lies in the fact that they highlight the different quantitative
and qualitative aspects of SFM financing. They refute the traditional argument that the panacea
for forestry lies in additional resources being made available from the international donor
community, for redressing shortfalls in the levels of SFM financing will fall largely to the private
sector. This requires, however, an investment environment that both enables private sector
involvement, and ensures such involvement is channeled into SFM rather than UnSFM. This is
                                                
13 Although undeniably optimistic, there is also the possibility that structural reforms oriented towards promoting
private sector investment in SFM could develop into a virtuous circle as increased returns to the state through
appropriate valuation, fiscal and incentive regimes permits further structural reforms in the sector, etc.
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equally true at both a global and national scale and is the principal role for concessionary public
sector finance.14
81. The above basic assumptions will doubtlessly  be challenged. It should, however, be made
clear that they form the basis of much of the research findings and analysis that follows in the
remainder of this report, which can therefore be regarded as a comprehensive set of answers to
the following two key questions:
• How can private sector investments in the forestry sector be most effectively
leveraged, and what role could the donor community play?
• What conditions are needed to ensure that such investments are channeled into SFM
rather than UnSFM activities?
82. As a final note, it should be recognised that this research focus is inherently limiting in so
far as it looks at different types of activities within the forestry sector as a whole, and in particular
at the many factors influencing UnSFM over SFM (and vice versa); it does not, to the same
degree, look at the relationships between forestry and other forms of land use. There are many
extensive studies of this issue by the World Bank, FAO, and others, particularly with regards the
root causes and economics of forest conversion. However, as the underlying remit of this study is
to examine ways of improving the attractiveness of investments in SFM as a land use type, any
conclusions drawn should also be relevant to the mitigation of forest conversion.
3.2 Characterisation of Financial Needs
83. In this section the assumptions on SFM financing described above are characterised in
more detail. In particular, attention is paid to delineating the respective roles of the public and
private sectors at both the international and national levels. It should be recognised that the basis
of the analysis is very much what ‘could’ be happening as opposed to what ‘is’ realistically likely
to happen. The central objective is to identify and classify the main factors constraining financial
flows into SFM and to suggest possible solutions and funding targets for both the donor
community and national public sector actors.
3.2.1 Overview
84. Creating an ‘enabling environment’ for SFM investment is synonymous with removing
barriers to the implementation of SFM. The process of removing barriers, in and of itself,
requires financial resources and hence is the principal ‘financial need’ characterised in this
section.
85. Components of the enabling environment for SFM investment can be broadly classified as
structural or operational:
• Structural components can be either prerequisite, facilitative, or complementary to
direct investment in SFM activities ‘on the ground’. In essence, their objective is to
                                                
14 This has been both explicitly and implicitly accepted by much of the donor community, including the development
banks (ODI, 1996).
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establish an environment conducive to the development of SFM and to provide an
appropriate framework for attracting investment.
• Operational components relate more specifically to the project level and are thus
more relevant to the forestry operators and managers themselves. Generally, they
ensure that these actors can realise their objectives, be they profit, subsistence, or
whatever, through SFM activities. They cover the whole lifecycle of a typical forestry
investment from project identification and preparation, through implementation and
management, to post-project monitoring.
86. This structural-operational distinction is somewhat arbitrary; inevitably there is substantial
overlap. Indeed, in many cases, operational components form a specialised subset of the
structural whole.15
3.2.2 Structural Requirements
87. Developing the many structural components of an appropriate framework for SFM
investment represents a considerable challenge but is a prerequisite for ensuring the widespread
adoption of sustainable forestry, particularly if there is a need to attract outside investment to
promote the development of this sector. Significant resources – financial, social, and
technological – are required over the long-term, and returns are often indirect and unrecoverable.
By their very nature, therefore, many of these structural requirements must be met by public-
sector or some other concessionary funding.
88. Typically, structural requirements will comprise the following:
• Policy – an effective and appropriate policy and regulatory framework; i.e., a
clearly defined forest policy, integrated with other sectoral policies, especially
with regards land use allocation issues;
• Legal – clear legal framework, particularly with regards land tenure rights and
allocation; including effective enforcement procedures and structures;
• Political – stable political arena; transparent, participatory and democratic
decision-making processes;
• Institutional – functioning institutions, i.e., streamlined public-private sector
interface, ongoing capacity building to increase efficiency of public bodies, and
effective organisation of private sector actors to represent and promote their
interests; 16
• Market – adequate market infrastructure, including appropriate level of
government intervention (generally low);
• Fiscal – well-conceived objective-led tax/subsidy regime (i.e., incentives/
disincentives); and
• Macroeconomic – stable macroeconomic horizon conducive to investors.
                                                
15 This particularly applies to the commoditisation argument in Section 3.2.3.
16 Interface refers to the institutional point at which public sector and private sector interact – this could be a
government investment promotion agency, appropriate fiscal or regulatory bodies, development or planning offices,
etc.
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89. Specific examples of these structural requirements are listed in Table 3.1. For clarity, the
categories listed above have been grouped into policy (which includes legal and political
components), institutional, and market (which includes fiscal and macroeconomic components).
As mentioned above, many such requirements absorb often significant financial resources. In
cases where these resources are not available, the requirements listed below are unmet and
become barriers to SFM investment. Table 3.1 also includes some possible solutions as to how
these barriers can be overcome.
90. The implementation of these structural components falls predominantly to the national
level, although will of course depend on individual countries’ sovereignty settlements in relation
to both sub-national and supra-national bodies. The principal role of foreign finance, particularly
ODA, is in supporting national-level structural development processes such as nfps. Those
measures that can be directly addressed at the international level are specified.
91. A further subset of structural requirements relates to facilitating involvement of small-
scale noncommercial forest users and stakeholders such as subsistence farmers, rural
communities, and NGOs, all of which represent or can mobilise local people, provide and
disseminate information, and be involved in SFM research, training, and implementation
activities. Barriers in this case tend to be more conventional than financial. This is because
centralised institutions are accustomed to dealing with large-scale forestry investors and operators
- often unwittingly demanding conditions that cannot be met by small-scale interests. Removing
such barriers, therefore, relates closely to changing perceptions (see below). Other options
include:
• project funding windows within existing institutions to deal specifically with
NGO/CBO project proposals; 17 and
• promotion of mechanisms to facilitate partnerships between small-scale operators and
large-scale investors.
92. In addition, there is an informational requirement for SFM whose importance is
constantly reinforced by key actors including forest users and managers, potential investors, and
relevant government departments.18 Often available information is inappropriately presented,
misinformed, misdirected, or simply not well researched. This dearth of ‘good’ information,
particularly regarding investment opportunities, constitutes a major barrier to SFM (Gentry 1996)
and should be addressed at both global and national scales. Possible solutions include:
• integrated research, e.g., inventories of forest resources and economic analyses of
how they can be sustainably managed;
• creation of information clearing-houses, effective dissemination, and extension
services, e.g., within the structure of the nfp; and
• support for project packaging and presentation to match investors’ interests.
93. The lack of appropriate information on SFM relates closely to another major barrier to
investment, which is the investors’ own perception of SFM, and indeed of forestry in general,
which tends to be one of a high-risk, long-gestation, low-return investment opportunity. In many
                                                
17 Community-based organisations.
18 Including multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, IFC, and UNDP contacted as part of this research.
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cases, such concerns are misplaced. In other cases, they may be valid, but can be addressed
through information and awareness campaigns targeted at, for example, institutional investors or
the capital markets in general.
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Table 3.1 General Examples of National Level Structural Requirements for SFM
Category Requirements Possible options for meeting requirements
appropriate strategic
investment framework
mainline investment strategies within sectoral development
plans (e.g., nfp); inclusion of sectoral financing facilities
within generic development plans (e.g., NEAP, NSDS)
secure land tenure
arrangements
Consultative reform / long-term stabilisation of property rights
regime ensuring open access to land for local populations
where necessary
clear and enforceable
forest policy
multi-stakeholder awareness campaigns; streamlined judicial
process for forest policy infringements; enforced penalties
clear definition of public
and private sectors’ roles
and responsibilities
Public-private consultative process leading to: consensual
definition of roles, corresponding investment agency structure,
criteria for private sector forestry investments, and defined
scope of public sector interventions
Policy
(including legal
and political)
improved rent capture for
public-sector forestry
operations
appropriate valuation (see under market requirements),
hypothecation of forestry revenues for reinvestment in
removing structural barriers
forest accounting
methodologies to value
full range of forest
resources
user/service fees, e.g., water, carbon sequestration, support for
incremental costs of initial transition to SFM, and of global
externalities (e.g., via objective-led revolving funds)
appropriate national
accounting systems
changes in natural capital stocks to be recognised
dynamic and efficient
public-private sector
interface
creation of autonomous investment and forest management
agency with private sector expertise; staff recruitment from
private sector
improved absorption
capacity for
concessionary funding
(e.g., ODA)
reduce bureaucracy, consolidate/harmonise relevant rules and
regulations, streamline project approval cycle, increase
involvement of local operators, and autonomise/decentralise
implementation bodies
Institutional
coherency between
relevant policy
departments
strategic coordinating policy body; systematic meetings and
information-exchange between departments
emerging market and
forestry-related risk
mitigation mechanisms
strategic planning, e.g., nfps, market development and
capacity-building, provision of investment risk guarantees;
longer grace periods for concessionary funding (to meet
perception about long-gestation period), and conditions to
promote value-chain investing
incentives for SFM /
disincentives for UnSFM
identify perverse subsidies; reform / restructure tax and
subsidy regime to encourage shift from undesirable UnSFM
activities to desirable SFM activities; provide appropriate
indirect subsidies, e.g., contractual supply guarantees
Market
(including  fiscal
and macro-
economic)
adequate market
infrastructure
e.g., public sector investment in processing, distribution, and
storage infrastructure for forest products where appropriate
(see section 3.2.3); also relates to capital market infrastructure,
e.g., stock market category for forestry
Sources: Chandrasekharan 1996b, Richards 1998, Frumhoff et al. 1998, Laarman 1997, Gentry 1996
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94. However, negative perceptions cut both ways. In many countries government departments
and small-scale forest users tend to be skeptical and thus resistant to the motives of private sector
investors and operators. Again, in some cases this is justified, in others not. Amongst other
things, removing these perceptual barriers requires an appropriate regulatory framework,
including operational and investment criteria, so that private sector interests act within acceptable
bounds as defined by policy-makers through widespread consultation with stakeholders.
3.2.3 Operational Requirements  – SFM vs. UnSFM
95. To understand the operational requirements of SFM, it is first necessary to identify the
different components of SFM activities in comparison to UnSFM and then, to determine which
components represent costs and which benefits. Such an analysis should provide an indication of
the incremental implementing costs, and their effects on profit margins, of sustainable forestry
operations.
96. Table 3.2 provides a comparison between the principal cost components of a typical
unsustainable and sustainable medium- to large-scale forestry operation. It should be stressed that
this is an example only, and it is not intended to represent all forestry operations, particularly not
those at a smaller scale. However, Table 3.2 illustrates types of operation which are likely to
attract private sector investment  - a focus of this study. Also included are the principal benefits
(in a broad sense) of the two types of operations, over both the short and long terms.
97. As Table 3.2 clearly shows, there are a wide range of additional costs that must be met by
the sustainable forest manager. These incremental costs constitute a key barrier to SFM,
particularly as many are incurred in the pre-operational phase of the investment. Removing this
barrier is an area where public sector concessionary funding could exercise substantial leverage,
particularly in ensuring the market and non-market-based valuation of the full range of forest
goods and services. In this regard, market “commoditisation” and the structural conditions it
requires are discussed at length in the next section. Financing mechanisms to derive non-market-
based values are considered in Chapters 5 and 6.
98. Some of the key operational requirements needed for the widespread adoption of SFM
practices, including those relating to commoditisation, are summarised in Table 3.3. It should be
noted that some – particularly those relating to market infrastructure – substantially overlap with
some of the structural requirements described in the previous section. As discussed earlier, most
of these requirements relate to pre-operational investments in planning and training, and access to
technical assistance. Operational-phase requirements depend much more on the specific
circumstances of the forestry operation in question. Following the same argument outlined in
Section 3.2.2, since most of these requirements are not being met at present, they can be regarded
as barriers to SFM. Options for their removal are therefore also shown in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.2 Comparison of Activities in Typical Large-scale Sustainable and
Unsustainable Forestry Operations
Unsustainable
forestry
Sustainable forestry
land or forest rights
acquisition
land or forest rights acquisition
develop information base – e.g., forest inventory, surveying, mapping
management plan – strategic
integration/consideration of forest services other than timber production,
including: biodiversity protection, carbon storage, soil and watershed
protection, landscape beauty
participatory involvement of stakeholders
environmental impact assessment of planned activities
management plan –
cursory
fire prevention and control measures
roads and
infrastructure –
unplanned
roads and infrastructure – planned
Pr
e-
op
er
at
io
na
l
Equipment
procurement
equipment procurement
laborLabor
training
work scheduling and supervision (e.g., quality and volume of inputs and
production outputs, impact on residual stand and the environment, etc.)
implementation of activities in management plan not directly related to
timber production (biodiversity protection, carbon storage, soil and
watershed protection, landscape beauty)
marketing – general / specialisedMarketing – general
certification
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l
Sales sales
short- and long-term monitoring of forest status and environmental
conditions, research
C
os
ts
Post opera-
tional
ongoing stakeholder consultation and involvement
timber timber – might include lesser known species
fuel wood and
charcoal
fuel wood and charcoalShort
term
some NTFPs NTFPs
forest services – e.g., watershed protection, soil conservation, Carbon
storage, biodiversity protection, landscape beauty/amenity value
social benefits and stability, positive economic benefits
B
en
ef
its
Long term
Reduced service
provision due to
slower recovery rates,
higher soil erosion,
higher mortality, etc. better residual stand for future operations/activities
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Table 3.3 Examples of Operational Requirements for SFM
CATEGORY REQUIREMENTS POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR MEETING REQUIREMENTS
Research, e.g., multiple-
objective forest inventories
Dissemination mechanisms (e.g., extension services) for existing
information and research methodologies; collaboration with
research bodies / NGOs
Additional capital
investments, e.g., in
comprehensive management
plans
Incremental cost support for transitional phase to SFM, particularly
for global benefits of forests; packaging of different financial
investments streams (concessionary/commercial, etc.); credit
facilities for micro-investors; investment guarantee facilities
Technical assistance Extension services; identification and facilitation of appropriate
knowledge and skills resources; technology transfer
Pre-operational
Participation of local
stakeholders
Development of appropriate methodologies for private sector
operators
Training and technical
assistance
Extension services; identification and facilitation of appropriate
knowledge and skills resources; technology transfer
Stand regeneration and
tending
Ensuring that appropriate silviculture systems are established and
that they are made financially viable.Operational
Marketing and sales
assistance
Brokerage/packaging of project outputs for sale (e.g., through
public sector forest investment agency); price guarantees for
noncommercial investors
Post-operational Monitoring
Collaboration with local communities; established dispute
resolution procedures; secure land tenure arrangements and
enforcement regimes (see Section 3.2.2)
3.3 Commoditisation of Forest Benefits
99. An effective mechanism for removing barriers to SFM, in line with the assumptions
underlying this report (see Section 3.1.6), is for the incremental cost barrier to be internalised and
accounted for within the investment itself. This can only be achieved through the creation and
development of a structural framework, which ensures that SFM activities offer higher rates of
return in relation to UnSFM.
100. The incremental costs of SFM generally relate to its more comprehensive treatment of the
forest resource, which in turn requires a wider range of activities and management components. It
is reasonable to assume that additional benefits in the form of financial remuneration should stem
from this same comprehensive treatment, which is derived from the recognition of the multiple
goods and services provided by forests.
101. As discussed in Chapter 2, an implicit component in this recognition is valuation. Much
recent research has focused on calculating and comparing the various costs and benefits of
sustainable and unsustainable forestry operations (see Table 3.2, and Box 3.1) in the context of
internalising environmental externalities. The terms of these analyses, however, are often
economic, in the broadest sense of the word, recognising values which may accrue to the global
or national economy but which often do not generate recoverable financial returns to those who
are directly responsible for providing these services – forest owners and managers.
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Box 3.1 Cost Comparison between Uncontrolled and Reduced Impact Logging
Much controversy has focused on the costs of sustainable selective logging activities in natural forest systems.
Considering that harvesting is often the most damaging (and expensive) activity in a forestry operation,
improving logging practice is a vital component of any sustainable management plan. Some advocates of reduced
impact logging  base their arguments on the evidently healthier residual stand following logging, and thus the
higher future crops that can be expected. This argument, however, is often undermined if the net present value of
these future crops is calculated using the discount rates prevalent amongst commercial concerns. Over a 30-to-60-
year rotation (typical of tropical moist forests), consideration of the forest’s health for the second rotation is at
least controversial in a conventional cost-benefit analysis (Richards 1998, Boscolo et al. 1998).
Any economic rationale for good forestry practices should thus focus on those benefits that accrue within a
shorter time frame. An analysis of the costs and benefits of reduced impact versus uncontrolled logging
operations often provides enough subsidies to justify the use of reduced impact harvesting techniques on the
grounds of operational costs alone.
It has to be pointed out, however, that during the transition phase between one logging system and the other, there
are higher costs associated with the uncertainties and lack of familiarity with the new system. Although this may
result in higher costs during this transitional phase, these costs should not be attributed to the use of low impact
harvesting techniques themselves for after the initial transition, it can be expected that logging operators will be
as efficient in the new system as they were in the previous one. Operations will then profit from the additional
benefits accruing from carefully planning and optimising harvesting activities.
TIMBER NONTIMBER
OPERATIONAL COSTS
Uncontrolled
logging
COMPARATIVE
COSTS
Reduced-impact
logging
OPERATIONAL COSTS
Uncontrolled
logging
COMPARATIVE
COSTS
Reduced-impact
logging
Planning Higher
Machinery Similar
Equipment maintenance Lower – due to optimisation
of use
Other operational costs (e.g.,
training, monitoring, stand
tending, etc.)
Higher
Labor – tractor drivers Lower – due to better
extraction plans
Labor – chainsaw operators Higher – due to directional
felling requirements
None (however costs might be
incurred through lack of
compliance with regulatory
regime, etc.)
Higher – implementation of
comprehensive ecosystem-
wide management plan
including planning,
monitoring, and
implementation of additional
operational activities.
BENEFITS
Uncontrolled
logging
COMPARATIVE BENEFITS
Reduced-impact logging
BENEFITS
Uncontrolled
logging
COMPARATIVE BENEFITS
Reduced-impact logging
Timber – in some cases fewer
trees harvested, due to
introduction of harvesting
restrictions (riverine buffer
zone, slope limits, etc.)
Less damage to residual stand,
with associated long-term
benefits of, e.g., higher future
crop.
Potential revenues from
extraction of lesser known
timber species
Higher biodiversity
Higher carbon storage
Timber – (in some cases a
significant percentage
generally wasted as broken
trees, split trees, high stumps,
unrecovered/lost trees etc.)
Timber – in other cases higher
volumes may be achieved due
to reduced waste and
inefficiencies
None
Better soil and water
protection
Sources: Moura Costa & Tay 1997, Barreto et al. 1997, Pinard et al. 1997, Boscolo et al. 1998.
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102. Although government-mediated transfer payment schemes have been introduced to this
end, their scope and efficacy is limited (see Chapter 6). The result is more unsustainable forestry
centered on timber production, for “forest managers will not change their practices until they
either recognise the benefits of non-timber forest benefits (NTFBs) or can capture additional
forest values. This change can come through:
• market forces,
• direct regulation and prohibition of forest destruction,
• government intervention to purchase and protect lands in the name of larger
social benefits.” (Lampietti & Dixon 1995; see also World Bank 1998)
103. Using the market is increasingly being seen as the most effective and enforceable way to
fully engage the private sector and other forest users alike with the objectives of SFM. Regulation
and government intervention, however, have a crucial role to play in creating an appropriate
structural environment for SFM activities (see Section 3.2.2). Integral to such an environment are
mechanisms to harness market forces to ensure that those who benefit from forest services pay
for them and that these payments reach the forest owners and managers who often provide these
benefits at a financial cost (often as an opportunity cost in terms of lost timber revenue).19
104. Establishing these market-based mechanisms is equivalent to ‘commoditising’ the full
range of forest goods and services so a financial ‘sale price’ can be recovered by their suppliers,
either through bilateral contractual deals or through multilateral commodity markets. It should be
noted that in the case of some bilateral transactions relating to, for example, water resource use
charging or bio-prospecting (see Annex 4 for details), these ‘sale prices’ have been negotiated or
fixed arbitrarily rather than being determined by the balance between the demand or WTP for
environmental services and the marginal costs of supply.
105. The first step in the commoditisation process, exemplified in Table 3.4, is to identify
which goods and services represent potential commodities, and whether their benefits are accrued
at the local, regional, or global level (which should then determine the scale of the commodity
market). 20
106. The second step is to develop the legal, policy, and institutional architecture to enable the
creation and transferability of the commodity and the subsequent development of a market for it.
Pertinent issues include:
• legal definition of the commodity,
• clarification or establishment of ownership or property rights over the commodity,
• consistency or fungibility of the commodity if supply is from diverse geographic
sources or project types, and
• allocation of responsibility for market regulation to appropriate government
department or agency.
                                                
19 This has been termed ‘the winners pay the losers’ principle.
20 One obvious criteria that makes a forest good or service ‘commoditisable’ is that it can be valued by the market.
Non-use values, such as existence value, challenge these criteria through a range of competing methodologies and so
have not been included here.
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Table 3.4 Identifying Potential Commodities in a Natural Forest
Established commodities Potential commodities*
(generally tend to be externalities at present)
Likely
scale of
market Goods Goods Services
Timber, NTFPs, e.g., resins,
game
'New' NTFPs, e.g., medicines,
materials, nuts, etc.
Watershed protection, water
flow regulationPrimarily
local or
national Wood for fuel, charcoal Landscape beauty / amenity
value
Timber Lesser known timber species Carbon sequestration and
storagePrimarily
global NTFPs, e.g., rubber Biodiversity and habitat
protection / conservation
* Those goods that are used locally for community or individual subsistence (e.g., wood for fuel), or
whose value lies in their cultural or spiritual significance and which will inherently resist financial
valuation (e.g., some medicines, or materials for artifacts or adornments) have been omitted.
107. The third and final step in the commoditisation process is market development. This
should focus particularly on information dissemination to overcome perceptual barriers that
might restrict buyers’ and sellers’ awareness and confidence in the commodity. Initially, in any
new market, demand and supply will inevitably be thin, forcing up transaction costs that risk
becoming major barriers to further market development. In some cases, this can serve as
justification for the public sector to take a proactive role in market stimulation through, for
example:
• The promotion and publicisation of successful ‘demonstration’ transactions;
• running a pilot phase market to gain experience and establish necessary protocols;
and
• buying down risk by channeling concessionary finance into early stage sustainable
resource use operations.
108. Table 3.5 uses the forest goods and services identified in Table 3.4 above to illustrate this
commoditisation process; the various components of which will fall to different actors either in
the public, private commercial, or noncommercial sectors. The shaded areas indicate
predominantly structural requirements that, as discussed, are largely the preserve of national
governments. However, as potential commodity markets for carbon sequestration and
biodiversity conservation are global, much of the required policy and market developments will
be mediated by international fora. The role of different actors is discussed further in Section 3.4,
and Chapter 4.
109. The ‘commoditisation’ argument could be criticised for being overly focused on the need
to cash-in on forests’ multiple roles, highlighting the financial above the environmental, the
social, and the economic. In essence, however, what commoditisation should achieve is to ensure
that the profit-motivated financial logic of commercial forestry coincides with the widest possible
valuation and recognition in the marketplace of the multiple roles played by forests, thereby
enhancing the financial incentives for SFM as compared to UnSFM.
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Table 3.5 Forest Commodities: Examples of Necessary Steps for Commoditising Forest
Goods and Services (pre-operational and operational barriers to investment)
PLEASE SEE FOLLOWING PAGE FOR TABLE
Notes: Shaded areas indicate where operational requirements overlap with structural
requirements (see Section 3.2.2). However, in the terms of the above analysis, they should be considered
as predominantly structural.
* It is assumed that the principal mechanism for recovering the incremental costs of managing a
forest for landscape beauty is through ecotourism.
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Goods Services
Timber Lesser known
timber species /
some NTFPs
Some NTFPs Carbon
sequestration
Watershed
protection
Biodiversity
protection
Landscape
beauty*
Research (science)
– wood science,
technology,
characteristics of
species
Research (social /
science) – identify
characteristics of
products
Policy definition –
CoP to the
UNFCCC
Research (science)
– impacts of
management
strategies on
watershed
Research (science)
– impacts of
management
strategies on
biodiversity
Research
(economic) –
valuation of
landscape beauty
Research (market)
–viable end
products
Research (market)
– viable
marketable
commodities
Ratification of
international law
Research
(economic) –
valuation of water
protection role
Research
(economic) –
valuation of
biodiversity
protection
Identification of
beneficiaries /
demand
Marketing/ market
adaptation, e.g.,
identification of
buyers and sellers
Resolve
outstanding legal
issues on property
rights, etc.
Implementation of
policy via national
and international
mechanisms and
law
Identification of
beneficiaries (e.g.,
downstream water
companies)
Identification of
beneficiaries (e.g.,
global community,
bio-prospectors,
local peoples,
agricultural
interests)21
Appropriate policy
/ mechanisms to
recover financial
benefits
Business
organisation
(suppliers)
Market
structuring, e.g.,
transaction
accounting and
tracking
procedures
Mechanisms to
recover financial
benefits, e.g.,
fiscal policy, user
charges, etc.
Appropriate
intellectual
property regime
Capital
investment, e.g.,
tourism
infrastructure
Extraction and
processing
infrastructure
Institutional
reform/creation,
e.g., national
interfaces to CDM
Mechanisms to
subsidise
incremental costs
to managers, e.g.,
direct payments,
agreements with
water companies
Global
incremental cost
support
mechanisms
Market
development
Formation of
distribution
networks
Dissemination of
information to
market actors
Dissemination of
information to
market actors –
market awareness
National
interfaces/rules to
mediate foreign
interests (where
applicable)
Marketing
Market
development
Research (science)
– quantification of
Carbon benefits
Transaction
facilitation /
brokerage
Enforcement
mechanisms
Marketing Identification of
buyers and sellers
Dissemination of
information to
forest operators
Market
development
Project packaging
and presentation
Project and
investment
packaging and
presentation
Transaction
facilitation /
brokerage
Marketing /
transaction
brokerage and
facilitation
Financial
return
Financial return
Financial return
Financial return
Financial return
Financial return
Financial return
                                                
21 Probably the largest global service provided by forests in the context of protection and conservation of
biodiversity and genetic resources is that of agricultural germplasm (D. Pearce, personal communication.)
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110. It should be made clear that commoditisation does not necessarily comprise distinct
individual processes for each of the forests’ potential commodities. Many of the steps outlined in
Table 3.1 are interrelated and should be addressed jointly. As Figure 3.4 illustrates,
commoditisation of one particular forest service (e.g., carbon sequestration) must not simply
replace timber production as the dominant consideration to the continuing detriment of other
forest functions (e.g., NTFPs). Box 3.2 explains the concept of integration in further detail.
111. Concluding, the goal-setting process to operationalise SFM in site-specific conditions
involves the market and non-market valuation of a range of goods and services that can then be
converted into specific management objectives. Commoditisation offers a market-based approach
to this end. Non-market valuation requires appropriate financing mechanisms, which are
discussed further in Chapter 6. Both strategies rely on enabling structural frameworks whose
development falls largely to the public sector.
Box 3.2 Integrating Forest Values
Integral to SFM is the recognition of the full range of goods and services provided by forests, applied
across both space and time, as compared to UnSFM’s strong bias towards regarding forests solely as
short-term timber factories. What is less clear is how management strategies can implement this
recognition. Most examples of SFM have been based on the assumption that within a large forest area,
riverine segment A should be managed for watershed protection, wildlife-dense segment B should be
managed for biodiversity conservation, easily accessible segment C should be managed for ecotourism
and landscape beauty, leaving segment D to be selectively logged. However, such a management
strategy, although a significant improvement on unsustainable logging operations, fails to genuinely
integrate the various different forest values. There is a danger, therefore, that if and when these values
are commoditised (see Table 3.4), forests again come to be regarded as resources to be managed for
single end-products, but this time scaled-up to the landscape level to create a semblance of multiple
end-product sustainable management.
Avoiding this scenario is what is meant by ‘integration’ during the commoditisation process and is
represented in Figure 3.1. If the ‘sale’ of forest commodities is packaged in such a way as to avoid an
overt focus on one forest good at the expense of another, integrated forest management will be best
ensured. Much of this depends on the commoditisation process itself. Much also depends on a greater
understanding of how the various goods and services interrelate, and the degree to which they are
interdependent, in different forest systems.
It seems likely that these interactions will be positively correlated: for example, managing a forest for
carbon sequestration will likely also benefit biodiversity conservation. However, it is vital that more
research be carried out in this area to develop our understanding of how multiple end-use SFM is most
viable in practice. Potential foci of such research include:
• the tradeoffs in terms of production possibility boundaries inherent to a multiple end-use
management regime;
• the different timings, scales and forms of financial or economic returns from the different forest
goods and services; and
• the pros and cons of a segmented versus an integrated application of multiple end-use management
strategies.
Source: Spears 1997, Fischlin 1996, Price et al. 1996
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Figure 3.4 Integrating Multi-purpose Forest Management
FORESTS’ GOODS AND SERVICES
MARKETS
IntegrationCommoditization
3.4 Beneficiaries and Recipients of SFM Financial Flows
112. The previous section provided an overview of the types of activities requiring funding for
the widespread implementation of SFM. This section seeks to complement that overview by
briefly analysing the main actors involved in these funding activities, in terms of recipients and
beneficiaries (see Figure 3.5). Also examined are the different types of funding commonly used
by these actors. The objective of this section is to provide the necessary context for the more
detailed analysis of financial mechanisms in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
Figure 3.5 Financing Flows
SOURCES
RECIPIENTS – IMPLEMENTING ACTORS
BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARIES
SECONDARY BENEFICIARIES, etc.
Structural
activities
Operational
activities
Types of financing
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3.4.1 Types of SFM Financing
113. The public-private, domestic-foreign typology commonly used for describing SFM
financial actors (e.g., UNDP 1997) was mentioned briefly in Section 3.1.4. For the purposes of
this analysis, the private sector category is further subdivided into commercial-noncommercial.
This allows a distinction to be made between ‘commercial’ enterprises primarily interested in
profitable investments (e.g., logging companies, large-scale landowners), and ‘noncommercial’
entities whose primary motives for investing in forestry are other than or are in addition to profit.
Such motives might include subsistence (e.g., poor farmers, rural communities), providing
technical or developmental assistance (e.g., NGOs, community–based organisations (CBOs)), or
fulfilling environmental or social mandates (e.g., NGOs, private foundations). It is important to
stress that none of these motives exclude profitability. Indeed, they can be regarded as constraints
within which noncommercial actors (or ‘civil society’) operate to maximise profit.
114. Table3.6 lists the main examples of investors in the forestry sector according to this
typology. In this context, the term ‘capital flows’ is used in its broader sense to include human,
social, and natural capital, as well as financial capital. An important distinction can thus be made
between (adapted from Chandrasekharan 1996b):
• implicit investments – transfers of/investments in skill, technology, knowledge, and
labor (‘financing-in-kind’) – applies particularly to the skills and knowledge-based
institutions in the public and noncommercial private sectors; and
• explicit investments – monetary transfers/financial investments in, e.g., capital goods,
equity – applies particularly to the commercial private sector.
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Table 3.6 Examples of Institutions Providing Sources of Capital to the Forestry Sector
Source of
funding
Beneficiary/recipient
Private sectorPublic sector
Commercial Noncommercial
D
om
es
tic
• government departments
• government agencies
(national and
decentralised, e.g., forest
corporations)
• research institutions
(sectoral, e.g., forestry
institutes and general, e.g.,
universities)
• forest companies
• sectoral investors
• general direct investors
• large-scale landowners
• subsistence farmers
• rural communities
(including indigenous
communities)
• CBOs or looser affiliate
community networks
• NGOs (mostly implicit
investments, in kind)
Fo
re
ig
n
• Bilateral donors
• multilateral donors
(including funding
institutions of
international conventions)
• research institutions
(sectoral and general)
• international forestry
companies
• sectoral investors
• specialist direct investors
(e.g., revolving
environmental funds)
• general direct investors
(e.g., TNCs)
• institutional equity
investors (e.g., banks,
pension funds, insurance
companies)
• foundations
• specialist concessionary
funds (e.g., sinking
environmental funds)
• philanthropists,
benefactors
• international NGOs
Sources: Chandrasekharan 1996a & 1996b, Joshi 1997, UNDP 1997.
115. Table 3.7 relates financial actors and funding types with their associated activities in the
forestry sector. Such an integrated analysis should help to create a clearer picture of the
qualitative dimension of implementing SFM, in terms of the type of activities currently under-
funded (thereby constituting barriers to SFM), and the likely sources from where funding can be
mobilised to remove these barriers. Table 3.7, however, offers examples only by way of
illustration, as for most SFM-related activities, a wide variety of possible funding streams exist.
116. In many cases, different activities may be jointly funded from a variety of sources. This
can either be in a coordinated fashion such as in joint ventures or some form of public-private
partnership (objective-led) or, in a more fragmented way, with each source providing financial
inputs for certain components of an activity according to their own specific interests (interest-led
approach). This fragmented interest-led approach is illustrated by the duplication of certain
activities in Table 3. This duplication and fragmentation can itself represent a major barrier to
SFM and suggests the potential benefits of better coordination and targeting of financial flows
into both the structural ‘enabling environment’ for SFM investment, and into project-level
operations themselves.
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3.4.2 Recipients and Timings of SFM Financing
117. As illustrated by Figure 3.6, the recipients (or direct beneficiaries) of SFM investments
(financial or otherwise) are defined here as those who directly implement the activities financed
(including structural reforms). These investments, however, may lead to secondary benefits
accruing to other parties not directly involved with the implementation of these activities. In this
way SFM investment can generate a cascade of direct and indirect benefits.
118. Table 3.7 shows the temporal progression of the development of a forest sector
framework leading to commercial forest enterprises, as well as the likely sources of funding
available for each stage. Forest sector activities can be divided into structural and operational, as
discussed in Section 3.2. In this context, operational activities were divided according to their
stage in the business cycle, as follows:
• early stage – identification of business opportunities, develop business concept;
• mid-stage – startup business, pre-profit operations;
• late stage – operations reach profitability and become self-sustaining, opportunity for
expansion and new developments.
119. Investments in structural development are usually financed on a concessionary basis,
principally by domestic public sources. ODA funding can also often play a significant role in
structural activities through initiatives such as the development of nfps, institutional capacity
building, etc. The main recipients of funding for structural activities are usually developing
countries’ public sectors, with some participation of NGOs and specialised consultancies. If
properly targeted, investment in structural development activities may result in leveraging of
private sector investment into operational activities.
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Table 3.7 Examples of Activities Funded (in non-italic font) and Types of Investments (in
italics) According to Sources of Finance
Sources of fundingCategory of activity
funded Public sector Private sector
commercial
Private sector
noncommercial
consultation process and policy
reform to secure land tenure
arrangements – general
government budget deployed
through appropriate ministry
(im)
proposal / consultation / lobbying
on public-private interface, e.g.,
SFM investment criteria and
rules – human resources (im)
facilitation of and engagement
with consultation process on land
tenure – technical assistance and
human resources (im)
Po
lic
y
implementation of international
law (e.g., Kyoto Protocol)
through structuring and
development of new markets
(e.g., Carbon offsets) – policy
development using general
budget (im)
development of trading systems
and bodies for emerging forest
commodities – e.g.,
administrative costs of pilot
phase self-financed through
transaction charges (im/ex)
dissemination of information on
policy and investment
opportunities to small-scale
operators – human and
administrative resources (im)
In
st
itu
tio
na
l establishing autonomous agency
to promote forest investment –
securitised earmarked revenue
from state forest operations /
concessions (ex/im)
operating costs of forest
investment agency – project
facilitation charge / success fees
(ex), secondment of personnel
(im)
decentralised institutional
structures / affiliate organisations
to mediate commercial
investment – human and
administrative resources (im)
mechanisms to compensate
operators for incremental costs of
SFM from provision of
national/global benefits – e.g.,
broker financial contracts
between beneficiaries and
operators (im)
market development, e.g.,
modernisation of processing,
distribution, and storage
infrastructure for NTFPs – debt
(ex)
project development and
presentation for investment
sourcing – technical assistance
including marketing and grant
funding (ex/im)
St
ru
ct
ur
al
M
ar
ke
t
reform tax/subsidy regime –
administrative costs financed by
treasury or from improved rent
capture (im)
business organisations /
information networks to facilitate
identification of potential buyers
of forest services – informational
resources (im)
project-financing windows for
small-scale operators –
concessionary microcredit
facility capitalised by bond issue
(ex)
research on impacts of different
management strategies on
different forest values (see Box 2,
Section 3.2.3) – technical and
human resources (im)
scoping for / identification of
business opportunities in
emerging markets –
informational resources (im)
financing and technical assistance
for development of SFM plan –
early stage venture capital fund
(ex/im)
Pr
e- incremental cost support for
transition to SFM (e.g., training)
– environmental funding facility
(ex)
development of emerging
commodity markets – private-
public partnership investments in
SFM demonstration projects for
experience-building (ex)
SFM knowledge / experience
sharing network or centralised
body (e.g., RIL academy) with
extension services – human
resources / capital investment
(ex/im)
D
ur
in
g
infrastructural SFM investments
in the context of economic
development plans, e.g., roads /
access points – debt-financed
capital investments (im)
Marketing / sales / transaction
brokerage for non-timber forest
commodities – from operating
budget (ex)
market organisations / collectives
to mediate sales of national /
global benefits –human resources
(ex)
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l
Po
st
-
information clearing-house and
experience-gathering from SFM
activities – informational and
human resources (im)
site preparation / replanting for
second rotation – debt, profit-
financed (ex)
monitoring / protection of
resource / land tenure
enforcement – human resources
(ex)
N.B. (ex) and (im) indicate whether the capital investments meet explicit (financial) or implicit (natural, social,
human) costs.
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Figure 3.6 Sources and Recipients of SFM Investments in Relation to Investment Cycles
(arrows indicate sample investment)
_____________________________
Many forestry operations typically require investment from multiple sources depending on the stage of the business
cycle. SFM activities, in particular, often need early stage concessionary finance from public or noncommercial
private sources to leverage later stage private sector investment. Running parallel to this operational financing is the
need for investment in structural activities to build capacity and create ‘enabling environments’ for SFM operations.
Again, such investments can potentially come from a variety of sources. Figure 3.7 attempts to illustrate these
complex multiple-source financing requirements for SFM. It also uses various examples to show that the recipients,
SOURCES OF
INVESTMENT
PRIVATE
SECTOR
commercial
PRIVATE
SECTOR
noncommercial
PUBLIC
SECTOR
LIKELY SOURCES
POSSIBLE SOURCES
O
PE
R
A
TI
O
N
A
L
A
C
TI
V
IT
IE
S
EA
RL
Y
ST
A
GE
MI
D
ST
A
GE
LA
TE
ST
A
GE
ST
R
U
C
TU
R
A
L
A
C
TI
V
IT
IE
S
RECIPIENTS OF
INVESTMENT
PRIVATE
SECTOR
commercial
PRIVATE
SECTOR
noncommercial
PUBLIC
SECTOR
LIKELY RECIPIENTS
POSSIBLE RECIPIENTS
e.g., policy
reform
e.g., promotion
of investment
opportunity
e.g., micro-
financed
business start-up
e.g., equity-
investment in
profitable
operations
FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY. 42
or direct beneficiaries, of SFM investments are not necessarily the same as the sources, depending on the type and
timing of the investment in question. This disjunction between investment source and beneficiary can act as a major
barrier to private sector involvement in SFM if catalytic public sector financing and mechanisms to facilitate its
application are unavailable.
_____________________________
120. Operational activities at the early stage of the business cycle may attract funding from
either public sector or noncommercial private sector sources, in the form of concessionary grants
or loans, or the provision of technical assistance for development of appropriate business and
management plans. In many cases, there is a shortfall of capital available for the start up phase of
forestry enterprises. This is because the commercial private sector is generally reluctant to invest
until there is evidence of financial profitability of businesses. At the same time, the public sector
often is unwilling to subsidise commercial ventures of the private sector. This Catch-22
associated with early-stage operational investments can often represent a weak link in the forest
enterprise cycle.
121. As ventures reach the middle of the business cycle, they become more likely to mobilise
financial resources. These can come from private sector commercial sources, public sector, or a
combination of both (adapted from EA Capital 1998):
• private – e.g., own capital, ‘angel’ investors, joint venture partners, strategic
investors, early-stage venture capital funds, commercial loans;
• public – e.g., extension, research, training services, loans; and
• public/private – e.g., enterprise development facilities, microfinance facilities / SME
concessionary loans.
122. Mature enterprises, at the late stage of the business cycle, can attract capital from more
established private sector commercial sources, through debt and equity transfers. The required
roles for public and non-commercial private sector investors therefore diminish.
123. Figure 3.6 graphically represents how different sources of investment specialise in
financing different types of activity with the involvement of different recipients at different stages
of the operations’ business cycle.
124. Two main observations can be drawn from this analysis. First, there is the potential need
for a variety of complementary funding streams for the different stages of the forestry sector
development or of the forestry business cycle. The complexity of such multi-sourced investments
may become a barrier to SFM. Such a barrier could be addressed through investment and
informational facilities designed to bring together and package appropriate financial resources in
the context of this ‘life-cycle approach’ to the forestry sector (see Chapter 8). This has the
potential to reduce investment liabilities and risk, facilitate strategic management, reduce project
uncertainties, and ensure long-term commitments and involvement from relevant stakeholders.
125. Second, as Figure 3.6 illustrates, there is a strong reliance on public sector finance in the
start up phase of forestry sector enterprises. This can be problematic if the current trend of
diminishing public sector resources continues (see Section 3.1.3). Additionally, this reflects the
current lack of involvement of the private sector in SFM, due to both real and perceived barriers
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and risks associated with this activity, preventing investment until later stages of the business
cycle.
126. A conclusion that can be drawn from this cursory analysis, and in support of the
assumptions described in Section 3.1.6, is that it is clearly necessary to involve private sector
actors in earlier stages of the forestry financing cycle. The public sector could play a role by
targeting their increasingly scarce resources on investments with two clear intertwined objectives:
(1) to create a structural environment that ensures profit-seeking private sector resource
flows are channeled into SFM rather than UnSFM; and
(2) to leverage private sector resources by removing investment barriers to SFM.
These twin objectives are inseparably intertwined, and form the basis of the proposals made in
this chapter, and in the remainder of this report.
SOURCES OF FORESTRY FINANCING
4.1 Domestic Financing; 4.2 Official Development Assistanc
4.3 Private Financing and Globalising Forest Sector
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4. SOURCES OF FORESTRY FINANCING
127. Financing arrangements for forestry vary greatly depending who finances (the source), for
whom and what (the utility), and how much funding is involved. There are direct and indirect,
individual and institutional, and loan and grant mechanisms. In terms of sources they can be
classified into domestic and foreign, and public and private (see Table 3.6). These broad
categories tend to get mixed with each other through various combinations and joint financing
arrangements (Chandrasekharan 1996b). The focus of this chapter is sources of forestry
financing.
4.1 Domestic Financing
128. In The importance of domestic investment has been emphasised as one of the main
channels for forestry financing (UNDP 1996). Public domestic financing falls into two
categories:
(i) those which are directly managed by public institutions for productive purposes on
state-owned lands or enterprises; and
(ii) financial support to the private sector.
129. In general terms, public sector financial flows are implicit through, for example,
incentive/disincentive regimes, policy reform, institutional development, and strategic planning.
Domestic public sector flows are frequently difficult to classify due to the wide range of activities
financed, which are mainly structural (see Section 3.2.2) but can also be operational through
state-funded agencies or research bodies.
130. Governments apply several instruments to raise funds from the private sector (royalties,
user fees, taxes, etc.) but their assessment is not part of the scope of this study. Several reviews
have been carried out which can be referred to (e.g., Karsenty 1998, Richards 1998).
131. In general, public sector forestry institutions have lost many of their directly productive
functions to the private sector, due to widespread changes in macro policies. Their revenues and
expenditures are usually controlled by national treasuries, and rarely is anything approaching an
adequate share of the income from forests reinvested into the sector. The possibilities for
increasing public sector self-financing for forestry is based not only on the potential of the forest
resource base but also on the level of political willingness. In recent years, self-financing has
been declining in many countries (UNDP, undated).
132. Due to financing capacity constraints, the public sector can only play a supporting role in
SFM, which is ultimately the responsibility of the private sector in most countries in the
developing world. The public sector’s investment can take the form of cash outlays or in kind
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(farmers’ labor input, farmland, etc.). Public funding is often necessary but, alone, is not a
sufficient condition for achieving SFM.
133. It has been pointed out by Repetto and Sizer (1996) that the forestry sector should be self-
financing, and it may not need any innovative sources of finance for SFM investments. And were
the policies right, and the potential rents effectively collected and transferred to forest managers
and owners, no other financing sources would necessarily be required, if forests can reach a
minimum necessary productivity. As both intensive and extensive management can be applied,
there is a degree of flexibility to choose right approaches in particular situations. In the case of
the state-owned forests (and collecting forest related taxes and charges), the problem is that
revenues from forestry and biodiversity utilisation are collected by the treasury, and they are not
earmarked for reinvestment or recurrent costs of resource management and conservation (Keipi
1998).
134. Domestic private investments are constrained by the level of available financing from
local and external sources. In addition to large-scale and medium-sized industrial operations,
private investment is made by farmers and forest dwellers, small-scale enterprises (SSEs), NGOs,
CBOs and private voluntary organisations (PVOs), which all mobilise funds and other resources
for forest management and processing of forest products.
135. It appears that small investments by rural people and their organisations are not
necessarily  recorded and, therefore, their importance tends to be grossly underestimated in
official statistics. Chandrasekharan (1996b) points out that recent experience in forestry
development shows that if resources of the local populations are mobilised effectively, a great
deal of productive and effective forestry investment can take place at a rather low (financial) cost.
Conducive policies to provide tangible incentives and clearly targeted support are essential to
achieve such results.
136. Domestic financing has been largely dependent on the importance of the forest sector in
the national economy, and the preconditions that can make SFM investment profitable for the
private sector. The objective of foreign ODA financing has often been to assist in creating the
necessary enabling conditions for private investment, be it domestic or foreign.
4.2 Official Development Assistance
4.2.1 ODA Sources
137. As explained in Chapter 3, two main conventional international financing mechanisms
have been applied in the past to provide funds for the forestry sector: ODA and private sector
investment. Both mechanisms take various forms and channels and are often interlinked.
138. ODA typically supports environmental conservation, social development, infrastructure,
capacity building, and the removal of structural barriers, as well as providing technical assistance
and other resources to catalyse development. More recently there has been a growing interest in
supporting the internalisation of global externalities. In forestry ODA environmental and social
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issues tend to have an increasing priority. In addition to such strategic objectives, much ODA still
appears to be used for solving temporary or chronic liquidity problems of recipients.
139. ODA flows are generally in the form of debt, grant, or technical assistance. ODA has two
main channels:
(i) bilaterally from the donor agency to the recipient; or
(ii) multilaterally through international agencies which raise their resources from
donor agencies and international financial markets.
140. Actual development activities are carried out by various specialised bodies including
public institutions, private companies and NGOs and PVOs. About twenty donor countries and
thirteen multilateral agencies are involved in providing ODA for forestry (Chandrasekharan
1997). Donors and multilateral agencies have their own priorities and strategies in terms of
regional and sectoral focus and types of intervention. These have not necessarily matched with
those of the recipient countries.
4.2.2 Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
141. Multilateral assistance is provided by development banks, UN agencies and specialised
organisations, international NGOs, etc. Among the MDBs, the World Bank is by far the largest
source of funding, and its policies tend to guide other agencies. Of particular importance has been
the World Bank 1992 Forest Policy, which rules out any financing of logging in primary tropical
forests. Whether this has had a positive environmental effect or not is  unknown. Due to local and
international conflicts related to the use of forests, WB and the regional development banks
(African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank) have switched their focus from “pure” forestry towards integrated projects where forestry
is part of rural development and environmental conservation. The International Fund for
Agricultural Development has also been financing some forestry/tree planting activities as part of
their agricultural projects. The switch in emphasis has also reflected the need to address
development and conservation through a comprehensive approach rather than strictly sectoral
interventions.
142. MDBs, and the World Bank especially, have particular comparative advantages in
development financing, which are also relevant to forestry. Multilateral banks can often address
policy constraints more effectively than, for example, individual bilateral donors. This is
particularly the case with structural adjustment interventions outside the forestry sector. These are
often macro-level issues and may not be tackled as part of the sectoral policy reform (e.g., within
the nfp framework).
143. The World Bank is currently undergoing a review of its Forest Policy and Strategy
through a broad-based consultative exercise involving an evaluation of the bank’s operational
activities related to forestry. The revised policy will be a major signal to both the donor
community and the international financial community on which kind of activities are considered
appropriate for financing, and what kind of preconditions should be put in place at country level
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to mobilise such financing. The contentious issue of using primary natural forest for timber
production will be one of the critical elements to be addressed.
4.2.3 International Agencies
144. Technical assistance in forestry is provided by a number of UN agencies such as FAO,
ITTO, ILO, ITC, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNIDO, WFP, and WHO. The GEF is being
managed by World Bank, UNDP and UNEP (see the review of GEF as an instrument for forestry
financing in Chapter 5). UNDP is the main funding channel of the UN for development and
environment through country programme allocations. In 1993, UNDP, as a follow-up to UNCED,
launched the Forestry Capacity Programme to help countries formulate and implement their nfps.
In 1998, in order to support sustainable livelihoods, UNDP launched PROFOR to promote SFM
and related public and private sector partnerships at the country level. This is to be accomplished
through a collaborative approach to SFM, which makes maximum use of the existing instruments
and available sources for financing with three specific objectives (UNDP, undated):
(i) identifying successful strategies for SFM;
(ii) strengthening nfps, and forest partnership agreements as instruments to promote
nfps; and
(iii) developing innovative financing for SFM.
145. FAO is the principal technical agency involved in forestry, and its scope covers
practically every aspect related to forestry, including linkages with agriculture. Its normative
activities are funded from the regular budget while field projects are financed by donors and the
FAO Technical Cooperation Programme.
146. The ITTO focuses on the promotion of SFM in tropical forests through interventions in
reforestation and forest management, forest industries, and economic information and market
intelligence. They finance projects through the Special Account to which voluntary contributions
are made by donors, sometimes including the private sector. The 1994 International Tropical
Timber Agreement made provisions for the establishment of the Bali Partnership Fund (BPF)
(see Box 4.1). This facility, which is expected to become operational in 1999, should offer an
opportunity for improved decision-making on the use of funds not yet earmarked, based on
objective criteria rather than on relying upon donor priorities, as has been the case in the past.
Practically all the past contributions to the ITTO Special Account have been earmarked.
4.2.4 Non-governmental Assistance Agencies
147. A large number of NGOs and organisations provide support to SFM in specific fields,
based on funds raised from public and private sources. They include international NGOs (such as
IUCN, WWF, IUFRO), regional organisations (such as ICIMOD, CATIE, AIFM) and CGIAR
institutions (particularly CIFOR and ICRAF). Each of these bodies has their own priorities and
programmes, usually designed based on the needs of targeted recipients and the comparative
advantages of these bodies. Their role is often research-oriented.
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Box 4.1 ITTO Bali Partnership Fund (BPF)
Purpose
The BPF is established under Article 18 of the ITTA, 1994. The resources of the fund will be used “to enhance
the capacity of members to implement a strategy for achieving exports of timber and timber products from
sustainably managed sources by the year 2000 – in short to achieve the ITTO Year 2000 Objective.
Criteria
At present there are three sets of criteria to identify projects that may benefit from the resources of the BPF:
1. Article 21(4) of the ITTA
- The special needs of members whose forestry sectors’ contribution to their economies is adversely affected
by the implementation of the strategy for achieving the exports of tropical timber and timber products from
sustainably managed sources by the year 2000
The needs of members with significant forest areas who establish conservation programmes in timber producing
forests
2. Criteria contained in Annex B of ITTC Decision 8(XX)
- To adopt forest policy and enforce legislation
- To establish and secure a Permanent Forest Estate
- To reduce damage done by timber harvesting to the physical and social environments and to the forest
ecosystem
- To train the work force to accelerate the use of reduced impact logging thus becomes of the utmost priority
and urgency
- To limit harvest levels to the sustained yield capacity
- To raise political and consumer awareness of the fact that timber harvesting can be consistent with the
sustainability of the topical forest
- To concentrate research on the analysis and application of existing data and knowledge so as to ascertain
what is or can be made relevant to the operational knowledge of forest ecosystem behaviour and put that
information onto preliminary management prescriptions
3. Rule 19, paragraph 2 of the Financial Rules
- The importance of assisting member countries to implement the ITTO C&I for sustainable management of
tropical forests
There is a provision for the council to annually review the criteria. Guidelines, however, have not yet been
developed for the process and mechanism to apply the above criteria.
Sources of funds
The Agreement defines four sources for BPF:
(1) voluntary contributions from donor members
(2) voluntary contributions from public and private sources which the Organisation may accept
(3) per cent of the interest earned from the ITTO Special Account
(4) interest earned from the BPF itself
Sources (1) and (2) may be earmarked or un-earmarked, while sources (3) and (4) are un-earmarked. A set of
criteria should be developed for prioritising projects to be funded from un-earmarked funds, because ITTO
resources have been insufficient to finance all the projects approved by its Council.
Current resources
For the time being, only Japan has committed US$11.5 million to BPF. Two countries have declared their
intention to initially contribute US$0.1 mill. each.
Current status
The fund is not yet operational but is expected to function in 1999.
Source: ITTO 1998
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4.2.5 South-South Cooperation
148. Technical cooperation among developing countries and countries in transition provides an
additional source of technology transfer. These mechanisms are already gaining importance, but
as a source of financial flows their role is still limited. There are particular areas where South-
South cooperation can be especially valuable. A good example is rubberwood utilisation where a
few leading countries are spearheading global technological development (notably Malaysia and
Thailand). They could be the main sources of technical assistance to about another 20 countries
possessing rubberwood resources but lagging behind in wood utilisation (TC 1993).
4.2.6 Lessons Learned from ODA
149. The failure or limited success of project interventions in delivering improvements in
forestry and the control of deforestation led to the recognition of the importance of sound policies
and the sectoral programmatic approach. Several frameworks have been proposed and tried to
address this issue over the last fifteen years, and a consensus has been reached that they can be
grouped under the concept of nfps that can be flexibly applied in specific country conditions (IPF
1997).
150. In view of the effectiveness of ODA as a means to support nfp implementation, the
following main conclusions can be made based on past experience (Oksanen & Salmi 1996, GTZ
1996, United Nations 1997):
• Donor-imposed programme priorities, concepts and cycles are not in harmony with:
national policies and priorities, national planning and programming cycles, and with
each other. This discord diverts and distorts national development and perverts
government departments into supplicants, aiming not to maximise national well-being
and development within their own sector but rather to maximise the inflow of donor
funding.
• The international community has not been able to define and agree on concepts for
channeling assistance in a way that meet national priorities; do not foster dependence
on aid at the national level;  do not burden developing countries with a multiplicity of
complicated bureaucratic requirements for each donor supported activity (an example
of this situation is that each donor or international institution follows its own project
planning, monitoring, evaluation and financial management guidelines); and ensure
that a large share of the funds are not disbursed by the delivery mechanisms.
• Despite public declarations of commitment to international planning frameworks and
the recognition of their importance as effective coordination mechanisms, many donor
agencies and development banks appear to continue with “business as usual” in
project formulation and negotiation in contrast with public commitments to support to
programmatic approaches; pooling of donor financing to adequately address the
problems of SFM development has rarely materialised, and there have been
institutional barriers to implement such coordinated arrangements as forest partnership
agreements.
• Even good donor interventions tend to remain ineffective if the sectoral governance in
the recipient country is weak and there is no real political will to implement policy
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reforms. There is often lack of full recognition of policy constraints and respective
necessary action to remove these constraints. Continuous aid flows in such situations
tend to postpone reforms rather than to encourage them, allowing "bad" governance to
continue.
• Frequent abrupt changes in donor policies and financial commitments represent an
important element of uncertainty for recipients, and there is a general lack of
transparency and international scrutiny of donor assistance.
• The quality of donor assistance is weak and is often linked with aid constraints. There
is also a  lack of systematic efforts to improve effectiveness and efficiency.
• Accountability problems with recipients are a constraint in transferring
implementation and financial management to national bodies.
• Recipients seem unable to maintain progress toward implementing policy reforms that
would create an enabling environment for SFM.
151. When these constraints are coupled with weak forest administrations, low national
priority of the sector, and failure to mobilise domestic and external private sector financing, the
result is often excessive reliance on donor financing, which has limited effectiveness. There is a
persistent need to redirect ODA to supplement public spending for SFM in a complementary way
that provides substantial support in particular for capacity building, technology transfer, and
catalysing other sources of financing (Implementing … 1996). A further problem is ODA
allocation between recipient countries: there is too much concentration on some 'popular'
countries leaving many others in serious need, without any support. This is exacerbated by the
specific efficiency problems of technical assistance delivered through traditional modes of
support.
152. In conclusion, the needs and mechanisms for reforming or improving ODA towards
supporting SFM are widely known and apparently accepted as well. Incremental improvements
can be observed, but institutional failures have proved to be hard to correct, and they act as a
barrier to the coordinated and effective use of ODA financing (Simula 1996). Due to resource
constraints, some donor agencies have started to carefully look into their strategies and
procedures, and it appears that innovative financing mechanisms could gradually lead to true
“ODA reform” (see Chapters 6 and 7). Additionally, it needs to be emphasised that ODA will
never be adequate to solve the problem of SFM financing, and its role will always remain
complementary as a reducer of predominantly structural barriers to private investment.
153. A fundamental question for future ODA in the forestry sector is its effectiveness in
contributing to poverty alleviation and to SFM. In spite of its good intentions, aid itself does not
appear to exercise much leverage over policy, and over-reliance on conditionality has added to its
ineffectiveness. The key constraint is the recipients’ lack of capability to implement sound and
supportive policies and to exercise good governance. Sectoral reforms are often constrained by
lack of supporting reforms at a macro level. Hence the true crisis is dwindling faith in, and
political support for, ODA (Killick 1997). While ODA is likely to continue to be justified for
low-income countries, global targets for “new and additional” funding appear unrealistic,
particularly in such a revenue-generating sector as forestry.
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4.3 Private Financing and Globalising Forestry Sector
154. Commercial private sector flows, both foreign and domestic, are generally categorised as:
• direct investments – for supply of capital goods (e.g., equipment, land, etc.) or
services (e.g., training), and
• indirect investments – as either debt (e.g., commercial bank loans) or equity (e.g.,
common and preferential stock, portfolio investment, or venture capital).
155. Domestic noncommercial private sector flows tend to be implicit investments in the form
of labor, equipment, and technical knowledge or assistance. At the international level, however,
financial resources are often mobilised through grants or concessionary financing (e.g., sinking
environmental trust funds) by the NGO community and private environmental benefactors.
156. As indicated in Chapter 3.1, foreign private capital flows into forest-based investments
have been increasing in the 1990s. Three main channels are used for private capital flows:
(i) foreign direct investment (FDI) by companies, often through joint ventures with
local firms;
(ii) portfolio investment in which stocks and bonds are purchased on local capital
markets by individuals and institutional investors; and
(iii) commercial bank loans.
157. Foreign private capital, particularly FDI, is not only an important source of finance but is
also essential in acquiring technology, know-how, and management skill. FDI is less volatile than
portfolio investment, and it tends to have a long-term time horizon as regards returns. FDI is also
attractive as it does not require fixed repayment and does not contribute to debt burdens. The
general problem with FDI is its high concentration on a small number of countries (Jun & Brewer
1997), which can also be assumed to prevail in forest-based activities. In addition, much of the
current FDI flows are assumed to be directed at unsustainable forest management ventures.
158. An important precondition for rising private financial flows has been the emergence and
expansion of capital markets in developing countries, including (UNDP, undated):
• the formation of national stock markets;
• links to established institutional debt and equity markets;
• regional and international investment and merchant banking; and
• various forms of venture equity capital.
159. In the forestry sector, it is necessary that SFM make more business sense for investors
than UnSFM. Indeed, the problem is not necessarily the availability of funding but how to
channel funds to support SFM.
160. The shift from public to private sources of capital poses a policy challenge, as the private
sector is by definition less accountable to the public interest than are government agencies. This
explains why a growing array of “green” international investment strategies have emerged to
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ensure that capital is not invested in environmentally damaging activities (French 1998; see also
Chapter 6).
161. FDI has been mainly undertaken by transnational corporations, both from developed and
developing countries. The driving forces have been the “globalisation” of the markets for
products and production factors, as well as changing supply-demand balances for raw materials
in traditional exporting countries. The competition for existing forest resources and favorable
sites for new industrial plantation establishment, where subsequent processing could be
established, has intensified. The current financial crisis has put many projects on hold, but the
underlying trends will continue in the long run.
162. The need to monitor transnational corporations has been emphasised by various observers
(Dudley et al. 1996, High Stakes 1998) as it is feared that these enterprises will apply lower
environmental standards in the developing world than at home. Due to the immobility of forest
resources, there are fewer possibilities in the forest industries than in other manufacturing sectors
to seek “pollution havens”  - where profits can be boosted by exploiting lower environmental
standards. Cut-and-run operations are more driven by short-term business opportunities than
long-term enterprise strategies. They represent unsustainable forestry practices and are a cause of
serious concern. They should be eliminated or discouraged and certainly not aided by special
financial arrangements.
163. In the forestry sector “globalisation” is driven by the liberalisation of capital markets and
changing ownership patterns in the forest-based industries. It is also linked with trade
dependency and local supply constraints. Commercialisation of technology, and the accelerating
rate of technical progress and its dissemination are also important contributing factors.
164. International capital markets have started to recognise the potential offered by, and the
specific characteristics of, forestry investments (particularly fast-growing plantations). Well-
informed investors rightly perceive many such investments as relatively low-risk long-term
opportunities with positive real rates of return that complement traditional portfolios. There is a
pressing need, however,  to educate the international capital markets on the specific requirements
of sustainable forestry, and new funding instruments are needed to lower the overall risk of SFM
investment (Crossley et al. 1996).
165. Changing ownership patterns in forest industries are characterised by further
concentration through mergers and acquisitions, and expansion of Asian logging and mechanical
wood processing companies to Africa and Latin America. In addition, new pulp and paper groups
in Asia, thanks to their low production costs, are attractive for takeovers or alliances with
globally operating companies from developed countries. Local constraints in wood supply leave
the industry little other option than to expand elsewhere. This can be observed among European,
North American, and Japanese corporations as well. Meeting the future demand for forest
products in China, India and other Asian net importing countries will be the main dynamic force
in the industry in the medium term.
166. Globalisation is both an opportunity and a challenge in the forestry sector. Theoretically,
it offers efficiency gains that will enable the industry to better assume its environmental and
social responsibilities. In particular, globalisation offers buffering against regional business
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cycles, which have been problematic in the forestry sector. Economic growth and higher income
should also help countries take better care of their own natural resources than in the past. As new
technologies are generally less harmful for the environment, new investment represents
improvement. Easy access to global markets will also lead industries to maximise the returns
obtainable from economies of scale. For example, in the pulp industry, the largest modern units
are currently producing more than one million tons per year using about 4-5 million cubic meters
of wood per year. This means less production units but higher vulnerability to external
disturbances. Economies of scale are not necessarily essential in plantation management and
small-scale tree farms can be a feasible (often complementary) alternative (e.g. Brazil, the USA).
167. Increasing global economic integration will mean that productivity and efficiency will be
the fundamental drivers of competitiveness in forest-based industries in the long run. Low costs,
which are mainly achieved through low wages, will not offer more than a temporary advantage.
Differentiation as a strategic option offers a tool to compensate some productivity losses but can
not secure long-term competitiveness. Successful forest industries will be drawing on mastering
their entire business concept and its uniqueness, rather than relying on cost leadership (Simula
1997).
168. The scope of forestry as a business is also changing. The forest company of the Twenty-
first  century will also be in the business of managing renewable resources, and selling a variety
of nontimber services. The sale of these services can help finance and motivate the conservation
of natural forests. Forestry companies, environmental organisations, and those who enjoy forest
benefits have a mutual interest in creating these markets and should work together to realise this
goal. Five principal forest services have been identified by the industry for this purpose: carbon
sequestration services, watershed protection and hydrological services, biodiversity-related
services, nontimber material forest products, and ecotourism and recreational services (World
Bank 1997; see also Table 3.3).
169. In conclusion, conventional private sector financing mechanisms will continue to play
their role in production and industrial investment in the forestry sector. They will not be able to
solve the problem of raising funding for investment for the creation of new forest resources as
well as the sustainable management of the existing ones. Most private investment still flows to
unsustainable practices. In order to change this pattern and raise new resources for financing
SFM investment, a number of key areas of action have been identified (Crossley et al. 1996):
• educating capital markets about investment opportunities;
• packaging these opportunities in understandable and recognisable formats for the
private sector;
• reducing the risks and incremental costs of an emerging industry; and
• covering the incremental costs of internalising environmental externalities.
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THE GEF AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SFM FINANCING
5.1` Background; 5.2 GEF and Sustainable Forestry;
5.3 Key Issues Related to GEF Funding of SFM;
 5.4 Potential for GEF Funding of SFM-Related Projects
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5. THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SFM
FINANCING
170. This chapter analyses the GEF as an instrument of financing sustainable forest
management, particularly from the point of view of productive SFM or sustainable utilisation.
The reason for this emphasis is the fact that a vast majority of world’s forests are, and will
probably continue to be, sustainably exploitable. Consequently, the potential impact of SFM (or
UnSFM) on the forest ecosystems and human communities is therefore assumed to be larger in
the forests outside protected areas than inside those areas. First, the purpose, history, and
structure of the GEF are presented. Second, the GEF’s past contribution to SFM is analysed,
based on a review of 50 GEF projects. Several key issues are then discussed, and finally,
conclusions on the GEF’s potential for SFM financing are drawn.
5.1 Background22
171. “The GEF is a mechanism for international cooperation for the purpose of providing new,
and additional, grant and concessional funding to meet the agreed incremental costs of measures
to achieve agreed global environmental benefits in the areas of biodiversity, climate change,
international waters, and ozone layer depletion. Land degradation issues, as they relate to the four
focal areas, will also be addressed.” (GEF Operational Strategy).
172. Global benefits are the raison-d’être of the GEF. They usually overlap with national
benefits and vary from project to project (Figure 5.1). Clear distinctions between global and
national benefits are often difficult to make.
173. The GEF serves as the interim financial mechanism for the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) and the UNFCCC. In this regard, the GEF Council receives formal guidance
from the Conferences of the Parties of CBD and UNFCCC and is accountable to them.
174. The GEF was established in 1991, for a three-year Pilot Phase. A total of 116 projects
with GEF funding of US$733 million were approved between 1991 and mid-1994. The GEF was
restructured in 1994. Thirty-four nations, including 13 recipient countries, pledged US$2 billion
to the restructured GEF’s core-fund (GEF-1). A second replenishment of the GEF (GEF-2) will
provide new funds for the 1999-2002 period. Pledges for GEF-2 are US$2.75 billion.
                                                
22 The main sources of this chapter have been (i) The Study of GEF’s Overall Performance, (ii) GEF Operational
Strategy, (iii) GEF Operational Programs, (iv) GEF Annual Report 1996, and (v) GEF Corporate Business Plan
FY00-FY02.
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Figure 5.1 Global and National Benefits
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175. The GEF governance structure is comprised of an assembly, a council, and a secretariat.
The GEF Assembly, which meets every three years, consists of representatives of all participating
countries – currently numbering 155 – and is responsible for reviewing GEF’s general policies.
The GEF Council is the main governing body. It is responsible for developing, adopting, and
evaluating operational policies and programmes. It also approves and modifies projects when it
comments on the work programme and when it reviews final project documents. The council
comprises representatives of 32 constituencies – 16 members from developing countries, 14 from
developed countries, and two from countries with transitional economies. It meets every six
months. The GEF Secretariat services and reports to the assembly and council. It is headed by a
chief executive officer. The secretariat’s responsibilities include ensuring that decisions taken by
the assembly and council translate into effective actions. It coordinates the formulation of the
work programme, oversees implementation, and ensures that GEF’s operational policies are
followed.
176. The GEF’s Implementing Agencies (IAs) are responsible for developing projects for GEF
funding and implementing them through executing agencies in specific countries and regions.
The IAs are the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World Bank. The World Bank also serves as GEF’s
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trustee. Each agency has created a GEF Coordination Unit in its headquarters office, led by an
executive coordinator. In addition, the GEF “family” includes a Scientific and Technical
Advisory Panel (STAP) of 12 internationally recognised experts. The STAP is an independent
advisory body that provides scientific and technical guidance on GEF policies, operational
strategies, and programmes. The STAP maintains a roster of experts, and the GEF projects above
US$750.000 must be reviewed by someone on this list. The GEF’s institutional structure is
presented in Figure 5.2.
177. Each country participating in the GEF has a Political Focal Point. The Political Focal
Point is often the Ministry of Finance or Ministry of Planning. In addition, each recipient country
has a GEF Operational Focal Point. The Operational Focal Point is often the Ministry or
Department of Environment. The role of the Political Focal Point is to serve as the contact point
with the GEF Secretariat. The role of the Operational Focal Point is to identify project ideas that
meet country priorities and ensure that GEF proposals are consistent with country priorities and
commitments under the global environmental conventions. The Operational Focal Points must
endorse all project proposals for GEF in their countries.
178. GEF projects are executed in the field by a wide variety of organisations, ranging from
government agencies, international organisations (e.g., FAO), private sector institutions, and
international, national, and local nongovernment and civil society organisations.
179. A variety of coordination mechanisms have been developed within the GEF structure. The
chief executive officer meets annually with the heads of the IAs, and more often with the
executive coordinators in the IAs. The GEF Operations Committee (GEFOP) is the forum
through which members of the GEF family regularly discuss major policy issues. The GEFOP
meets at least quarterly and includes representatives of the secretariat, IAs, and STAP. In
addition, representatives from the biodiversity and climate change conventions participate in the
GEFOP. Focal area task forces in biodiversity, climate change and international waters,
comprising specialists from the secretariat, IAs’, and GEF coordination units are fora for
discussions of technical issues presented by the secretariat. Finally, the GEF conducts an annual
Project Implementation Review to examine the status of GEF projects that have been in
implementation for at least a year and to identify lessons learned.
180. The GEF funds three broad types of activities in its four focal areas. The GEF Operational
Strategy reflects programme guidance from the biodiversity and climate change conventions, and
currently defines ten long-term operational programmes. The vast majority of GEF resources are
allocated to projects under the ten Operational Programmes. The GEF also finances enabling
activities in the biodiversity and climate change areas including compilation and assessment of
existing country information, as well as development of strategies and action plans. Finally, the
GEF funds a limited number of short-term response measures (STRM) that do not fall within the
parameters of long-term programmes or enabling activities but are high priorities and yield
immediate benefits at low cost. There are also specific instruments under the main financing
mechanisms, such as the Small Grants Programme (SGP) and various types of trust funds (see
Chapter 6). The SPG is a UNDP-GEF project with current activities in 46 countries. In each of
these countries a national screening committee periodically allocates small grants. The GEF trust
funds are usually one of the mechanism used to ensure the sustainability of interventions and thus
to secure flows of global benefits beyond the life of projects.
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Figure 5.2 GEF’s Institutional Structure
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5.2 GEF and Sustainable Forestry
181. In implementing the CBD, the GEF contributes to protection and sustainable use of
biodiversity and equitable sharing of benefits. Sustainable utilisation is one of the means to
protect globally significant biodiversity. According to the GEF Operational Strategy “sustainable
use of biological resources is a prerequisite for their long-term conservation”. The focus is given
to the removal of barriers and demonstration.
182. “Forest ecosystems” under the Biodiversity Focal Area, is one of the ten Operational
Programmes (OP) of the GEF. It has been the largest OP with cumulative resource allocations of
US$311 million by the end of June 1998 (GEF Corporate Business Plan 1998). This is equivalent
to 16 percent of the total GEF allocations. The annual resource allocation for this OP (number 3)
is presently US$60 million, and it is projected to grow to US$75 million by the year 2002. In the
GEF Corporate Business Plan the relative share of the projected resource requirements for OP3
will fall slightly to 12 percent of the whole GEF. OP3, however,  is said to have a strong pipeline.
Most of the focus of OP3 has been in tropical humid forests with some projects including parts of
dry tropical, subtropical, and temperate broad-leaved forests.
183. In addition to OP3, GEF is supporting forest-related projects or components under other
operational programmes, with special reference to mountain ecosystems (OP4) and arid and
semi-arid ecosystems (OP1), both under the Biodiversity Focal Area.
184. It is notable that carbon sequestration has not been made eligible for GEF financing as
yet. There is, however, a new OP being developed under the Climate Change Focal Area to cater
for carbon sequestration (OP12). It will take still some time before this OP is accepted and
becomes operational.
185. Many observers have argued that in the past the forest ecosystems-related projects of GEF
have mainly focused on protected areas management, and much less on sustainable use of the
resource. This was also one of the key findings relating programming issues in biodiversity focal
area by the Study of GEF’s Overall Performance:
186. “The GEF biodiversity portfolio has been concentrated heavily on protected area
conservation projects. Of the twenty-seven biodiversity projects funded in the GEF-1 work
programme, only the Central African Republic Bangassou Dense Forest project and Sri Lanka
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Medicinal Plants project are wholly or primarily for
sustainable use. In addition, the Guyana Iwokrama Rain Forest project funded in the pilot phase
is a demonstration project on guidelines for sustainable use of tropical forests. However, at least
nine of the GEF-1 projects that are primarily for protected areas also have sustainable-use
components. Fifteen protected area projects do not have a sustainable use component.” (GEF
1998d).
187. In interviews conducted in preparation for this report, several of the UNDP and World
Bank GEF specialists were of the opinion that the number and quality of project proposals
relating to SFM, including SFM in production forests, submitted by recipient countries, have
been increasing. Whereas earlier projects focused more on institutional and capacity
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strengthening of environmental administrations and conservation areas, currently there are more
site-specific project proposals that include sustainable resource use components.
188. In this report, 50 projects were analysed. They were purposefully selected for their
potential to address SFM issues. Most of the selected projects were under OP3 (Forest
Ecosystems). However, projects from other focal areas and operational programmes, and several
STRM projects were analysed as well. Based on the available project documents and other
information, the project components, activities, and budgets were reviewed. All forestry-related
inputs, except those relating purely to protected-area management, were summed up. The
omission of protected-area management activities does not mean that they are not considered part
of SFM; nevertheless, they were omitted because of the special focus on the productive SFM of
the present analysis. The complete list of projects reviewed is presented in Annex 3. Details of
the analysis are explained in the footnotes of same annex.
189. It is emphasised that the figures of the following analysis should be considered only as
indicative. The assessment of conservation and sustainable use in GEF's work is not easy as these
activities are closely interlinked and often indivisible - in the sense that many inputs (e.g.,
capacity building, participatory planning, and other removal of barriers) contribute to both.
190. The total volume of the projects analysed was US$365 million, which is some 20 percent
of the total volume of GEF projects under GEF focal areas (see Table 5.1). The productive SFM
contribution of the analysed projects was estimated at US$65 million or 18 percent of the total (4
percent of the whole GEF). The total volume of the GEF pilot phase projects was US$93 million
out of which US$16 million (17 percent) was allocated to productive SFM. The volume of GEF-1
projects was US$271 million, and the respective productive SFM allocation was US$49 million
(18 percent). GEF accounts for a few percent of the total ODA for forestry.
Table 5.1 Summary of Analysed Projects23
US$  percent GEF  percent of analysedprojects
Total GEF under focal areas 1,802,545,000 100
Projects analysed 364,343,278 20 100
- Pilot phase 92,901,000 5 26
- GEF-1 271,442,278 15 74
Their SFM contribution* 65,116,997 4 18
- Pilot phase 16,029,000 1 17**
- GEF-1 49,087,997 3 18***
*forestry related inputs other than protected area management, ** of pilot phase; *** of GEF-1.
191. According to this analysis, of those GEF projects that have forest components, 17-18
percent of the project budgets have actually contributed to productive SFM. There is no
                                                
23 The figures refer to the GEF contribution only, excluding any co-financing.
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significant difference between pilot phase and restructured GEF projects in this respect. A vast
majority of the inputs of the forest-related projects focus on protected area management and
strengthening of national or local conservation administrations and organisations. The productive
SFM activities included mostly community participation and SFM management components in
the buffer zones of protected areas.
192. In addition to the main operational programmes and STRMs, the UNDP-managed SGP
has financed a considerable amount of SFM-related projects. As the maximum budget of a SGP
project is US$50,000, the total volume of project financing through this window remains rather
modest. It is beyond the scope of this report to carry out a detailed analysis of SGP vis-à-vis
SFM.
193. While GEF has focused on the management of protected areas (including the related
sustainable use of biodiversity), it appears to be moving to provide support to “biodiversity
overlay”, i.e., incorporating conservation requirements in the management of nonprotected areas.
This could include such activities as monitoring of the conservation status of species, establishing
set-aside areas, ecological corridors, etc. As stated in section 5.3.3., the GEF has not engaged
itself in providing support to sustainable management of forests that are primarily used for timber
production. This represents a significant constraint for the GEF to contribute to achieving SFM at
global or national levels, neither of which is an explicit goal of GEF.
5.3 Key Issues Related to GEF Funding of SFM
5.3.1 GEF Strategy Relating to Forests
194. The forest-related goal of the GEF is to protect globally significant biodiversity in forest
ecosystems. The present GEF strategy for eaching this goal focuses on the creation and
strengthening of protected areas: “protecting a representative sample of the Earth’s biodiversity”
(UNDP-GEF 1998). The GEF strategy addresses the symptoms of biodiversity loss,
deforestation, and forest degradation through its own inputs, while the root causes are to be
addressed through national or other inputs (see para 5.3.2 on the discussion on incremental costs).
The GEF strategy so far has focused on a “last resort” approach of rescuing remaining
biodiversity hot spots. Protected area management is vital for the conservation of biodiversity,
but it does not really relieve the pressure on the vast majority of forest ecosystems (and the
biodiversity in those areas) which resides in poorly productive agricultural systems, poorly
defined land and resource tenure, and the high profitability of unsustainable resource exploitation
versus the high initial investment costs of sustainable use systems. The GEF explicitly leaves
these issues to be addressed by recipient countries and other sources of funding, and the solutions
are often found in national-level policies and their enforcement.
195. The GEF addresses global benefits that overlap with national benefits in the Biodiversity
Focal Area (Figure 5.1). Their separation on a scientific basis is not always easy, and both are
difficult to define. Therefore, there is a degree of flexibility in defining GEF’s contribution -
leaving it subject to negotiation. The relevant steps in the project preparation during which the
discussions are carried out between the recipient country and GEF experts are  identification of
threats to the biodiversity; determination of necessary interventions required to remove the
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threats (GEF alternative); definitions of activities which would occur regardless of GEF
involvement (realistic baseline); and the definition of national development responsibility
(sustainable development baseline) (UNDP-GEF 1998).
196. It should also be noted that land degradation (see Paragraph 153) is only eligible in
projects where the entry point is one of the GEF’s focal areas (e.g. protected area management).
In view of the magnitude of the problem of land degradation, the GEF’s role is therefore bound to
be limited. SFM should be seen as a similar crosscutting issue in combating land degradationand
contributing to all of the three main focal areas of GEF: biodiversity, climate change, and
international waters. SFM is a major tool in combating land degradation, which in turn is one of
the main threats for biodiversity, climate change (in the form of reduced carbon sequestration), as
well as water availability and quality, particularly in arid and semi-arid areas.
5.3.2 The Concept of “Incremental Cost”
197. The incremental cost “may be interpreted as the costs of achieving global environmental
objectives over and above the costs of national sustainable development” (UNDP-GEF 1998).
The incremental cost is the difference between the GEF alternative and the sustainable
development baseline (Figure 5.3). The GEF has put forth considerable effort in developing and
making the concept operational in different types of projects. However, according to many
observes (interviews carried out for the present study) the incremental cost concept is poorly
applicable for sustainable use projects, in which decision-making criteria tend to be extremely
complex. Decisions are not made purely on ecological grounds, as social, cultural, and economic
criteria are also considered when countries formulate their projects for GEF financing or co-
financing. This is demonstrated also in the incremental cost calculations of ongoing forest-related
GEF projects. The difficulties in making such calculations are expressed in many of the project
documents.
198. In practice, in the past the baseline cost has been simply defined as the total cost of all
ongoing projects by other donors in many of the reviewed projects (see Annex 3). The GEF
alternative is the sum of all ongoing projects plus the estimated project costs of the planned GEF
project, and the incremental cost is the difference between these two. In some other cases, the
incremental cost (or what is accepted as the incremental cost and what is not) is apparently
defined through judgements by the project formulation team.
199. Similar observations on incremental cost calculations were found by the Study of GEF’s
Overall Performance based on the views expressed both by IA task managers and recipient
countries. The “Overall Performance” study did not, however, recommend its abolition but did
urge further streamlining with simpler and more straightforward guidance on calculation
methodologies. This has now been done (e.g., Kumari 1997, Kumari & King 1997, UNDP-GEF
1998). The improvements, however, have not completely solved the problem of addressing
overly complex cases of sustainable use projects where local, national, and global benefits are
produced in concert, and these benefits (and responsibilities) are often indivisible.
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Figure 5.3 GEF Financing of Incremental Cost
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5.3.3 Sustainable Logging and Sustainable Use
200. Although the GEF Corporate Business Plan (1998) emphasises the importance of
sustainable forest management, the plan explicitly states that sustainable logging cannot be
financed by the GEF because the “scientific debate on the matter is still ongoing.” It is worth
pointing out that the ongoing scientific debate has not prevented GEF from financing projects
related to climate change. This is probably due to the fact that there is a convention on climate
change but none on sustainable forest management.
201. As with the Study of the GEF’s Overall Performance, the research conducted for this
report found that GEF has not yet fully succeeded in addressing sustainable use issues in
biodiversity conservation. Only some 18 percent of the GEF inputs to forest-related projects have
contributed to SFM in production forests. Discussions with World Bank and UNDP staff revealed
that protective conservation is still considered as the main objective of GEF interventions. Some
GEF experts, however, would like to see more support to barrier-removal type demonstrations of
how logging can be done in a biodiversity friendly manner in primary forests that would
otherwise be logged in a destructive manner. In some projects the GEF is addressing harvesting
by setting aside (conserving) sub-areas in production forests of high biodiversity in order to make
logging operations less destructive to globally significant biodiversity, found in the area. The
GEF also funds sustainable uses of non-timber forest products, mainly under buffer zone
components. Some observers are of the opinion that such projects have increased in number
recently. The possibilities of achieving conservation, however, through sustainable-use
components have not yet been fully utilised by the GEF. Sustainable use is possibly considered
more risky than protective conservation.
202. Clearly, the raison-d’être of the GEF is generation of global benefits in focal areas. The
GEF serves as the financial mechanism for the CBD and the UNFCCC. The GEF operational
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focal points are often ministries or departments in charge of the environment. The GEF
Secretariat and the coordinating units in the three IAs are mainly, but not solely, staffed by
specialists in environmental protection. For these reasons, sustainable use may have remained
weakly developed in GEF. This was also clearly pointed out in the Study of GEF’s Overall
Performance.
203. A quick review of the composition of the formulation/appraisal teams of the projects
reveals that in most cases there has been limited or no sustainable use expertise. In many cases,
this expertise has been provided by a co-financing agency, and the sustainable use component(s)
of the projects have ended up in the co-financed component of the project (under the "Sustainable
Development Alternative"). In almost every GEF project reviewed for this study, the sustainable
use components were non-GEF financed if there was any co-financing at all in the project. This
would be justified if such components fall under the priorities of the other sources of funding.
From the GEF’s point of view, the sustainable use components apparently have not usually
passed the incremental cost analysis, and the national benefits have been considered to be greater
than the national costs.
204. One specific reason for the absence of sustainable use forest projects/components in GEF,
and GEF/World Bank projects in particular, may be the World Bank policy forbidding any
support for logging/timber utilisation in primary natural forests (see Chapter 4). This policy has
prevented the World Bank and GEF/World Bank from carrying out even pilot projects or
technological development in this field. The ongoing World Bank forest policy and strategy
review process is likely to reassess the rationale of this policy. Many observers are of the opinion
that the policy has been counter-productive.
205. By comparison, the French Fund for the Global Environment (see Box 5.1), a bilateral
financing mechanism similar to GEF, has adopted a more open stance on SFM and sustainable
use. The French Fund has allocated 14 percent of its total financing (vs. 3 percent of GEF) to
sustainable forest management.
5.3.4 Project Preparation and Approval Process
206. According to the Study of GEF’s Overall Performance, the GEF’s project preparation and
approval process is considered lengthy and cumbersome, especially in view of the size of the
grants awarded. Unexpected and unexplained delays are also reported to be common. The
cumbersome project cycle is common to all GEF operational programmes, and no additional
evidence was found that forestry projects would have been treated any differently. It is clear,
however, that the institutional and stakeholder complexities of SFM projects do not make the
preparation process any easier than average, probably on the contrary. This may discourage
countries to submit SFM-related project proposals on production forests to GEF.
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5.3.5 Programme Approach and Ownership Issues
207. Genuine national planning processes or existing plans have not been always used as a
starting point for project planning. In GEF forest projects, only rarely is a reference made to
existing nfps or other sectoral strategies (e.g. Tropical Forest Action Programme).
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Box 5.1 French Fund for the Global Environment (Fonds Français pour
l’Environnement Mondial – (FFEM))
Objective and Beneficiaries
In addition to its contribution to GEF, France has created FFEM to serve as a bilateral instrument to
assist those countries that are poorest or that face serious problems in meeting their obligations of
international conventions.
Description
The eligibility criteria allow financing projects aimed at the protection of the global environment in four
areas: (1) the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, (2) biodiversity protection, (3) the protection of
international waters, and (4) maintenance of the ozone layer. Actions aimed at combating deforestation
and desertification are equally eligible if they fall under any of these four areas.
FFEM projects must have the following characteristics:
• a sustainable and significant effect on global environment;
• projects must be developmental -  preferably investments;
• projects must be mainly financed from other resources; FFEM pays only incremental costs and
complements traditional sources of funding; and
• emphasis on innovative and pilot projects which can be replicated in other zones or sectors.
Organisation
Decisions are made in a steering committee, which is supported by a scientific and technical committee
that has a consultative role. The French Development Agency acts as the FFEM secretariat.
Project Cycle
There are two main phases in the project cycle:
(1) identification, which is achieved when an agreement in principle has been made by the steering
committee which in turn authorises the secretariat to proceed with preparation; and
(2) commitment made by the committee for funds to be disbursed.
Extent and Example of Application
FFEM has a budget allocation of FRF 440 million for the period of 1994-1998. There are eleven projects
contributing to sustainable forest management amounting to FRF 60 million (14 percent of the total).
Assessment
As a bilateral instrument, FFEM’s operation is simpler than the multilateral GEF. However, similar
problems of definition related to the additionality of FFEM components have been experienced. This
complicates the meaningful formulation of projects to address global environmental problems.
Source: FFEM
208. The local ownership of GEF projects appears to be somewhat controversial. According to
the Study of GEF’s Overall Performance, the degree of ownership depends on the project design
and development process. In many cases, this process has been dominated by foreign experts and
consultants. Some recipient country representatives are of the opinion that international priorities
and obscure global concepts dominate the project formulation discussion. This issue is
particularly important in forest-related projects in general (chapter 4.2).
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5.3.6 Private Sector Involvement
209. The GEF was conceived as a financing mechanism mainly for public sector projects.
Private sector representatives are not included in the GEF institutional structure. There are,
however, several GEF trust fund projects which can finance or which are specifically targeted to
private sector projects, most notably the GEF/IFC Small and Medium Scale Enterprise
Programme, the Central American Fund for Environment and Development, and the Terra
Capital Fund (which became operational in October 1998). Details of these GEF instruments can
be found in Chapter 6.
210. It is notable that none of these trust funds has yet financed a private sector forestry
project. According to the fund managers, the reason has been that no forestry proposals have been
submitted. It is likely that potential private sector investors/operators active in forestry do not
know about the availability of such financing, or these trust funds are perceived as conservation
funds. This indicates that the GEF could take special efforts to inform the private sector of the
availability of these instruments. The GEF is currently preparing a paper on modalities to engage
the private sector in its operations without subsidising it.
5.4 Potential for GEF Funding of SFM-related Projects
211. Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that, in its present form, the GEF’s potential
for financing productive SFM-related projects will remain limited to addressing the problem of
sustainable forest management at global and national levels. The institutional and “cultural”
changes that are needed within the GEF would be substantial and are not therefore likely without
an international agreement on such changes.
212. A key issue to be addressed is the broadening of the base of representation and staffing in
all the GEF institutional organs, including the council, beyond the present emphasis on
conservation. Adequate private sector involvement would be an essential prerequisite in this.
Such a broadening of representation would also possibly require splitting some of the organs into
sub-organs, which would deal with projects only in their fields of expertise. From here, it would
be only a short step to Ecosystem Specific GEFs (Forest-GEF, Atmosphere-GEF, Water-GEF,
and Urban-GEF). It is well understood, however,  that currently the GEF fulfills its present
mandate, and the above changes would require substantial revision of this mandate. For example,
when the UN Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought asked the GEF to become its
financial mechanism, the proposal was declined. The reason was that preventing desertification
was considered to be an issue which should be addressed by the countries’ own sustainable
development programmes. The fate of productive SFM may be similar.
213. Nevertheless, the GEF is and will continue to be an important financing mechanism for
forest conservation. What appears to be beyond the GEF's current possibilities, is playing a major
financing instrument for solving the complex problems of deforestation and forest degradation,
not to mention the sustainable development of forest-dependent human communities, in required
scale.
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214. A legally binding global convention on forests, and a possible concomitant high-level
policy decision to use GEF as (one of its) financing mechanism(s), could bring about the policy
changes required for mobilising large-scale financing of SFM in production forests as well
through GEF. The experience on the financing arrangement for the Convention on Combating
Desertification and Drought suggests that this GEF-based option may not be politically feasible
(chapter 7.4.3).
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INNOVATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS
6.1 Typology of Innovative Financing Mechanisms;
6.2 Overview of Innovative Financing Mechanisms;
6.3 Innovative Financing for Specific SFM Activities;
6.4 Forest-based Carbon Offsets;
6.5  Innovative Financing – Preliminary Conclusions
FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY. 70
6. INNOVATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS
215. Innovative financing mechanisms tend to fall into one of two categories. Either they are
designed, applied and developed for a specific purpose (often to remove a specific investment
barrier) related to the financing of environmental projects and enterprises, or they are
conventional financial vehicles used widely in other sectors but that have been adapted and
applied to the specialised requirements of SFM or other emerging investment areas. They are also
referred to as IFIMs (innovative financing and incentive mechanisms), which have been defined
as “(innovative) mechanisms which result in new or increased finance and/or influence the flow
of private costs and benefits in a way that stimulates sustainable forestry” (Richards 1998). This
definition highlights the point that innovative financing mechanisms are often designed to
address the problem of environmental externalities (see Section 3.2.2).
216. In this chapter, innovative financing mechanisms of direct relevance to SFM are
considered. Reference is also made to several “structural mechanisms” (e.g., tax and subsidy
regimes) that could be aptly termed ‘economic instruments’, as they tend to have more overt
political and social considerations beyond the strictly financial. Although a clear line cannot be
drawn between financial and economic mechanisms, the focus of this analysis is on the former.
217.  It should be stressed that the financing mechanisms considered here do not necessarily
entail entirely new and additional resources being made available for forestry. Often innovative
financing mechanisms can constitute a reallocation of priorities, a qualitative enhancement of
existing flows, or changes in the financial incentives prevalent in the forestry sector. In this sense,
they are often designed to be catalytic, barrier-removing, sector-defining, or otherwise enabling
of substantial and sustained private sector investment in SFM.
218. In total, 18 innovative financing mechanisms are considered. These were selected to be
indicative of the available and emerging investment vehicles for SFM and should not be taken as
an exhaustive review.24 In Sections 6.1-6.3 they are classified and briefly assessed according to a
typology developed from the arguments and terminology used throughout this report. The bulk of
the analysis, however, is contained in Annex 4, where each mechanism is considered through a
standardised “Fact Sheet” format. The one exception to this is forestry-based carbon offsets,
which, by virtue of their potential importance for SFM, are considered in greater detail in the
main body of the text (Section 6.4), with further material, including case studies, presented in
Annex 5.
6.1 Typology of Innovative Financing Mechanisms
219. For purposes of clarity, the innovative financing mechanisms reviewed in this report have
been categorised according to the following typology, which seeks to describe the fundamental
nature of the mechanism in question:
A. direct commercial financing mechanisms
                                                
24 An excellent, more exhaustive, and recent review of IFIMs related to tropical forestry can be found in Richards
(1998).
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B. direct concesssionary financing mechanisms
C. market development mechanisms
D. structural development mechanisms
220. The first two groups of direct financing mechanisms (A and B) are clearly closely related.
Both involve the direct transfer of financial resources from source to beneficiary, usually for a
specific purpose. Such transfers can be direct investments, or through debt, or equity, or a
combination of both. The means by which the financial transaction occurs is unique to each
mechanism. A distinction is made, however, between those mechanisms that seek to channel
commercial-rate investments characteristic of the private sector (e.g., from conventional capital
markets) and those that rely wholly or to a degree on concessionary or sub-commercial financing,
such as grants or below market-rate loans.
221. Mechanisms that mediate indirect financing or financing in kind, for example, through
training or technical assistance, play extremely important roles in removing or mitigating barriers
to SFM investment, but their detailed consideration lies outside the remit of this chapter. Many
such mechanisms are briefly considered however in Chapters 3, 4, and 8.
222. The third category of mechanisms (C) are those that seek to create, promote, or develop
new markets for services provided by SFM activities, and which are not recognised as tradable
commodities or services by conventional markets. These mechanisms are direct manifestations of
the commoditisation argument presented in detail in Section 3.2.3 and summarised in Table 3.4.
Their principal aim is to provide forest users and managers with a means of recovering the
incremental costs of providing these services through the market, foregoing the need for less
effective subsidy or compensation arrangements. As SFM is inherently concerned with valuing
the full range of functions played by forests, these market development mechanisms ultimately
seek to provide a direct market-based incentive for forest users to make the transition from
UnSFM to SFM.
223. The fourth and final grouping (D) consists of mechanisms that do not fit neatly within the
other three categories. They have been termed “structural mechanisms” in so far as they address
structural barriers to SFM investment (see Section 3.2.2) which are themselves largely based on
widespread policy failures (such as perverse incentives for UnSFM built into fiscal regimes).
Indeed, the same argument could be made for the market development mechanisms that seek to
redress endemic market failures. Thus, market development mechanisms can be regarded as a
specialised subset of structural mechanisms.
224. As the typology described is based on the nature of the financing mechanism in question,
each of the four categories will contain mechanisms that source and supply finance at different
scales. The question of scale is particularly important for national-level mechanisms and the
degree to which they can support or form part of ongoing structural development processes such
as nfps. This issue is considered in more detail in the next section.
225. As a final point, it should be stressed that the typology described here is intended to be
descriptive rather than analytical. Furthermore, it does not pretend to neatly divide the
mechanisms reviewed below, as in any abstractive classification system there will always be
substantial overlaps (Borges 1956).
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6.2 Overview of Innovative Financing Mechanisms
226. Table 6.1 summarises the key characteristics of the innovative financing mechanisms
reviewed in this report. These are:
• Barriers addressed – these refer to investment barriers to SFM and are either
structural or operational (see Section 3.2).
• Main sources – the principal, actual, or potential sources of the SFM financing flows
channeled through the mechanism in question; these sources are categorised by sector
as public, private commercial or public noncommercial (see Section 3.3.1).
• Main recipients – the principal actual or potential recipients of the SFM financing
flows channeled through the mechanism in question. These sources are categorised in
the same way as the sources (see Section 3.3.2).
• Timing – this refers to the principal stages of the business cycle in which investment
mediated by the financing mechanism in question is likely to be targeted, and is
divided into early, mid and late stages (see Section 3.3.2); as is evident from Table
6.1, structural and market development mechanisms could potentially be accessed at
any stage of the business cycle (see Table 3.7 and Figure 3.6).
• Scale – this provides an estimate of the likely scale of application of the mechanism
in question and can be either local, national, regional (includes sub-regional), or
global.
227. Table 6.1 is intended to serve solely as a point of reference for the more detailed
descriptions and assessments of the innovative financing mechanisms that can be found in the
fact sheets in Annex 4. Its treatment of each mechanism’s defining characteristics is therefore
simplistic so as to enable a brief comparative evaluation of the available innovative means of
channeling financial resources into SFM.
228. In this regard, certain correlations are immediately evident. First, the direct financing
mechanisms tend to address operational barriers to SFM. They provide a means for commercial
and noncommercial forest users and managers in the private sector to mobilise financial resources
for operational activities at all stages of the business cycle. Generally, these resources will not be
forthcoming from existing conventional sources such as capital markets or banks, particularly
regarding early and mid-stage investments. The purpose of such mechanisms is thus to overcome
this barrier to SFM.
229. Second, direct concessionary financing mechanisms tend to operate at local or national
levels. As discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, this is principally due to inefficiencies (e.g.,
high transaction costs) inherent to globally managed financial transfers. Often, however, such
mechanisms provide a channel for foreign financing and particularly ODA within the context of
sectoral development strategies such as nfps. The need to mainstream financial management as a
core component of national-level capacity building in the forestry sector similarily applies to the
structural mechanisms that also (inherently) apply predominantly at national levels. Both these
types of financing mechanism should be tightly coupled to ongoing structural development
processes aimed at removing barriers to SFM investment.
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Table 6.1 Summary of the Key Characteristics of Innovative Financing Mechanisms
Applicable to SFM
Innovative
mechanism
Barriers
addressed
Main sources
(by sector)
Main recipients
(by sector)
Timing
(stage)
Likely scope
A. DIRECT COMMERCIAL FINANCING MECHANISMS
1 portfolio equity
instruments
Operational private commercial private commercial Late stage national
global
2 public-private
instruments
operational public
private commercial
public
private commercial
Early stage
mid-stage
(late stage)
local
national
global
3 private sector
forestry
investment funds
operational private commercial private commercial (midstage)
late stage
national
global
B. DIRECT CONCESSIONARY FINANCING MECHANISMS
4 national
environmental
funds
operational
(structural)
public
private commercial
public
private commercial
private noncommercial
Early stage
midstage
late stage
local national
regional
5 debt-for-nature
swaps
operational
(structural)
public
private commercial
public
private noncommercial
midstage
late stage
local national
6 Conservation trust
funds
operational
(structural)
public
private commercial
private noncommercial
public
private noncommercial
Early stage
midstage
late stage
local
national
regional
7 biodiversity
venture capital
funds
operational public
private commercial
private noncommercial
private commercial
private noncommercial
early stage
midstage
local national
regional
8 small and medium
scale enterprise
credit lines
operational public
private commercial
private noncommercial
private commercial
private noncommercial
early stage
midstage
late stage
local national
9 micro-credit operational
structural
public
private noncommercial
private noncommercial Early stage local
10 small targeted
grants
operational public
private noncommercial
private noncommercial Early stage
midstage
local
C. MARKET DEVELOPMENT MECHANISMS
11 forestry-based
carbon offsets
structural
(operational)
public
private commercial
private noncommercial
public
private commercial
private noncommercial
Early stage
midstage
late stage
global
12 bio-prospecting
fees
structural
(operational)
(public)
private commercial
public
private noncommercial
Early stage
midstage
late stage
global
13 water resource
use charges
structural
(operational)
public
private commercial
private noncommercial
private commercial
private noncommercial
Early stage
midstage
late stage
local national
regional
14 tradable
development
rights
structural public
private noncommercial
private commercial
private noncommercial
Early stage
midstage
late stage
national
global
15 marketable forest
protection and
management
obligations
structural public
(private commercial &
noncommercial)
public Early stage
midstage
late stage
global
D. STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS
16 fiscal instruments structural private commercial
(private noncommercial)
public
private commercial
private noncommercial
Early stage
midstage
late stages
national
17 national forest
funds
structural
operational
public
private commercial
public
private noncommercial
Early stage
midstage
late stage
local
national
18 environmental
performance
bonds
structural private commercial public midstage
late stage
local national
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230. By contrast, the market development mechanisms are predominantly global in scope. This
can be attributed largely to the disjunction between the demand or willingness to pay for forest
services such as carbon sequestration or biodiversity protection, which is manifest in developing
countries, and the supply of these services, which is principally in developing countries in the
tropics. One implication of this observation is the need for international regulations to facilitate
the development of these increasingly globalised market structures (see Chapters 4 and 5)25.
231. Third, many of the mechanisms reviewed rely on mixed public and private sector
financial sources, a generalisation that conceals a wide array of different funding arrangements.
Prevalent amongst these is the use of catalytic public sector concessionary financing to leverage
more substantial resources from the private commercial sector. Often, the allocation of public
sector resources in this way offers reassurance or guarantees to private sector investors,
particularly related to risk mitigation. In addition, such resources can be used as transfer
payments to subsidise the incremental costs often incurred by forest managers implementing
SFM in the early stages of operations.
6.3 Innovative Financing for Specific SFM Activities
232. As described throughout this report, SFM comprises an extremely wide range of
activities. In this section, the applicability of innovative financing mechanisms to different SFM
activities is considered. For this assessment, SFM activities are grouped into four types:
• production – multipurpose natural or semi-natural forest management that
includes extraction of timber (includes activities such as: reduced impact logging,
enrichment planting, forest rehabilitation or reforestation for subsequent
production management, and agroforestry).
• conservation – is defined as multipurpose natural or semi-natural forest
management, which excludes extraction of timber and generally focuses on
biodiversity protection (includes activities such as preventing deforestation, forest
rehabilitation or reforestation for subsequent conservation management, and
small-scale extraction of NTFPs).
• plantation – refers to the establishment or management of plantations (includes the
provision of services such as carbon sequestration and watershed protection that
can be integrated into plantation management strategies).
• product industries – includes all industries, of whatever scale, dedicated to value-
added downstream processing, manufacturing, distribution, marketing, and end-
use of extracted forest goods (includes both timber and NTFPs).
233. Again, such categorisation is intended only for simplicity’s sake and is far from
prescriptive. More detailed assessment of the SFM activities potentially eligible under different
financing mechanisms can be found under the “Replicability for forests” heading in the
appropriate fact sheet (see Annex 4).
                                                
25 This is most clearly illustrated by the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC that makes provision for the setting up of
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Effectively, the CDM represents a new market for greenhouse gas
mitigation services provided at the project level, including carbon sequestration and storage in forests.
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234. Table 6.2 assesses each innovative financing mechanism’s applicability to these four SFM
categories as: definitely yes, possibly, unlikely, or definitely no. The possibly and unlikely
categories imply that the mechanism’s applicability is conditional on the way the mechanism is
developed or managed; the circumstances of the investment in question; the requirements of the
financing source; or a range of other factors. Further details can be found in the appropriate fact
sheets (see Annex 4). Also included are very approximate estimates of each mechanism’s funding
potential for the range of eligible SFM activities. No attempt is made to quantify this potential.
Instead a three-point scale of low/medium/high is used. This scale is intended solely to be used
for comparative purposes within the context of Table 6.2. It should be stressed that because many
of the mechanisms considered are either as yet unimplemented, or implemented in non-SFM
sectors, this estimate of funding potential is again conditional on a whole range of issues. These
are also considered in greater depth in the appropriate fact sheet.
235. Again, certain observations can be made from the cursory comparative assessment
provided by Table 6.2. First and foremost, it is immediately apparent that conservation activities
have the greatest potential access to innovative financing. This is unsurprising, as many of the
innovative mechanisms were explicitly designed to address the lack of conventional financing
available for conservation and biodiversity preservation. Some commentators, however,  argue
that greater attention should be paid to NFM activities that include timber extraction, exemplified
by the need to convert logging operations onto a more sustainable footing through the widespread
introduction of reduced impact logging techniques. This implies the need to consider new
innovative financing mechanisms designed to this end, or the broadening of the objectives or
scope of existing or proposed mechanisms considered here.
236. This point is further reinforced by the evidently different focus of commercial and
concessionary direct financing mechanisms. Innovative market-rate financing from private
commercial sources (see Table 6.1) is largely targeted towards extractive operations in
plantations and natural forests managed for production, as well as the downstream forest product
industries. Conversely, concessionary financial sources tend to be designed for conservation
activities. The obvious implication is that, by choice or by design, commercial interests in the
private sector will remain largely oblivious to the range of concessionary financing mechanisms,
particularly those managed or developed by international institutions (see Chapters 4 and 5). It as
been made clear that the focus of this report (and indeed the focus of the international
community) should be on finding ways to engage the private sector in SFM. As Table 6.2
suggests, many of the innovative financing mechanisms available are inherently inappropriate for
this objective.
237. Second, although market development mechanisms offer perhaps the most significant
potential for ensuring the widespread implementation of SFM by providing financial incentives
for forest users and managers to provide a range of services (other than timber production), their
funding potential is more limited than the other categories of mechanisms. This is with the
notable exception of forestry-based carbon offsets, which are addressed in greater detail in
section 6.4. This heightens the imperative to ensure that ongoing market developments based
around these mechanisms are structured in a way that streamlines transactions (which translates
into ease of recoverability of incremental costs incurred by forest managers). It also ensures the
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market is accessible to all types of forest users, particularly at the small-scale. A similar argument
is applicable to the structural mechanisms considered here (category D).
238. Third, as described in Chapter 3, SFM activities often require a combination of different
types of financing from different sources. Table 6.2, taken in conjunction with Table 6.1,
reinforces this point, particularly with regards funding requirements at different stages of the
business cycle. It is essential therefore for effective ways to be developed of combining both
innovative and conventional financing mechanisms, to access different scales of financing flows
from a range of domestic and foreign sources. Such considerations should be incorporated a
priori into the earliest possible design and implementation phases of these and other financing
mechanisms. In addition, easily accessible investment packaging and finance structuring facilities
should be developed at global, national and local levels. This is developed further in chapter 8.
Table 6.2 Applicability and Funding Potential of Innovative Financing Mechanisms for
SFM
Categories of SFM activities
Innovative mechanism Fundingpotential Production Conser-vation Plantation
Product
industries
A. DIRECT COMMERCIAL FINANCING MECHANISMS
1 portfolio equity instruments Medium yes possibly yes yes
2 public-private instruments High yes yes yes yes
3 private sector forestry investment
funds
Medium yes unlikely yes yes
B. DIRECT CONCESSIONARY FINANCING MECHANISMS
4 national environmental funds High possibly yes unlikely possibly
5 debt-for-nature swaps High unlikely yes possibly no
6 conservation trust funds Low no yes no unlikely
7 biodiversity venture capital funds Medium unlikely yes no possibly
8 small and medium scale
enterprise credit lines High yes yes unlikely possibly
9 micro-credit Medium yes possibly yes yes
10 small targeted grants Low possibly yes unlikely possibly
C. MARKET DEVELOPMENT MECHANISMS
11 forestry-based carbon offsets High yes yes yes unlikely
12 bio-prospecting fees Low unlikely yes no possibly
13 water resource use charges Medium yes yes yes no
14 tradable development rights Low possibly yes unlikely no
15 marketable forest protection and
management obligations Medium yes yes no no
D. STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS
16 fiscal instruments High yes yes yes yes
17 national forest funds Medium yes possibly yes unlikely
18 environmental performance bonds Medium yes unlikely yes unlikely
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6.4 Forestry-based Carbon Offsets
6.4.1 Background
239. As mentioned earlier, the potential of forestry-based carbon offsets to influence SFM
financing warrants their consideration in greater detail. This section can thus be regarded as an
extended Fact Sheet C/11. The text included here is further expanded in Annex 5.
240. It should be noted that while the term “carbon offsets” embodies the concept of
commoditisation of carbon sequestration and storage services provided by forests, the actual
mechanisms for creating this market are joint implementation, and the CDM. “Forestry-based
carbon offsets” is thus used as a generic term encompassing these specific financing mechanisms.
241. During the last ten years, forestry-based carbon offsets have evolved from a theoretical
idea into a market-based instrument for accomplishing the global environmental objectives of the
UNFCCC, signed in Rio in 1992 during UNCED. A major step forward in this process was the
signing by 170 countries of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC in December 1997. The most
important aspect of the Kyoto Protocol is the adoption of legally binding commitments by 37
developed countries and economies in transition (collectively called the “Annex 1 countries”) to
reduce their GHG emissions by an average of 5.2 percent below 1990 levels (the “baseline”) by
the years 2008-2012. Crucially, forestry and land-use change activities were included amongst
the recognised strategies that countries could use in meeting these GHG reduction commitments.
242. The protocol also provides for the use of three “flexibility mechanisms” designed to
facilitate the attainment of these commitments, principally (in theory) by reducing the
implementation costs of the GHG reduction targets. These mechanisms are:
• QELRO trading – the international transfer of national allotments of emission rights
or Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Obligations (QELROs);
• Joint Implementation  – the creation of emissions reduction credits through
transnational investments between Annex 1 industrial countries and/or companies;
• The CDM – a new mechanism resembling joint implementation that allows for the
creation of Certified Emission Reduction credits in developing countries, regulated by
a newly formed central authority.
243. The CDM’s purpose is to assist non-Annex I parties (developing countries) in making
progress towards sustainable development and contributing to the UNFCCC objective. It also
assists Annex I parties (developed countries and economies in transition) in achieving their
QELROs. Non-Annex I parties will gain the economic, developmental, and environmental
benefits from implemented projects that generate Certified Emission Reductions for export.
Annex I Parties may use the certified reductions to contribute to compliance with part of their
emission reduction targets, as determined by the Convention.
244. The CDM will act as an international body to oversee emission reduction projects that
take place in developing countries not under emission restrictions. Like joint implementation,
projects must be shown to be additional to what would have occurred otherwise and to have the
express approval of the host government. In addition to the joint implementation requirements,
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projects must also be certified by an independent third party. In effect the CDM, therefore,  is a
hybrid mechanism that brings together joint implementation and emissions trading with voluntary
developing country participation.
245. One important facet of the CDM is that its resulting Certified Emission Reduction credits
will apparently be bankable from inception (probably 2000). What this means is that credits
granted by the CDM up until the first reporting period (2008-2012) will be cumulatively
available for “spending” during the reporting period (though project credits may also continue
throughout the reporting period). This creates a strong incentive to engage in CDM projects as
early as possible, as each year of emissions reductions adds to the transaction value at the point of
“spending” (i.e., 2008-2012). Other major components of the CDM include:
• project activities must be additional to policy actions that may cause the same
outcomes;
• the CDM is open to participation by either private or public entities, or combinations
of the two; and
• the CDM also has a mandate to use a portion of its proceeds to assist countries that are
particularly vulnerable to climate change.
246. The recent CoP to the UNFCCC in Buenos Aires, Argentina,  November 1998, agreed a
timetable for finalising the necessary rules, structures, and methodologies for the implementation
of these flexible mechanisms. The deadline has been set for CoP6, which is scheduled for
October 2000.
247. In relation to forestry, both joint implementation and the CDM can be seen as important
financial mechanisms based on the valuation of an externality of global importance. Both, though
particularly the CDM, have the potential to mobilise significant financial resources for SFM
activities.
6.4.2 Financing Potential
248. Flexibility mechanisms provide a variety of opportunities for investments in pursuit of
clean and sustainable development. Most estimates indicate that a global market in emissions
trading could be in the tens of billions of dollars annually by the first commitment period
(2008-2012), if there was full and free trading with developing countries through the CDM (see,
for instance, a recent study carried out by the Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT) for
the World Bank (Ellerman et al. 1998). While a portion of such theoretical sums will consist of
transfers between industrial countries, particularly the Economies in Transition of Eastern
Europe, a substantial percentage will also flow to developing countries. How these sums are
apportioned, which countries will be best positioned to take advantage of these new capital flows,
and the degree to which regulatory mechanisms can control emissions trading remains to be
determined. It is vitally important, however,  that investment priorities be set by the developing
countries themselves rather than by the outside buying parties who are less likely to appreciate
the secondary positive (or negative) values which different investment tracks can bring in
different socioeconomic situations.
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249. One of the major advantages of trading in carbon offsets through joint
implementation/CDM is that it could represent a new source of capital which is targeted towards
sustainable development ideals, but which is project specific. Potential capital flows to these
types of projects could be very large, if industrial nations make a concerted effort on climate
change. With the continuing reductions in ODA from the OECD to the G-77, this could be an
important facet in encouraging investments down environmentally appropriate paths.
250. Besides representing a new source of capital, extensive utilisation of project-level carbon
trading mechanisms could lead to technological leapfrogging for developing countries. This can
occur by accelerating the adoption of clean and efficient technologies. In this context, biomass
energy can bring a new dimension to forestry (see Annex 5). The opportunity for an outside
concern to earn Certified Emission Reductions for providing or financing the best available
technologies – rather than outdated or used equipment – could help overcome the higher capital
costs and lack of information that disadvantage such technologies in many developing countries.
Once in place, developing countries can begin to establish their own competence with various
new technologies or techniques, which can catalyse new service and trade opportunities in their
own right.
6.4.3 SFM and Carbon Offset Financing
251. Biomass energy comprises one of a wide range of carbon-oriented project-scale
interventions, which include direct preservation, reforestation, and the reduction of the negative
impacts of forest management and harvesting  (Brown et al. 1996, Moura Costa 1996a). It
remains uncertain, however, which forestry activities will be accepted as means to implement the
objectives of the Kyoto Protocol. The IPCC is currently working on a “Special Report on Land
Use, Land Use Change and Forestry,” which will provide the information required by decision-
makers to decide on this issue. A final position is expected to be agreed upon during the COP6 of
the UNFCCC, in the second half of the year 2000.
252. Tropical countries rich in forest resources have the potential to implement a series of project
based activities with positive carbon benefits. Other less forested countries in the tropics can also
benefit through rehabilitation; stopping degradation; establishing new forest-cover; including
plantations and integrated agroforestry systems; as well as (possibly) efficiency improvements in
wood processing and manufacturing industries.
253. In the context of forestry and conservation practices, however, it should be recognised
that not all projects that appear to have positive GHG effects are conceptually valid as carbon
offsets. For example, existing national parks may not be considered to generate carbon offsets;
these forests were already in existence when the concept of carbon sequestration arose.
Therefore, simply renaming them as “carbon offset projects” does not involve any active removal
of CO2 from the atmosphere.
254. Worldwide, several million hectares of forests are currently under forest management
regimes related to GHG mitigation funding. To date, more than twenty-five forestry projects have
already been funded through joint implementation mechanisms (see Annex 5). These projects
have taken place in more than fifteen countries, financed by government, NGO, or private sector
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concerns and implemented by community organisations, NGOs, and private sector companies.
Four case studies, including the well-known Costa Rican programme, are profiled in depth in
Annex 5.
6.4.4 Issues
255. Despite potential advantages, there are objections legitimately raised against the concept
of trading in carbon offsets through joint implementation/CDM. Chief among these objections is
the fear, among developing countries, that agreeing to an emissions trading system will lead to
mounting diplomatic and economic pressure to undertake emissions commitments themselves.
Other issues being raised include: potential aid reduction; emissions slippage; industrial countries
cornering the offset market; marginal cost pricing of offsets; and increased conditionality on
investments (Stuart & Sekhran 1996). Furthermore, lobbies from within both the developed and
developing world communities are demanding that OECD countries should not be allowed to
avoid their own domestic emission reduction responsibilities.
256. In addition, optimistic predictions of the CDM’s potential (such as those noted above) are
increasingly being questioned. Issues cited in this context range from the limited permanence of
carbon stored in land-use projects, the declining cost-effectiveness of carbon offset forestry
investments, and conflicting investor and host country interests (e.g., Smith et al. 1999).
257. If structured properly, however, trading in carbon offsets through joint
implementation/CDM could be advantageous to both public and private sectors in developing
countries. Advantages could include:
• the injection of new capital, additional to current aid funding and traditional trade
sources;
• access to new sources of funding, technology, and expertise to assist in the
implementation of national priorities;
• carbon offset investment in the forestry sector could be directed to: implementation of
national land use plans, forest conservation efforts, consolidation of national parks,
rehabilitation of degraded areas, development of plantations and farm forestry,
strengthening of forestry sector institutions and systems for improved management;
and   
• Investment in the energy sector could be directed to reduce dependence on fossil
fuels, including the utilisation of renewable biomass energy sources.
258. If such actions were carried out concertedly, increased employment generation and
economic growth would result. Countries might gain better access to external markets through
the use of Best Available Technologies, potentially associated with independent certification
(through ISO, ITTO 2000, or FSC). Forestry initiatives to mitigate GHG emissions would also
probably have positive effects on the objectives of other UNCED commitments, notably the
Biodiversity Convention and Agenda 21.
259. It is becoming apparent that a flexible CDM is important to future acceptance of the
Kyoto Protocol by many countries. At this stage, however, the CDM remains poorly defined and
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it seems clear that a large number of countries and interest groups have their own interpretations
of it. Developing country governments want to use it to improve financial flows in their direction.
Certain social and environmental advocates see it as a redistribution mechanism against historical
development inequity. Other environmental groups see it as a way to enhance capital flows to
forest conservation and sustainable forest management.
260. A further question involves the operational structure of the CDM. While some see it as a
fairly simple regulator of emission transaction projects, others view it as a direct financing
participant in projects, much along the lines of the GEF. While some industrial countries clearly
prefer the former model, many developing countries prefer the latter, as it would seemingly give
them far greater control in spending priorities. The nature of the institutions(s) or organisation(s)
that will be in charge of the CDM is also under debate. As noted above, the CDM has a mandate
to use a portion of its proceeds to assist countries particularly vulnerable to climate change. It
remains to be seen, however,  how the CDM will make priorities, how the transfers will occur,
and the degree to which added transaction fees (the presumed source of proceeds for vulnerability
abatement) may impair market efficiency.
6.5 Innovative Financing – Preliminary Conclusions
261. The repeated assumption underlying this report is that efforts should be focused on
mobilising private sector financing for SFM operations. However, for new resources to be
channeled into SFM rather than “business-as-usual” UnSFM, structural barriers must be
addressed, particularly those key policy and market failures discussed in Chapter 3 which provide
“perverse incentives” for forest users (Richards 1998). Generally speaking, such structural
activities have been the preserve of conventional public sector financing mechanisms such as
those discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Such conventional sources of finance, however, have been,
and are likely to continue to be, insufficient for this broad purpose. Attention should be paid to
how innovative financing might “step into the breach,” and in particular how combinations of
mechanisms might be used to remove outstanding operational and structural barriers on both
case-specific or widespread bases. Inherently this will require greater collective efforts from both
public and private sectors.
262. In summary:
• Existing financing mechanisms are, for the most part, inadequate or inappropriate as a
means to facilitate private sector investment in SFM (particularly productive
activities). This is largely because the requirements and disbursement conditions are
too complex, cumbersome, or slow, or because they are mostly focused at promoting
forest conservation, rather than multipurpose forestry integrating conservation with
other productive activities.
• This said, private sector investors in SFM could make better use of emerging
innovative financing mechanisms as a means of complementing their investments
and/or removing barriers that prevent larger capital flows.
• In this light, innovative financing mechanisms designed to channel concessionary
financing must be targeted towards removing key structural barriers to private sector
SFM investments.
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• Compatibility and coordination of market-rate and concessionary financing
mechanisms is necessary to provide catalytic and operational support for the
investment cycle of private sector SFM activities; this is particularly the case for the
market-based and non-market financing mechanisms designed to internalise the
incremental costs of providing the full range of forest goods and services.
• Greater awareness of the possibilities of public-private sector partnerships is needed,
based on whatever innovative financing mechanisms, tailoured to country-specific
conditions can be designed.
263. One emerging innovative financing mechanism relating to forestry-based carbon offsets,
which is based on the commoditisation (or market creation) of the carbon sequestration and
storage function of forests, goes some way to responding to these conclusions and criticisms. At
the same time, it represents what might potentially be a significant new financing resource for
SFM activities. There is a strong case for trying to replicate this model for other forest goods and
services.
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PART III. PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY FUNDING
7. FINANCING STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT
264. In this chapter an attempt is made to map out a comprehensive strategy for financing sus-
tainable forest management based on the analysis of previous chapters. The strategy is addressed
at both international and national levels. First, the general goal and objectives are defined. Sec-
ond, the main elements of the proposed strategy are considered. Strategic interventions at inter-
national, regional, national, and local levels are then identified. Finally, the need to address inter-
national policy constraints is recalled. The core component of this international level strategy is
an Investment Promotion Agency as a new body to focus efforts in this field. It is presented in
detail in Chapter 8.
7.1 Goal
265. The ultimate goal of the financing strategy is to raise the necessary resources for achiev-
ing SFM worldwide, including revenue generation of the sector itself, as well as private and pub-
lic investment from domestic and international sources. Of particular importance is the role of
public sector financing in addressing structural constraints and in leveraging private investment.
266. It is recognised that deforestation and forest degradation can only partly be addressed by
sector-specific measures, as their root causes often lie in policies and actions outside forestry.
The respective broader structural problems are frequently linked with poverty in rural areas. For-
estry can contribute to subsistence livelihoods and poverty alleviation, but in sector-specific in-
terventions, structural problems can be addressed only to the extent in which they are directly re-
lated to the management and utilization of forest resources. Therefore, multisectoral integrated
financing measures are required to address the overall needs for achieving SFM in developing
countries. 26
7.2 Objective
267. To reach the above goal, three key questions need to be answered (United Nations 1997):
(i) How do we raise the level of financing to achieve the transition from unsustainable
to sustainable practices as it is recognised that in many cases initial investment
outlays will be necessary?
(ii) How do we change the pattern of financial flows from UnSFM toward SFM?
(iii) How do we improve the efficiency and effectiveness of available finance thereby
reducing the need for additional finance for SFM?
268. The focus of the international debate has traditionally been on the mobilisation of new
and additional resources from concessional sources. This remains an important target, but, recog-
                                                
26 These lie outside the remit of this analysis.
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nising the difficulties with development financing under a changing paradigm , the emphasis is
increasingly moving towards:
• using the existing sources and mechanisms more efficiently, and
• tapping emerging new sources and instruments, in particular private capital flows.
269. This overall shift is linked with new global realities that are all relevant to the forestry
sector. These include the globalisation of markets, decentralisation of developmental responsi-
bilities, privatisation of natural resource management and utilisation, new market-state relation-
ships, globalisation of environmental and developmental problems and related inequity, as well
as the strengthening of civil society in policy and implementation (UNDP 1997, Pearce & Steele,
undated).
270. Any global strategy that addresses these realities is bound to be general in its approach,
drawing on a mixture of mechanisms and instruments that would be applicable in specific coun-
try or project conditions.
271. An overarching objective can, however, be identified:
To mainstream sustainable forest management in the investment strategies of the public
and private sector at national and international levels, based on the recognition that SFM
is a profitable and ethically attractive investment target.
272. The concept of profit is understood broadly in this context to include various net benefits
derived at local, national, or global levels from sustainably managed forest resources. Main-
streaming is seen from two perspectives:
(i) raising the level of SFM financing so as to correspond with its potential contribu-
tion to socioeconomic development and environmental conservation; and
(ii) integrating SFM considerations and components into investments in sustainable
agriculture, biodiversity conservation, mitigation of climate change, rural devel-
opment, etc.
7.3 Elements of the Financing Strategy
273. The proposed financing strategy is comprehensive in its approach including strategic in-
terventions at both international and national levels (see Sections 7.4 and 7.5). A number of
common features which are applicable in a large number of countries can be identified including
revenue generation within the forestry sector itself, removal of structural and operational barriers,
commoditisation of environmental and social benefits of forests, tying financial support with per-
formance and aid reform, and the development of mechanisms for leveraging private sector in-
vestment and public-private partnerships. These elements are discussed in some detail below.
274. It should, however, be recognised that national situations vary extensively from forest rich
countries to countries with low forest cover. Each situation requires its own specific solutions
considering environmental socioeconomic and institutional conditions. These differences are re-
FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY. 85
flected in how various mechanisms can work and how funds can be raised from different sources
in national situations.
7.3.1 Revenue Generation
275. Financing can only be effective in achieving SFM if it can be used in an enabling envi-
ronment. Unless policy and market failure problems have been tackled, it is unrealistic to expect
private capital flows to stimulate SFM (Richards 1998). In view of the magnitude of resource re-
quirements needed to address policy and market failure (cf. Section 3.1), the key issue is not fi-
nancing per se but how positive financial incentives can be created for SFM. The focus should
therefore be two-fold:
(a) revenue generation within the sector and ensuring adequate reinvestment into
SFM from that revenue; this includes increased capture of resource rents from
publicly owned forest resources to finance SFM, and various fiscal instruments
which are targeted at restructuring tax and subsidy regimes to provide financial in-
centives for socially desirable activities and disincentives for undesirable ones2728;
and
(b) high productivity in the use of land, labor, capital, and other production factors.
276. When operations are profitable, they can be financed from traditional sources. Absence of
market and policy failures is an essential precondition for reaching efficiency (cf. Pearce &
Steele, undated).
7.3.2 Removal of Structural and Operational Barriers
277. It has been strongly argued that SFM should not need any additional resources from out-
side the forestry sector (e.g., Repetto & Sizer 1996). Some of the structural and operational barri-
ers preventing investment in SFM, however, often require targeted interventions from the public
sector. In addition, the environmental and social benefits of forests may not be forthcoming if
they cannot be recognised by those who produce them. Private sector decision-making on re-
source management and utilization must be motivated by appropriate incentives, so that the over-
all goal of SFM can be achieved. Enabling structural frameworks are key. Market-based instru-
ments are also essential vehicles in this process, complemented by targeted financing mecha-
nisms. The key issue is not the volume and sources of existing and potential financial flows, but
how cab various financing mechanisms contribute to incentives for SFM (cf. Richards 1998).
                                                
27 The discussion on mechanisms related to increased rent capture is not included in this study as they are being
analyzed in detail as part of an on-going World Bank study for IFF.
28 See Annex 5, D/16 for details.
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7.3.3 Commoditisation of Environmental and Social Benefits of Forests
278. Recent trends towards the commoditisation of forest benefits at global, national and local
levels offer for each forest, through its owners and managers, new possibilities to capture the
value of at least part of the environmental and social benefits that have not been recognised by
markets in the past. In this way, the objective function of forest management is expanded to cover
not only timber and non-timber forest products but also hydrological services, carbon sequestra-
tion, ecotourism, and other biodiversity benefits. Each type of benefit will require its own market
instruments. These will need to be tailored to specific local conditions, as environmental and so-
cial benefits vary extensively according to the type and location of the forest resource.
279. While offering new possibilities to create revenue for investment, there are two kinds of
concern to be addressed in their implementation:
(i) Unequal treatment. Similar forests may not be treated in the same way due to site-
specific factors, particularly location with regard to possible beneficiaries. For ex-
ample, forests that are located in watersheds supplying fresh water for big cities
will be valued differently from forests in watersheds around agricultural zones.
(ii) Limited contribution to SFM. Each instrument emphasises a particular aspect of
forest benefits. This is likely to limit their contribution to SFM, or even impede it,
if investment decisions are guided by a single goal. This problem is particularly
associated with global benefits (cf. Chapter 5), and, for example, raises the un-
founded specter of carbon sequestration leading to the clearing of natural forests
for fast-growing plantations.
280. The concerns related to global benefits can be duly addressed through the development of
appropriate ground rules at the international level, which should consider both the direct and indi-
rect impacts of various single-issue instruments on forest management. The use of national-level
policy frameworks (e.g., within the context of nfps) and local-level participatory decision-making
on forest management goals will ensure that such single-issue goals are adequately considered in
the context of national and local priorities before investment decisions are made.
7.3.4 Tying Financial Support with Performance and Aid Reform
281. Conditionalities have been widely used as part of concessional financing mechanisms.
These conditionalities have usually been linked with the necessary preconditions for effective
implementation at the project level. Less attention has been given, however, to linking imple-
mentation performance with future funding. Such a link would test the absorption capacity and
degree of commitment (financial and non-financial) of recipient parties and would also improve
the predictability of concessional funding.
282. At the national level, performance assessment can be linked with the nfp and its measur-
able indicators which cover both the progress of the policy process, input allocation, activities
carried out, outputs achieved, as well as changes in forests and their values. The various national
and operational-level C&I for SFM are also useful tools for monitoring and evaluating  perform-
ance, although many of the indicators report on aspects of forest status which changes only over
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longer periods of time. At the local level, certification of forest management can in certain condi-
tions be a useful tool for performance assessment.
283. As regards financing, performance assessment should also include necessary aspects of
good governance including transparency and accountability in the use of external funds.
284. With this kind of approach, it would be possible to switch from the traditional mode of
aid, which is donor-driven and pretends to be donor-controlled, to country commitment and con-
trol in implementation. The nfp is a major planning tool in this regard. This is an essential change
of approach to improve the efficiency of technical assistance and other development aid (see
chapter 7.5 for detailed discussion on nfps).
285. Without a fundamental improvement of aid policies that tie financial flows to national
policy reforms and implementation performance, ODA will not be able to create enabling condi-
tions for SFM investment without the risk of delaying necessary structural adjustments.
7.3.5 Mechanisms for Private Sector Participation and Public-Private Partnerships
286. The financing strategy is targeted at facilitating the role of the private sector as investor
in, and implementor of, SFM while the role of the public sector is to create enabling conditions
and leverage private investment.
287. A major ongoing International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) study
on private sector participation in SFM shows that in many countries there is a shift towards a
greater participation of the private sector in forestry. Not only are countries encouraging in-
creased private ownership, but they are also attempting to attract private interest in forest utilisa-
tion and management. This is further coupled with a greater reliance on market-based approaches
in guiding forest operators towards more efficient and sustainable forest management and indus-
trial utilization (Landell-Mills et al. 1999). These initiatives are a continuation of various forms
of public-private sector partnerships, which have become increasingly common in the natural re-
source sectors, including forestry.
288. Partnerships between the public and private sectors appear to emerge easily when there is
a need to address a widely recognised crisis (Gentry & Hernandez 1997). Deforestation and its
negative impacts on microclimate, water supply to downstream communities, and soil erosion,
qualify under such a definition when “safety thresholds” have been passed, as has recently hap-
pened in China and Central America. Forest fires are another example that may kick-start the
government into enacting difficult policy measures and engaging the private sector. Under busi-
ness-as-usual, this would probably not have been politically possible (recent examples include
Indonesia and Mexico).
289. Underlying requirements for public-private partnerships are thus twofold:
(1) The risk for catastrophes starts endangering major private sector interests, such as invest-
ments in industrial plants and infrastructure, or forest integrity in concession areas.
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(2) It is recognised that the government alone cannot address these risks, such that it is easier
to unite forces through public-private sector partnerships to better allocate available re-
sources.
290. Partnerships may also emerge without crises if broad awareness-raising has taken place
for other reasons or there is wide recognition of win-win opportunities.
291. There are many different types of partnerships ranging from informal consultations to
contractual arrangements where financial commitments are made by both sectors. Joint forest
management in its various forms is an example that allows input provision, benefit-sharing, and
participation in ways that can be tailoured to meet local conditions. Although increasing rapidly,
experience in the forestry sector on public-private partnerships is still limited compared to other
sectors (e.g., water).
292. A number of preconditions have been identified for successful public-private partnerships
in natural resource-based activities (cf. Gentry & Fernandez 1997, Fry 1998):
• the need for action to be broadly recognised, often due to a crisis in the supply of for-
est products and services (fuel, watershed protection) or a natural catastrophe (hurri-
cane, fire, etc.);
• the drive and commitment of a few individuals to realise true partnerships of signifi-
cance;
• acceptance by other interested parties that their individual needs can be met through
involvement in the cooperative process;
• credibility and transparency to create and maintain commitment: a high degree of trust
and at least predictability is often necessary between the parties involved;
• as partnerships are context-based, there must be flexible ways to implement them in
varying socioeconomic and physical conditions;
• the creation of partnerships takes time, from the initial understanding of the problem
and its possible solution through to implementation; and
• industry’s participation is best secured when either their own interests are at risk, or
they can participate in taking preventive action and can see profitability improvements
as a result.
293. The development of appropriate partnership mechanisms needs to be tailored to specific
country/local conditions. Costa Rica is a good example of how various financing mechanisms
targeted at sustainable forestry and particularly related to the commoditisation of environmental
benefits can be developed through private-public sector partnerships. Many of these contain in-
novative elements and are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 and Annex 5.
294. Public-private partnerships are also becoming increasingly common at the local level. A
useful summary of the current situation in company-community partnerships, including out-
grower and farm forestry schemes, joint ventures, community enterprises, management and har-
vesting contracts, forest land renting, etc., is found in Landell-Mills et al. (1998).
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295. Investment in SFM offers a whole range of options for public-private partnerships that
become realistic when the necessary preconditions are in place (see Chapter 3). Particular atten-
tion should be paid to integrating those concessionary and market-rate financing mechanisms
which seek to internalise both global and national externalities. Chapter 8 addresses this question
in further detail.
7.4 International and Regional Level Financing Strategies
296. With these considerations on the context of financing of SFM, a series of strategic inter-
ventions can be identified for application at global, regional, national, and local levels (Table
7.1). In general, they are targeted at creating enabling conditions for SFM, aimed at removal or
lowering of structural and operational barriers; raising funds and promoting SFM investments;
and development and application of new financing instruments and strengthening of existing
ones.
7.4.1 International-level Interventions
297. The following list of principal areas of strategic intervention are suggested at international
level:
(a) Continue to strengthen policy frameworks as an important area of barrier removal
at the international level, including improvement of the international regime re-
lated to sustainable forest management. This would require better coordination
between existing instruments and institutional arrangements so as to ensure a
comprehensive and balanced approach to SFM, rather than the current tendency to
promote single-issue goals such as biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestra-
tion, etc.
(b) Promote commoditisation or the creation of marketable value for various forest
products and services which are not presently recognised in the marketplace, in-
cluding carbon sequestration, watershed protection and erosion control, biodiver-
sity, ecotourism, etc. As regards “global” or cross-border benefits, which are ex-
pected to play an increasingly important role, internationally agreed ground rules
and procedures will have to be established to provide the necessary framework
which international investors can comfortably rely on.
(c) Promote commercial and other investment in SFM, including awareness raising on
investment opportunities and removal of barriers to SFM, through the establish-
ment of an IPA. This activity is the cornerstone of the proposed strategy and is
elaborated in detail in Chapter 8.
(d) Carefully target concessional funding at the elimination of structural and opera-
tional barriers to SFM and at leveraging private investment.
(e) Develop and apply new and innovative approaches and mechanisms and improve
their effectiveness as potential instruments for financing SFM. This includes im-
provement of the GEF as a source of funding for SFM, the implementation of the
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CDM for forestry, various other joint implementation mechanisms, co-financing,
and other private and public sector partnerships where SFM is the main or ancil-
lary component (cf. point c above).
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Table 7.1 Levels and Areas of Intervention of the Financing Strategy for SFM
Level Objective Intervention
Global 1. Enabling conditions at global level • Agreed global policy framework, including
concessional financing and its uses
• Ground rules for trading of environmental benefits and
for market-based instruments (CO2, bio-prospecting,
certification, and labeling, etc.)
2. Fund raising and investment promotion • Awareness raising about SFM investment
opportunities
• Concessional funding
• Investment promotion (IPA – see Chapter 8)
• Country and sector risk mitigation
3. Development of globally applicable
instruments for SFM financing and
related programmes
• GEF, CDM, joint implementation, co-financing, etc.
• Innovative financing instruments
• PROFOR and other international programmes
Regional 1. Enabling conditions at regional level • Regional-level capacity building
• Cross-border trading of hydrological and other
services of forests
2. Regional financing instruments • Regional instruments of MDBs, regional venture
capital funds, etc.
National 1. Enabling conditions at national level • Policy framework: removal of structural and
operational constraints for SFM, regulation of
commoditisation of forest benefits
• Capacity building, including good governance and
transparency
• Nfp and its investment programme as coordinating
instruments
2. Fund raising and investment promotion • Concessional funding and pooling of resources within
sector programmes (including fpas)
• Investment promotion facilities
• Strengthening of financial intermediaries
3. National financing instruments • Direct commercial financing (portfolio equity
investments, investment funds, etc.)
• Direct concessionary financing (national
environment/conservation funds, debt-for-
nature/development swaps, venture capital funds,
Small medi8um scale enterprise credit lines and
micro-credits, small grants, etc.)
• Market development mechanisms (carbon trades, bio-
prospecting, water use changes, certification, etc.)
• Fiscal instruments and other structural mechanisms
(public forest funds, performance bonds, etc.)
Local 1. Enabling conditions at local level • Removal of operational constraints
• Capacity building
• Participation
2. Commoditisation of forest benefits • Valuation and integration
3. Local financing • Conventional project financing
• Micro-financing
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(f) Improve coordination and cooperation at the international level between various
agencies and different types of funding sources, drawing on available mechanisms
such as nfps and fpas in cooperation with countries (cf. point a above).
7.4.2 Regional-level Interventions
298. Many of these interventions are relevant also at the regional level where a number of spe-
cific items can be added, such as:
• regional level capacity building,
• cross-border trading of hydrological and other environmental services of forests,
and
• regional financing instruments of multilateral development banks (e.g., regional
environmental venture capital funds, risk mitigation facilities).
299. Experience in Central America suggests a regionally agreed institutional framework,
founded on pan-national mutual interests, can contribute to making capacity building and cross-
border cooperation more effective. When individual countries are not large enough to provide a
sufficient volume base for some national financing instruments (e.g., trust funds, venture capital
funds), a regional approach may be viable.
7.4.3 International Policy Constraints
300. The existing international forest regime is fragmented, non-comprehensive, and lacks a
clear focus on the promotion of SFM; however, views differ as to how to improve the situation
(cf. EFI 1996, Skala-Kuhmann 1996, Tarasofsky 1995). Individual instruments emphasise spe-
cific and partial roles of forests, rather than supporting a comprehensive approach with a financ-
ing component designed to solve the problem of deforestation and forest degeneration. Soft law
instruments, such as the IPF Proposals for Action or voluntary certification and labeling, are im-
portant but inadequate tools to solve the fundamental problems of sustainable forestry.
301. This lack of commitment to set down a legally binding obligation to achieve SFM is also
related to insufficient access to financing. An international instrument providing for such an obli-
gation would directly contribute to concessional and non-concessional funding to SFM. Its indi-
rect contribution could, however, be much more significant as it would provide a clear policy
framework within which various actors, particularly those in the private sector, are confident to
invest and operate. Regarding a financial arrangement that can be attached to such an instrument,
experience on the UN Convention on Combatting Desertification and Drought (CCD) should be
taken into account (see Box 7.1). The main lesson to be learned is that common understanding
should be reached on the financial arrangement before an international convention with financial
implications is agreed upon. Further discussion can be found in Section 8.5.
302. Multilateral financing institutions play a key role in development financing, including the
forestry sector. Not only do the policies of the institutions influence internal financing decisions,
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but they have also become important signals to the entire international financial community on
what is considered acceptable and what is not. The multilateral banks' role as a comfort factor for
private sector institutional investors is particularly essential in such a controversial sector as for-
estry.
Box 7.1 Financing of the Convention on Combating Desertification and Drought
The Convention came into force at the end of 1996. It did not include arrangements for financing and
only in late 1998 was the Secretariat of the Global Mechanism formally established through voluntary
contributions.
Expectations on financing have been divergent:
• The recipient countries expected a global funding mechanism with new and additional resources;
• The donor countries have seen the financial arrangement not as a fund but as a matchmaking exer-
cise between needs of the recipients and the available resources; such matchmaking is mainly to be
carried out at national and regional levels.
These clearly opposing perspectives undermine the consensus needed to underpin international treaties.
Effective implementation of the CCD is likely to require a global-level financing mechanism that can
play a catalytic role, in addition to national and regional level interventions.
303. The World Bank's Forest Policy (1992) and Environmental Guidelines rule out the possi-
bility of providing support to any timber harvesting in primary natural tropical forests. This has
left an important caveat for development efforts in those countries where substantial primary for-
ests could be sustainably managed for socioeconomic benefits while ensuring biodiversity main-
tenance and other environmental conservation. It has not been established whether the policy has
had any significant impact on deforestation and forest degradation, and some experts think that it
may have been counterproductive. The same policy is also applied by the GEF, which is co-
managed by the World Bank (cf. Chapter 5).
304. The World Bank is undergoing an evaluation of its forestry financing and a process de-
veloped to revise the current policy. It is not the purpose of this report to foresee what kind of
policy the World Bank will adopt. If the current provisions will not be changed, however, it is
obvious that the potential of several innovative financing instruments, such as conservation trust
funds, biodiversity venture capital funds, etc., will not be able to target natural forest manage-
ment, except in secondary forests. As several multilateral, bilateral, and private financing institu-
tions tend to apply the World Bank's guidelines, the sustainable management of these forests
would be excluded from international support – paradoxically the area where such support could
have significant short-term impacts. This point is also highly applicable to the proposed new
global financing mechanism for SFM (cf. Chapter 8).
305. What makes this a real dilemma for planning any future financing arrangements for SFM
at the global level is the fact that IPF/IFF as an intergovernmental policy forum has not con-
cluded any such constraints for SFM in developing countries. ITTO and FAO as the key interna-
tional sectoral agencies are actively promoting SFM, including sustainable harvesting in primary
natural tropical forests. There is an urgent need to achieve more coherence and coordination in
international-level policies related to the forestry sector than prevails at present.
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306. There are various ways to alleviate or reduce the concerns related to the conservation of
natural forests thereby making SFM an acceptable and attractive investment for MDBs. Third-
party certification of forest management can be a useful tool for the dual purpose of mitigating
investment risks and communicating to buyers and consumers that forests are well managed from
where the purchased products originate. Certification is not, however, applicable in all conditions
and, therefore, other less-costly and more effective instruments should also be considered.
7.5 National and Local-level Financing Strategies
307. Investments in SFM are made at national and local levels, which should therefore be the
focus of future financing strategies. International level interventions – the focus of this report -
can complement such strategies by raising resources through various mechanisms and providing
the necessary common ground rules.
308. Each country has its specific ecological and socioeconomic conditions, as well as institu-
tional framework. These conditions represent opportunities and constraints, which are the basis
for designing national and local-level financing strategies for SFM.
309. The first step is to develop a common long-term vision on how to achieve the SFM goal.
The nfp process is the appropriate tool for this purpose. Specific work on financing arrangements
can only become meaningful if there is a political will to implement the sectoral strategy and its
underlying structural reforms.
7.5.1 Areas of Intervention
310. Due to country differences, it is not possible to identify a blueprint for areas of interven-
tion in national or local-level financing strategies. Some typical examples, however, can be sin-
gled out. At the national level, strategic interventions can be targeted at:
• creating enabling conditions through the removal of structural and operational barriers
for SFM, regulation of commoditisation of forest benefits (identification of benefici-
aries and providers, basis for valuation and pricing of services, etc.), capacity building
including good governance and transparency, and using nfps as a tool for policy re-
form and coordination;
• fund raising through better access to concessional funding and pooling of resources
(e.g., through fpas or other forest partnership arrangements), investment promotion,
and strengthening of financial intermediaries; and
• development and application of national financing instruments including mechanisms
for direct commercial and concessionary financing, market development for forest
goods and services based on SFM, as well as fiscal instruments and other structural
mechanisms such, as national forest funds, environmental performance bonds, etc.
(see chapter 6).
311. At the local level, the focus of creating enabling conditions is often on resolving opera-
tional constraints, capacity building, and effective participation of interested parties in planning
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and implementation. Valuation and integration of various local-level forest benefits must be inte-
grated into planning and implementation. At the local level, conventional project financing
mechanisms are likely to remain important and may even become the main source of external
funds. Due to the small size of many beneficiaries, micro-financing facilities will often be appro-
priate, provided that suitable financial intermediaries are available. Small project size will also
lead to the need of their bundling to make them fundable from external sources.
312. Strengthening of financial and other intermediaries, including NGOs and CBOs, in de-
veloping countries is necessary to reach individual farmers, forest owners, and communities liv-
ing in and around forests. The small size of investment projects and their spreading throughout
rural areas make it otherwise impossible to effectively reach these beneficiaries (beyond targeted
pilot-type projects), and therefore an effective network of national intermediaries, including
commercial and rural development banks, extension agencies, etc., is often a precondition for
providing access to financing. Unfortunately, these intermediaries have little or no understanding
of the specific characteristics of SFM financing. In addition, special provisions are often needed
to overcome difficulties in making this sector a viable business segment for financial intermedi-
aries.
313. The development of national instruments and arrangements for SFM is a rapidly evolving
field where the feasibility of various options can be assessed against practical realities. The case
of Costa Rica where substantial experience has already been accumulated is reported in detail by
e.g., Chomitz et al. (1998). There are a number of preconditions that must be considered when
planning the replication of such country experiences (Box 7.2). A very recent example is the in-
vestment promotion concept supported by the World Bank (1998b) in Nicaragua (Box 7.3).
Box 7.2 Preconditions of Public-private Partnerships in Costa Rican Forestry Sector
Costa Rica is frequently cited as a success story in the creation of a market value for the environmental
services of forests. Public-private sector partnerships are an essential element of this achievement. Ap-
parent preconditions for the possible replicability of Costa Rica's experience include:
• Public opinion is widely concerned about the environment and its impacts on human life.
• The country has a strong tradition of democratic collective action.
• There is a strong tradition of entrepreneurship to develop private business. (In Costa Rica an envi-
ronmental cluster has been created where various economic activities effectively support each other.)
• Tourism is the most important source of foreign exchange, and the environment has been main-
streamed within this context. Ecotourism is compatible with conservation goals and offers investment
opportunities for the private sector.
• International organizations helped conceptualise development opportunities into instruments for
trading of environmental benefits.
• Payments made to the rural population are based on services provided and are transfer payments; this
has a strong motivational aspect.
• Effective organization of farmers and landowners exists, which ensures due consideration of their in-
terests.
• Secure private land tenure is openly tradeable which has significantly reduced investment risks in for-
estry.
Sources: Constantino, pers. comm.
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Box 7.3 Sustainable Forestry Investment Promotion Project in Nicaragua
The development objective of the Sector Investment Credit is to improve local capacity (private and
public) and develop alternatives to address long-term forestry issues in Nicaragua. The establishment of
a basis for improved forestry management will be initiated by promoting environmentally sound private
sector investments, improving the business environment, reducing the perception of risk in forestry
sector activities, and helping to define forest-sector institutional policies and reforms through a partici-
patory process.
The project would be the first phase of a longer-term effort to improve forestry management and private
sector development. Subsequent government efforts to implement the programme could eventually be
supported by an Adaptable Programme Credit and other donors.
The project activities include:
• provide technical assistance to private and communal sector forestry through the creation and op-
eration of the Sustainable Forestry Investment Promotion Office (SFIPO), supported by an Interna-
tional Forestry Advisory Panel;
• provide technical assistance to the newly created National Forestry Institute; to the Ministry of De-
velopment, Industry and Commerce; the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; and the National
Commission for Sustainable Development in promoting investment in sustainable forestry and re-
forestation; and
• launch an assistance programme to private/communal forestry entrepreneurs through matching
grant financing of pilot subprojects.
The three and half year project would be executed in a participatory manner in order to build the capac-
ity, consensus, and constituency necessary for successful implementation of the long-term programme.
A monitoring and evaluation system would be established to measure the learning and innovation proc-
ess and facilitate the incorporation of lessons and experiences into the future investment programme.
Project activities will be based on the following guiding principles:
• promotion of public-private sector partnerships;
• use of market-based instruments to achieve sustainable forestry objectives; and
• extensive involvement of civil society in policy reform.
SFIPO will be established by the government, but its goal is to evolve into an autonomous or semi-
autonomous and self-financing entity capable of responding to the needs of its clients.
SFIPO's main areas of action would be:
• promotion of private investments,
• integration of smallholders into the productive process by developing financial and economic in-
centives,
• transfer and introduction of appropriate technologies and best practices, and
• promotion of forest certification as a means to achieve improved forest management and reaching
new markets.
Source: World Bank 1998b
7.5.2 National Forest Programmes and Sector Support Programmes
314. Nfps have been successfully implemented in several countries (e.g. Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ghana, Indonesia, and Vietnam). They have assisted the national authorities in analyzing and ar-
ticulating their development goals in the forest sector. This has  increased the feasibility and effi-
ciency of both national and external financing in forest sector development. In particular, those
countries which have established a national financing mechanism to mobilise resources for nfp
implementation have made good progress in SFM (e.g., FONADE in Colombia, FONAFIFO in
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Costa Rica, in Cameroon under planning, and feasibility studies done in Togo and Benin). It is
clear, however, that the nfps have not succeeded in attracting sufficient financial flows for truly
large-scale implementation of multipurpose SFM. This is coupled with the limited success of
nfps in implementing necessary policy reforms but also relevant is the lack of capability to for-
mulate feasible investment programmes and to integrate appropriate financing mechanisms for
nfps. A list of developing countries with existing nfps under implementation is presented in Table
7.2.
Table 7.2 Developing Countries National Forests Programmes Being Implemented
Africa Asia and the Pacific Latin America
Cameroon Bangladesh Antigua and Barbuda
Cape Verde Bhutan Barbados
Côte d’Ivoire Fiji Belize
Equatorial Guinea Indonesia Bolivia
Ghana Laos Chile
Guinea Nepal Colombia
Senegal Pakistan Costa Rica
Tanzania Papua New Guinea Dominica
Philippines Ecuador
Sri Lanka El Salvador
Thailand Grenada
Vietnam Guatemala
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Montserrat
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
St. Kitts
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Trinidad
Sources: National Forest Programmes, Update No. 33 (FAO 1998); country information
315. Nevertheless, nfps, as perceived by IPF (1997), can act as the major instrument in creating
enabling conditions for SFM investment at national level (Box 7.4). They provide a framework
for programming and coordination that is needed to ensure that all the key areas where invest-
ment is required will be duly covered. Nfps also act as useful tools for the integration of national
priorities and programmes with the support and objectives of the international community. Nfps
are instruments designed to shift gradually away from project funding from various sources to-
ward coordinated sectoral support  - to increase the effectiveness of financial flows.
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Box 7.4 National Forest Programmes
The objective of an nfp is to ensure the conservation, management, and sustainable development of for-
ests to meet local, national, regional, and global needs and requirements, for the benefit of present and
future generations.
The nfp is based on the following principles:
• national sovereignty and country leadership;
• partnership and participation of all interested parties in the nfp process;
• holistic and intersectoral approach to forest development and conservation;
• the long-term and iterative process of planning, implementation, and monitoring;
• focus on systematically building the capacity of the country to take full responsibility for the devel-
opment of the forest sector;
• focus on systematic policy and institutional reforms consistent with the overall national policies and
global initiatives;
• focus on systematic raising of awareness on forestry issues at all levels of the society; and
• focus on the systematic building up of national and international commitment to sustainable forest
development.
The main elements of an nfp are:
• sector review to establish an understanding of the forestry sector in the context of national develop-
ment,
• policy and institutional reform processes based on the sector review and dialogue with the
stakeholders,
• an investment programme that includes both public investments and incentives for private and non-
governmental sectors,
• a capacity building programme to assist the governmental and non-governmental sectors in fulfilling
their roles and mandates, and
• monitoring and evaluation system to provide continuous feedback on nfp implementation, impacts
and efficiency.
The nfp is a technical process, in the sense that the identification of goals, policies, strategies, and
mechanisms for implementation are based on accurate information, and a political process, in the sense
that the choices between the available options are the outcomes of debates, negotiations, and compro-
mises on the part of relevant stakeholders.
Source: UNDP 1997b.
316. Two types of public investment programmes are formulated in the context of an nfp: (i)
those supporting activities that are directly implemented by public institutions, and (ii) those sup-
porting activities that focus on the private sector, NGOs, and CBOs, by providing different types
of incentives for forestry and conservation efforts. Even though each country will find its own
balance between public and private sector participation, involvement of the sectoral administra-
tion in the productive activities of nfp implementation is generally declining. The public sector,
however, will probably retain its role in some areas, such as in the provision of extension serv-
ices, and in the establishment and joint management of conservation areas. Actual investments in
the public sector are derived primarily from the capacity building programme (see below). Active
involvement of the private sector and local community in forest conservation, management, and
sustainable use of forest resources contributes to the decentralisation of development and to a
more equitable sharing of the benefits (Oksanen 1998).
317. The emphasis in the investment programme is given to the creation of favorable condi-
tions for and direct support to the private sector, NGOs, and CBOs, because of their comparative
advantages as development and conservation agents. These advantages include the capacity to
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reach the rural population through participatory approaches, awareness of traditional forest-
related knowledge,  the ability to mobilise local resources efficiently, independence, flexibility,
as well as the capability to represent local interests. The main focus is on facilitating and im-
proving the conditions for investment through a decentralised incentive programme, one that
promotes the sustainable management and wise utilisation of forests (Oksanen 1998). In particu-
lar, this programmatic approach will be useful for bundling small-scale projects together so as to
make them match the financing criteria of external sources.
318. The capacity building programme defines the actions that must be taken in order to sys-
tematically develop the sectoral planning and implementation capacity of the national institutions
and other key actors, as well as to decrease dependence on external assistance. The programme
should be based on the definition of new roles and mandates for public sector institutions, the
private sector, NGOs, and CBOs.
319. A well-tuned national coordination mechanism will benefit the removal of barriers to
SFM, investment promotion, and facilitate access to  available sources of finance. It will also be
capable of facilitating participation and addressing the concerns of the relevant international and
national stakeholders. It would create confidence in, and predictability about, the government's
policy and support to SFM, thereby lowering investment risks. Such a coordination mechanism
can be conveniently built within the nfp preparation and implementation process.
320. The main purpose for the coordination of international partners is, however, to integrate
external aid with the nfp process, and thereby coordinate donor contributions, so as to avoid
overlapping or redundant programmes. Coordination should enable increased political and finan-
cial commitments by all stakeholders, as well as fostering integrated and harmonised planning
approaches and cycles. Those elements of nfps for which international support is required can be
consolidated into Sector Programme Support facility, which the international community can fi-
nance through jointly agreed mechanisms (Box 7.5). Such an approach has worked well in other
sectors (health, education, agriculture, etc.) for mobilizing international support on a required
scale and to improve its effectiveness through a comprehensive approach. There are no funda-
mental reasons why this approach could not be increasingly adopted in the forestry sector as well.
Box 7.5 Sector Programme Support
Sector Programme Support (SPS) is an arrangement to channel international support into the imple-
mentation of nfps and in assisting public and private sector stakeholders’ engagement with the process.
Preconditions for success include enabling policy conditions and government commitment to lead and
implement the nfp. SPS would typically:
• focus on broad-scale capacity development,
• assist in alleviating other structural barriers to SFM,
• provide support to implementation at national, regional and local levels,
• strengthen accountability and transparency,
• promote flexibility and needs-driven implementation,
• reduce local bureaucracy related to international financing, and
• improve coordination and integration.
Appropriate criteria and indicators would be necessary for monitoring and evaluating the success of
SPS. These C&I are largely similar to those used for nfps.
Source: Aho 1999
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321. Various partnership arrangements have emerged in the forestry sector to pull together re-
sources and efforts from various stakeholders, including the international community (Box 7.6).
These partnerships can take various forms and one example is the fpa, which is a relatively recent
innovation and still in an experimental stage in a limited number of countries. It has been devel-
oped mainly as an instrument to ensure both internal and external commitment to, and coordina-
tion of, nfp implementation. The idea of the fpa is based on the assumption that partnership
mechanisms at the country level are needed to integrate all the relevant institutions and actors
into the nfp process.
Box 7.6 Pooling of Resources: Forest Partnership Agreements
In fpas, the interactions of national and international processes with nfps are defined, so as to promote
SFM through country-driven support to enhancing economic, social, cultural, and environmental func-
tions of all types of forests. Partnerships would include all national stakeholders and those international
parties supporting SFM in the country. IFF-II made the following preliminary conclusions on promo-
tion and facilitation of the implementation of IPF Proposals for Action:
"creation and/or strengthening, by countries and international organisations, of initiatives, ap-
proaches and partnerships, which could include partnership agreements, to encourage: long-term
political commitment; relevant, effective, sustained and reliable donor support; participation by
the private sector and major groups; as well as to recognise the special role of ODA to meet the
needs of developing countries, in particular least developed countries and countries with low for-
est cover."
Among the actions developing countries could commit to taking are:
• removal of incentives for forest destruction,
• full valuation of marketed natural resources,
• security of property rights for the rural population,
• technically sound land use planning and tangible incentives for sustainable use,
• effective measures to promote human development,
• empowerment of rural women living in forest areas, and
• participatory strategy and capacity building programmes for forests.
Commitments on the part of the international community could include:
• phased debt reduction as the fpa is implemented,
• support for raising agricultural productivity within the country,
• facilitation of market access for forest products produced sustainably,
• incentives for private investment,
• secure sustainable development funding, and
• funding for capacity building.
In an fpa, a developing country and several donor countries and financing institutions negotiate a long-
term agreement, through which each side makes commitments and takes specified actions. An fpa can
be either legally or non-legally binding, and involves both international and national components. Fpas
are initiated by a country-led identification of national and international partners and stakeholders in the
forest sector. To institutionalise an fpa as a coordination mechanism for international support, a forest
partnership facility can be established and a core support agency selected. Communication strategy and
mechanisms between all stakeholders are developed. Monitoring and evaluation systems for nfp im-
plementation are also established.
Fpas could include the establishment of a forest sector consultative group as a body to assist in coordi-
nation. It should be country driven and open to all stakeholders.
Sources: UNDP 1997b, Aho 1999
322. Formalised partnership arrangements between the core development partners in a given
country aim at providing a mechanism to integrate external aid into the national planning cycles,
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and to minimise overlapping programmes. It promotes the efficient participation and increased
commitment of all national and international stakeholders involved in the nfp process. It should
also ensure that the channeling of funds to development programmes is based on national priori-
ties that are determined through democratic and transparent decision-making processes. A memo-
randum of understanding  between development partners may provide an interim instrument to-
wards more formal coordination mechanisms, such as fpas or similar facilities.
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8. A PROPOSED NEW FINANCING MECHANISM TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT
FLOWS INTO SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT
323. Mobilizing private sector resources has been identified throughout this report as a key
component of a global SFM financing strategy. For such mobilization to occur, many of the bar-
riers to investment in SFM activities and operations must be removed or mitigated. Public sector
financing, both as bi- and multilateral ODA and from domestic sources, must play an essential
catalytic role in this process of barrier removal. In this chapter, a central component of such a role
is proposed in the form of an IPA (Figure 8.1). Such an agency would be specifically charged
with using public sector resources to leverage private sector financing for SFM investments. Its
operations would be primarily at the global level.
Figure 8.1 An Overview of the Proposed Investment Promotion Agency (IPA)
Private
Sector
Resources
SFM  ACTIVITIES
Public
Sector
Resources
structural
developm
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IPA CORE ACTIVITIES
- investment facilitation -
OTHER
INSTITUTIONS
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324. Before describing the IPA in detail, two points are worth stressing. First, the title of an
“Investment Promotion Agency” was selected solely so as to represent the main objective of the
proposed mechanism (promoting investment into SFM). Use of the word “agency” is intention-
ally neutral. It should not be interpreted as corresponding to any particular structure, size, scope,
etc.
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325. Second, the IPA is explicitly designed not to play a major role in direct investments of its
financial resources at the project level through grants, lending facilities, incremental cost support
(cf. the GEF) or any other means. It should not therefore be regarded as a SFM 'Fund' in the tra-
ditional sense of the word (see Section 8.5 for further discussion).
326. The ideas and concepts outlined below are intended to provoke thought and stimulate de-
bate and should not be regarded as a definitive model for a global forestry investment promotion
body. Indeed, the form and structure of the IPA as presented here are substantially less important
than its functions, which are best considered on their own merits and in their own right, and,
where appropriate, integrated into existing institutional remits.
8.1 Overview of the IPA
327. The defining objective of the proposed IPA will be to mobilise and facilitate financial
flows to SFM activities in developing countries.29 This will be done by capitalizing on existing
and potential public and private sector financial resources, primarily at the global level, with a
specific view to leveraging higher levels of private sector finance.
328. To this end, the IPA will carry out activities akin to 'innovative investment banking', using
a suite of existing and new innovative financial mechanisms, which are designed to promote in-
vestment into SFM (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Additionally, the IPA will aim to redirect private
sector resources currently flowing into non-sustainable forestry activities, by facilitating access to
information and technical assistance, and by promoting the development of necessary financial
and regulatory structures. These activities of the IPA, described in detail in Section 8.2, have
been identified on the basis of earlier analyses (see Chapters 3 and 7).
329. Inherent to this private sector-oriented role is the need for the IPA to be as slim, stream-
lined, and as efficient as possible, in order to deal with the pace and demands of private sector
investors and forest operators, and to avoid large overhead costs. The IPA should therefore have
sufficient autonomy to take informed but fast-track decisions that avoid lengthy bureaucratic pro-
cesses that slow efficiency. At the same time, it should have clear investment guidelines, mandate
and remit, so that its activities and decisions are accountable to its constituency and governance
structures. These issues will be discussed further in Section 8.3.
330. A menu of three possible options for the structure of the IPA is then proposed in Section
8.4 to allow for the preceding discussions on role, activities, and governance to be set within a
specific institutional framework. The pros and cons of each of these three options are briefly
compared, before a concluding section in which the need for such institutional innovation is out-
lined as compared to a more traditionally conceived “Forest Fund.”
                                                
29 An interesting development in this regard was the recent announcement that the World Bank was providing tech-
nical assistance to Nicaragua in the wake of Hurricane Mitch “to create and operate a Sustainable Forestry Invest-
ment Promotion Office for the development of certification of sustainable forestry practices and for the promotion of
investment in sustainable forestry and reforestation” in the context of a broader sectoral initiative aimed at building
management capacity and reducing market barriers (Nicaragua...1999).
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8.2 The IPA's Activities
331. To fulfill its objective of facilitating financial flows to SFM activities in the developing
world, the IPA will help promote, implement and manage a set of activities which, in combina-
tion, will make successful SFM investments possible. These activities are specifically designed to
circumvent or remove some of the barriers currently preventing private sector investment in SFM
so as to redress the evident paucity of bankable SFM projects.
332. The IPA's core activity will be centered on investment packaging and structuring of fi-
nancial deals for SFM operators, primarily in the private sector. In support of this core activity,
the IPA will provide information related to a wide range of SFM investment parameters and
identify and promote SFM investment opportunities. The IPA's other main activity will be in
providing streamlined access to risk mitigation services and facilities. These four roles, together
with the investment barriers they aim to mitigate, are outlined in Table 8.1 and described in detail
in following sections.
In addition, there is potential scope for the IPA to play a contributing role in ongoing structural
reforms in the forestry sector at the international level and at the national level through partner
institutions such as UNDP and the World Bank. Its objective in all such structural development
activities would be to promote the needs and interests of private sector investors and forest op-
erators. Clearly, there is already a wealth of activity in this field, and the value (if any) that the
IPA could add would have to carefully considered. A preliminary analysis is offered in Sections
8.2.5 and 8.4.3.
Table 8.1 Activities of the Proposed Investment Promotion Agency
IPA
activities
Barriers to SFM investment addressed
Incremental costs of transition to SFM activities
Long-term nature of certain types of forestry investment requiring different types of
funding at different stages
Multiple (disparate) sources of public and private sector funding
Investment
packaging
and
structuring of
finance
(CORE) Increasing complexity of financial structures and mechanisms
Lack of sector knowledge / misperceptions and misconceptions
Lack of awareness of available financial services and mechanisms
Lag-time in commercial response to and awareness of evolving policy agenda
Information
provision
(SUPPORT)
Paucity of investment experiences in SFM / lack of awareness of investment opportu-
nities
Structural difficulties in matching investors and investments, including: divergent
commercial attitudes and modus operandi, presentational styles and conventions, lan-
guage, distance, accessibility, etc.
Lack of successful partnerships and joint ventures
Identification
of
investment
opportunities
(SUPPORT) Low mutual awareness and interaction between investment community and forest op-erators (see above)
Real or perceived country, market, and sector risksRisk
mitigation
(ACCESS)
Risk of negative public perception of forestry investments
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333. Although, in this section, the IPA's functions have been broken down and categorised for
ease of explanation, in practice they are intended to be carried out as a coherent whole. Indeed,
much of the activities described below to an extent rely on their counterpart activities being suc-
cessfully implemented within the overall IPA structure. This horizontal integration of mutually
supportive activities within one entity represents the comparative advantage of the proposed IPA,
as in this way it will be able to develop a complete understanding of the many facets of private
sector investment into SFM and act accordingly using the necessary skills and expertise.
8.2.1 Investment Packaging and Structuring of Finance
334. The core activity of the proposed IPA will be to package investment opportunities and
structure financial deals so as to increase the attractiveness and feasibility of sustainable forestry
projects. The rationale for this role lies in the increasing complexity of forestry financing in terms
of investment objective, timing, and type, as well as the combination of forest products (or val-
ues) invested in. As a result of this complexity, successful sustainable forestry operations will
tend to, or often need to, tap multiple financing streams from a variety of sources. This necessity
in itself can act as a major barrier to SFM.
335. The IPA would therefore provide streamlined investment brokerage services to facilitate
access to the full range of financial resources and incentives available to forestry at the global
level, including those channeled through the conventional and innovative financial mechanisms
detailed in chapters 4, 5 and 6.
336. Depending on the needs of the investor or the investment, the IPA would bring these vari-
ous funding lines together as part of a finance structuring service designed to address specific
barriers to SFM investment. Such a facility would seek to attract private sector equity or debt
financing from venture, institutional or portfolio sources, using, where necessary, catalytic public
sector or other concessionary funding. In the specialised case of long-term forestry operations, for
example, private sector investment might be secured by the IPA through:
• developing innovative mechanisms or investment vehicles to anticipate cash flows
(e.g., advanced timber sales, securing timber receivables, carbon offset revenues);
• securing commitments for early, mid, and late stage project investments from a
mix of public and private sources, structuring them into a guaranteed project fi-
nancing package;30
• providing streamlined access to appropriate risk mitigation services to facilitate
appropriate long-term finance, or equity investments.
337. An integral part of the IPA's investment banking role would be to capitalise on the full
range of forest values about which conventional bankers, investors, investees, and investment ad-
visors are often unaware. This particularly applies to values such as biodiversity protection and
                                                
30 This could be particularly applicable in the context of emerging market commoditization and non-market-based
financing mechanisms designed to internalise forest externalities with a view to enhancing and stabilizing the returns
on SFM investments. Initial private sector take-up of such mechanisms might be dependent on early stage support
from concessionary sources.
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carbon sequestration whose benefits are recognised globally and for which accessing the relevant
transfer payment mechanisms can be problematic.31 Such value added revenue generation for
SFM investments could be carried out through, for example:
• promoting commoditisation or similar approaches (see Section 3.2.4),
• combining finance sourced through market-based and non-market mechanisms,
• optimal marketing strategies such as market niche identification (e.g., through certifi-
cation), and
• promoting investment in processing infrastructure.
338. In addition, the IPA can mobilise financing for any shortfalls in proposed or potential in-
vestments, including those resulting from barriers to SFM not addressed by other IPA activities.
This might require the development of new financing mechanisms, either for or in collaboration
with existing institutions, or using the IPA's own skills and resources. One such mechanism could
be an international forestry investment fund with a diversified portfolio, as described in Box 8.1.
Other examples include:
• debt instruments – e.g., forest bonds, debt-for-nature transactions, securitisation
schemes; and
• equity instruments – e.g., structuring of specific direct investment deals or joint ven-
tures.
339. More specifically, ways of leveraging additional resources by addressing obstacles met by
existing mechanisms should be considered. For example, the IPA could promote the development
of national-level forestry funds in developing countries, which would be large enough to be pub-
licly listed, and designed to take on ownership of small privately owned companies so as to make
available, for example, 'ethical' portfolio investments (Gullison et al. 1998; see also Fact Sheet
A/1 in Annex 4).
340. The role played by the IPA in these new developments, or in adaptations of existing in-
struments, can range from direct in-house management to conceptual development with imple-
mentation outsourced to commercial (or public sector) institutions under a franchising arrange-
ment or as a joint venture. 'Softer' alternatives can give the IPA a catalytic role in formulating
proposals or recommendations on such issues.
341. In summary, the IPA will promote, access, co-ordinate with, manage, or create both con-
ventional and innovative financial mechanisms on a case-by-case basis within an operational
framework based on the use of its own in-house information resources, investment banking skills,
and other relevant expertise, as well as catalytic concessionary finance to leverage private sector
capital and channel it into SFM project implementation and management.
                                                
31 Project submission requirements can often be complex, laborious, time-consuming, and impractical for forest op-
erators and investors lacking the requisite time, knowledge, or skills. In addition, for many private sector operators,
financing mechanisms managed by institutions can have prohibitively long project cycles, whilst market-based
mechanisms, especially in the early stages, can carry high transaction costs restricting market access to economies of
scale possible for only the major global players.
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Box 8.1 International Forestry Investment Funds
As discussed in the text, a series of real and/or perceived barriers currently dissuade the international
investment community from large-scale investment into SFM. These include: lack of liquidity, high
risk, low and long-term returns, and the fear of contributing to environmental degradation. An invest-
ment vehicle that could address these concerns might have the form of an investment fund listed in
stock markets (raising liquidity), investing in a mixed portfolio of different types of forestry projects
(spreading market risks), in different countries (spreading country risks), with emphasis in the tropics
(increasing overall returns). Such a fund would insist on having inputs on the forest management
guidelines and objectives followed by its investments, thereby ensuring its commitment to
sustainability. All investments could also be rated for their environmental practices prior to investment.
Investment targets can include undercapitalised companies requiring an injection of capital to shift to
more efficient and sustainable forestry practices that can increase profitability and reduce negative envi-
ronmental impacts. Some such companies might have forest assets either in production or approaching
production to ensure early returns.
The fund itself should not have any involvement in the direct management of forest operations. It
should, however, facilitate access to technical and marketing assistance. In some cases it may decide to
change investee companies' management structure or introduce third party operating contractors.
In order to provide reassurance to investors about the quality of the investment vehicle, such a fund can
be sponsored by high profile institutions, which, together, have financial, forestry and environmental
credentials. While ensuring commitment to sustainability would be reassuring, investors would ulti-
mately look at the bottom line and the quality of the fund manager in making investment decisions. In
this context, the fund should not be dependent on investment by international organizations (such as the
World Bank, GEF, etc.) to avoid creating the misconception that profit is not a priority, for the fund's
objective would be to provide a profitable portfolio of sustainable forestry operations, attracting the in-
terest of the financial sector. For, only the private financial sector can provide the volume of capital
necessary for promoting a real and widespread transition from the current unsustainable to a sustainable
forestry paradigm.
It should be noted that the idea for such an investment vehicle has been pursued by, amongst others,
Coopers and Lybrand in the UK, and the World Bank with the MacArthur Foundation in the US.
8.2.2 Information Provision
342. One of the main deterrents to investment in SFM is the lack of sector knowledge that cur-
rently prevails in the investment community. This 'ignorance' about forestry leads to a series of
misconceptions which only serve to confuse or discourage investors and those that are trying to
promote SFM investment (this is discussed further in Box 8.2). It is therefore essential that in-
vestors are informed of the potential rewards that characterise forestry activities and investments,
as well as the real risks and issues involved and the range of options for addressing them.
343. One of the key roles of the IPA, in support of its core investment structuring activities,
will therefore be to mitigate this knowledge gap by acting as an information clearinghouse,
providing carefully targeted information to key players in the investment community, including
institutional investors such as banks, investment fund managers, fiduciaries, and the insurance
industry. The same role could also apply to many direct investors already involved in the forestry
sector. Activities to this end might include:
• educational / promotional / awareness-raising campaigns through a variety of media
to specific audiences;
F• organization and coordination of investors' conferences, workshops, fora, and strate-
gic meetings; and
• collation and dissemination of information on case studies.
Box 8.2 Perceptions & Misconceptions about SFM Investments
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3The most basic source of confusion relates to the very type of forestry being talked about, which might
be pulp and paper, plantation management, national forest management, conservation, or downstream
processing. These and other subsectors that comprise the term 'forestry' may be further qualified by dif-
ferences between tropical and temperate forestry, sustainability issues, and operators' motives and mo-
dus operandi.
All these types of forestry can have very different dynamics, investment requirements, and risk : return
profiles. However, due to potential investors' lack of specialist knowledge, all forestry activities tend to
be lumped together, or unfavorably compared. Exacerbating this confusion are other perceptions relating
to different aspects of forestry investments. These include:
• Long-term nature – It is often perceived that forestry investments generate returns only over the
long-term, which when coupled with the discount rates typically used in the private sector, serve to
dissuade investors. However, many resource management and utilization activities, particularly in
the tropics, can provide short-term cash flows. Examples include: national forest management
agroforestry schemes with a diverse range of products, returns, and time-frames; and fast growing
plantations, with rotations as short as 6 years (Ruzicka & Moura Costa 1997).
• Low financial returns – Although in temperate regions returns tend to range from 2-8 percent real,
much higher returns can be achieved from sustainable tropical forestry operations, reaching up to
20-25 percent return on investment (EcoSecurities, internal document).
• Lack of liquidity – This is currently the case with many direct investments in forestry companies but
can be addressed by creating investment vehicles with higher liquidity, such as funds listed on the
stock market (see Box 8.1), or issuing of forest bonds (Haltia et al. 1997, Mansley 1996).
• Negative environmental impacts – Past stock market experience with international logging compa-
nies has left the residual perception that all tropical forestry is unsustainable (Campanalle, personal
communication).comm.). Mechanisms such as environmental due diligence and rating or independ-
ent certification of forest management standards (Upton & Bass 1995) can reassure the market and
its observers that investments can be done responsibly.
• Exposure to country and market risks – A wide variety of risk mitigation facilities and strategies are
available, although the problems are often complex and can represent a major barrier to SFM. This
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44. The quality of these outputs is entirely dependent on the quality of the IPA's information
inputs'. These should include: current policy and market developments in different host coun-
ries; sectoral financial performance trends (Gentry 1996); current status of global market de-
and and prices for forest goods and services; commercially successful SFM operations; and
vailable financial mechanisms and investment vehicles characterised by investor needs, risk :
eturn profiles, operational strategies, etc.
45. The magnitude of this informational role makes it imperative that the IPA builds on or
ovetails with existing initiatives in this field. With regards SFM case studies, for example, FAO,
TTO and the MDBs (e.g., the World Bank-MacArthur Foundation) have already collated a sub-
tantial corpus of knowledge. The IPA might add value to such information, often expressed in
                                               
2 In effect, this would constitute investment pitches but from an independent and highly-respected source.
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gray literature, by 'translating' it into a 'legible' and relevant form to the private sector and ensur-
ing its dissemination to a much wider audience via, for example, newsletters, the financial press,
and trade associations.33
8.2.3 Identification of Investment Opportunities
346. Another major factor that limits financial flows into SFM is investors' lack of capacity to
identify appropriate investment opportunities. This investment barrier is strongly related to the
points made above regarding the information shortfall. However, for foreign investors in par-
ticular, it has a more specific dimension relating to barriers of distance, understanding, conven-
tion, language, and experience. In particular there can often be a perceived disjunction between
the investment requirements of an investor and those of a project manager or forest operator.
347. The IPA will seek to address this disjunction, in support of its core investment brokerage
role, through a range of activities designed: to connect up investors with investment opportuni-
ties, and, to ensure the requirements of both the investors and the investment are presented in a
mutually compatible way. Broadly speaking, these activities will focus on providing technical
assistance for, or working directly with, investors and those managing or putting together poten-
tial investments. Specific outputs might include:
• pre-investment feasibility studies,
• packaging and presentation of investment opportunities in appropriate fora, and
• information dissemination and marketing.
348. An interesting precedent for a comparable type of marketing role lies in MIGA's Invest-
ment Marketing Services Department whose services include the dissemination of information on
investment opportunities, business operating conditions, and business partners through the
IPAnet, an on-line investment marketplace (MIGA 1998). With this in mind, any additional mar-
keting services should only target those areas where lack of investment knowledge can been
identified as a major barrier to investment.
349. MIGA also seeks to build capacity in developing countries to attract and retain foreign
investment directly. This relates more closely to a potential bottom-up strategy that should be un-
dertaken by the IPA to inform those seeking investment of the opportunities within the interna-
tional investor community, and to provide channels through which these opportunities can be re-
alised. Such a strategy could be integrated into strategic sectoral developments such as the nfp
process (see Section 8.2.5).
8.2.4 Risk Mitigation
350. Perhaps the most significant barrier to investment in the forestry sector is risk (see Box
8.3). Such risks can be either real or perceived. Perceived risks can largely be addressed through
the dissemination of information and experience (see Sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3). Genuine risks,
                                                
33 In effect, this would constitute investment pitches but from an independent and highly respected source.
however, require mitigation through a wide range of services provided by existing public and pri-
vate sector institutions operating on the global stage.
Box 8.3 Risks in the Forestry SectorCountry risks – Tropical forestry investments in particular can be in countries rated with high political
risks.
Sector risks – Inherent to forestry activities are a series of risks that are exacerbated by the long time-
scales of forest growth and the resultant irreversibility of investments therein. Natural risks include:
natural disasters (e.g., fire, droughts, landslides, floods), insect attack, climatic instability, negative envi-
ronmental impacts through potential conflict between the provision of different environmental services.
Anthropogenic risks include: encroachment, illegal logging, conversion to other land-uses, policy shifts.
Market risks – demand/supply imbalances and price fluctuations; readily available substitutes for wood
products; conflicting policy drivers for forest products; changes in market preference; susceptibility of
global and country demand to public pressures (see below).
Public perception risks – Although this is really a subset of market risks, negative public perception of
certain types of forestry activities, particularly logging in natural forests, can be significant in itself in
creating marketing or operational problems. An example is a growing selectiveness of the general public
in relation to the source of timber products, such as observed in the FSC process, the creation of timber
buyer groups, etc. (Nussbaum et al. 1996, Crossley et al. 1998). This can reduce the attractiveness of
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351. It is not for the IPA to duplicate these services. However, as risk mitigation must be
tightly coupled with and complementary to the IPA's role in investment packaging and finance
structuring, the IPA should provide streamlined access for its clients to the necessary specific and
generic risk mitigation and investment guarantee services, including:
• multilateral risk mitigation schemes (e.g., based on MDBs' collateral);
• bilateral risk guarantees using concessionary finance (e.g., through bodies such as
Overseas Private Investment Corporation);
• partial risk guarantees covering debt service defaults on a project loan due to a gov-
ernment's failure to meet its contractual obligations, including forest sector-specific
policy guarantees (World Bank 1998);
• commercial risk underwriting;
• risk ratings and due diligences from financial, social, and environmental perspectives
(Gentry 1997); and
• certification (to increase project's credibility to the general public and thus, the in-
vestment community).
352. In addition to managing access to these existing mechanisms and the risk mitigation
service they provide, where necessary, the IPA can also:
• facilitate or mediate multiple objective public-private investment partnerships;
• broker and develop new and innovative investment insurance schemes; and
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• create investment vehicles based on diversified portfolios to spread risks (see Box
8.1).
353. As suggested, there are numerous precedents in this field, some of which are directly ap-
plicable to forestry, and others that need adapting. In particular, the World Bank Group's potential
role should be examined, as well as those of the regional development banks, existing commer-
cial private sector risk underwriters, and insurance companies.
8.2.5 Structural Development
354. The importance of removing structural barriers to SFM investment, particularly those re-
lating to systemic market and policy failures at both international and national levels, was ad-
dressed in Chapters 3 and 7. The onus of removing these barriers lies predominantly on the public
sector, both domestic and foreign, which have a range of funding sources and instruments at their
disposal (see Chapters 4 and 7).
355. The additional structural development role for the IPA as proposed here would be explic-
itly designed to complement not substitute for this ongoing process of barrier removal. It should
be stressed therefore that the IPA does not represent new financing for policy, legal and institu-
tional development and reform.34 When demanded and where appropriate, however,  the IPA
could provide targeted input to ensure that the numerous proposed and ongoing structural devel-
opment activities taking place throughout the developing world are fully attuned both to the ris-
ing importance of private sector financing for sustainable forestry operations and to the nature,
requirements, and implications of these financial flows.
356. Examples of IPA interventions might include:
• an advisory role on private sector requirements in development of nfps or other na-
tional-level strategic forest-sector plans;
• training and technical support for institutional and market developments relating to
private sector SFM investments, e.g., development of securities markets, and appro-
priate listing provisions on stock exchanges (Gentry 1996); and
• provision of management or consultancy teams to set-up or streamline public-private
interfaces such as national forestry investment offices (see e.g., Nicaragua 1999
among others).
357. There is already substantial work being done in this area at both international and domes-
tic levels. IPA activities (and the additional value they provide) would therefore be implemented
through partner institutions such as UNDP, the World Bank, FAO, and bilateral development
agencies, in those countries where a requisite degree of receptiveness to private sector financing
had been prior identified. As an example, the IPA could work with the World Bank, IMF, and
                                                
34 Implicitly, therefore, the criticisms made by some commentators on the mobilization and application of ODA
funding, as well as public sector activities in developing countries, remain equally if not more valid (e.g., Oksanen et
al. 1996; Simula 1996; Oksanen 1998).
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other development banks, in developing structural environmental adjustment programmes for de-
veloping countries' forestry sectors.35
8.3 Operationalising the IPA
358. In this section, four main issues concerning how the IPA might be operationalised are ad-
dressed. In all cases, resolving these issues would be far more than just procedural. Solutions
found could largely define the whole nature of the IPA and how it implements its constituent ac-
tivities. As before, the purpose of this section is not to prescribe answers, but to raise pertinent
issues and, where appropriate, suggest possible options as a basis for further consideration.
8.3.1 Governance
359. The IPA would be accountable to a governing body comprising representatives from both
the donor community and developing countries.36 Representation would be encouraged from all
stakeholders, including governments, private sector and other industry bodies, and the NGO
community.37 The governing body, in turn, could be free-standing, accountable to the CoP of a
future Forest Convention, or nested within the architecture of the World Bank group. The gov-
erning body would be responsible for developing and adopting overall terms of reference, within
which the IPA would operate under autonomous management. These terms would include:
• broad definition of IPA role and activities to be undertaken, including financial and
other services to be provided,
• investment guidelines and criteria (see below),
• operational policies and guidelines, and
• administrative rules.
360. Once the IPA is fully operational, the governing body would have the responsibility of
carrying out periodic performance-oriented reviews of the IPA's annual reports, and appointing
independent auditors. In addition, the governing body would set guidelines for the allocation of
future IPA-generated operating revenue, as well as managing the disbursement of the donor
community's initial startup budget, ruling on outstanding administrative questions such as loca-
tion, staffing levels, salaries, etc.
                                                
35 Such forestry sector adjustment programmes might, for example, constitute conditionalities for the World
Bank/IMF lending (and would nest within the broader conditions and terms).
36 As an example, the governing body might consist of a council and secretariat, headed by an executive director. An
advisory panel for technical forestry or financial issues might also be required.
37 The balance of executive or 'voting power' between developing and developed countries, or between different
stakeholder groups lies outside the remit of this report. There are, however, numerous interesting studies on this issue
and its implications for the exercise of governing authority (e.g., Yamin 1998).
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8.3.2 Investment Guidelines
361. One of the key functions of the IPA's governing body would be to adopt a series of strate-
gic investment guidelines and criteria that are flexible enough to evolve alongside changing SFM
agendas or investment circumstances. Such guidelines would play a crucial role in sending ap-
propriate signals to the private sector investor community as to the acceptability of different types
of forestry activity.38 In this regard, the full range of forestry activities, including downstream
processing, agroforestry, and management of natural forests and plantations should be considered
for all forest types.
362. The IPA's investment guidelines should be related to both financial and technical (for-
estry) matters and should address the following:
• What type of investments and investors are eligible for the IPA's services?
• What types of forestry activities are eligible for the IPA's services?
• Should any type of forestry activity be excluded by the IPA from catalytic conces-
sionary financing?
363. The guidelines should also address forestry, environmental, social and equity issues,
drawing on the existing sets of principles, C&I for SFM (particularly those associated with certi-
fication), as well as the environmental and social guidelines of the international financial institu-
tions (see also Nussbaum et al. 1996).
364. The investment guidelines must tread a fine line between the opinions and obligations of
the public sector which underpin the IPA's legitimacy, and the needs and interests of the private
sector whose harnessing to SFM is the IPA's ultimate goal. In this sense, excluding a certain type
of activity might, in the end, do more harm than good if private sector involvement remains on an
unsustainable footing.
8.3.3 Equity Issues
365. Three equity-based issues will likely be raised in the context of the investment and opera-
tional guidelines of the IPA. These are:
(i) Political equity – the need to respect the national sovereignty of all parties in-
volved;39
(ii) Distributional equity – the need to distribute the IPA's resources equitably
amongst all developing countries;40 and
                                                
38 As discussed in Section 7.4.3, currently the signals from the World Bank group, and particularly the IFC, create
poor perceptions of NFM amongst private sector investors.
39 The strength of opposition in the developing world to the OECD's proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment
was testimony enough of the need to ensure the IPA's investment facilitation activities are carried out in concert with,
and not irrespective of, developing countries own actions in this field.
40 Foreign private sector investments (both direct and indirect) are concentrated in a select group of 25-30 develop-
ing countries, of which 12 have absorbed around 80 percent of total flows since 1990 (ODI 1996). Most LDCs, par-
ticularly in Africa, are almost completely excluded.
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(iii) Societal equity – the need for the IPA's services to be equally accessible to all in-
vestors and investees including small-scale forest users and managers.
366. It is important that the mechanisms and practices which are used to ensure these equity
considerations are duly addressed do not themselves become barriers to the IPA's operations
which should be primarily concerned with leveraging and channeling private sector finance into
SFM, and could be compromised if operational efficiency, based on clear assessments of market
and investment opportunities, is constrained by equity requirements.
367. It would be more appropriate for the IPA to address resource distribution issues by pro-
moting suitable investment conditions through partner institutions' structural development work
in host countries. This in turn would create positive incentives for developing countries to work
towards removing market, policy, and institutional barriers to SFM investment, so as to benefit
from private sector resources mobilised by the IPA. In this way, selective targeting of the full
range of IPA activities could be used to build long-term capacity in developing countries' forestry
sectors so as to redress inequitable resource distribution patterns
8.3.4 Affiliated Institutions – the Bottom-up Complements
368. The proposed activities and structures for the IPA have been focused almost entirely at
the global level as the IPA itself is conceptualised as a global institution. In order to carry out its
activities successfully, however, the IPA will have to access the resources of affiliated institu-
tions at national and local levels. Such institutions might include chambers of commerce, federa-
tions of industry, NGOs, CBOs, investment agencies, local business groups, environmental funds,
forestry departments, and local governments. Interactions between the IPA and these decentral-
ised institutions will primarily be information-based, facilitating IPA activities such as the identi-
fication of investment opportunities (see Section 8.2.3).
369. However, there is substantial scope for further collaborations in the context of forestry
financing mechanisms (e.g., environmental funds, and SME credit lines – see Annex 4), struc-
tural development processes, marketing fora, investor mobilization, investment barrier identifica-
tion, targeted catalytic financing, etc. In particular, bottom-up input into IPA activities from na-
tional and local noncommercial entities, including financial intermediaries and NGOs, is essential
to ensure that the IPA's services are open to smaller-scale investment actors.
370. Interfacing the global remit of the IPA with national and local requirements and charac-
teristics will benefit from institutional networks that can provide greater economies of scale. The
nature of already existing networks that could support IPA activities will vary from country to
country and region to region. In some cases, the IPA will be able to piggyback on well-
established information channels. In others areas, the IPA's core activity might be to promote the
development of appropriate networks through partner institutions. Clearly, this type of institu-
tional and informational capacity building would not solely benefit the IPA in its work activities
but would constitute an important strategic development in the country in question's forestry
sector.
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8.4 The IPA's Structure and Funding Requirements
371. In this final section, a menu of three alternative institutional structures for the IPA is pro-
posed, each with a ballpark estimate of associated funding requirements. The first structure is
presented in detail, allowing the descriptions of the remaining structures to focus mainly on their
points of difference with the first. This menu format is designed to allow different components of
each structure to be cross-evaluated, and then selected or deselected depending on their compara-
tive advantages. A graphical illustration of the three structures is also given in Figure 8.3.
372. Ultimately the IPA's structure will be defined by the international community's conceptu-
alization of the activities the IPA should carry out, how it should operate, and therefore the re-
sources needed for its establishment and operation. With this in mind, the following institutional
issues should be considered in the context of the three alternative structures:
• governance – degree of influence or control exercised by the different IPA
stakeholders (see Section 8.3.1);
• administrative and management requirements – related to the size or scale of the IPA
and its internal costs;
• scope of activities – degree to which IPA activities are carried out in-house, under
contract, or outsourced but coordinated and managed internally;
• agility – efficiency of IPA in carrying out its activities, particularly in responding to
private sector requirements, e.g., in terms of project cycles, transaction costs, dis-
bursement times, etc.
8.4.1 Structure I
373. Under structure I, the IPA itself would be a comparatively small institution whose in-
house expertise and skills would be concentrated in the areas of investment banking, financial
packaging and structuring, marketing, and insurance. This would be coupled with an information
gathering, collation, and distribution facility designed to establish IPA-1 as the hub of a network
of information, experience, and expertise on forestry investors and investments41, enabling IPA-1
staff to coordinate, mediate, and ultimately manage a wide range of investment promotion activi-
ties aimed primarily at the private sector.
374. As IPA-1's size and budget would be fairly limited, it would depend on partner institu-
tions with the necessary resources to provide some of the required financial services. Risk miti-
gation, for example, could be provided by commercial or multilateral development banks, risk
guarantee agencies, or insurance companies. Such services would be carried out under contract to
IPA-1, and subject to IPA-1's terms and conditions. Such contractual arrangements could be ne-
gotiated in advance and subsequently made statutory (rather than being agreed on a case-by-case
                                                
41 The IPA-1 database might include information on: past and proposed sustainable forestry projects; financial
mechanisms and instruments, with application procedures and criteria; contact people or institutions from global to
national levels; possible investment partners or financiers; project-level investment requirements including relevant
aspects of policy and fiscal regimes, etc.
FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY. 116
basis) so as to provide an optimised 'fast-track' service for IPA-1 clients in partner institutions.42
However, this would be contingent on the level of correspondence between IPA-1's investment
criteria and guidelines, and those of the partner financial institutions.
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375. In this way, IPA-1's financial expertise and informational capacity would form the basis
of a comprehensive investment facilitation service. Its role would be to identify the various com-
ponents required for any given investment, and then manage the provision of those components
from either internal or external sources (including innovative financial mechanisms). IPA-1
would then bring these individual components together into a structured financial package, tai-
lored to the needs of the investors or the investments.
376. Such activities would enable IPA-1 to clearly identify any deficiencies in the SFM fi-
nancing architecture, and to develop, where appropriate, financial instruments to address those
deficiencies. As described in Section 8.2.1, such development could involve anything from con-
                                                
42 This type of arrangement would greatly enhance partner institutions' understanding and experience of sustainable
forestry investments. This type of facilitatory role might then become incorporated into the respective institutions'
work remit outside and above any contractual arrangements with the IPA.
FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY. 117
ceptualisation, to promotion and implementation, and even direct management of investment ve-
hicles.
377. To carry out all its activities under the structure outlined above, IPA-1 would require an
initial budget in the order of tens of millions of U.S. dollars to set-up the necessary informational
infrastructure and provide working capital to initiate operations.43 Following this capital outlay,
IPA-1 could potentially become self-financing, by charging appropriate investment facilitation
fees depending on the extent of the service provided (see Figure 8.2). Such fees could be made
conditional on investment success, projected profit margins, or some other formula.
8.4.2 Structure II
378. Under structure II, the IPA-2 would be similar in size and scope to IPA-1, but would exist
not as a single autonomous unit, but as a series of franchises housed in existing institutions with
the necessary expertise to promote private sector financial flows into SFM (see Figure 8.3).
379. The terms of the franchise would be defined by IPA-2's governing body as a set of re-
quired activities framed by appropriate guidelines and policy criteria. Broadly speaking, the ac-
tivities comprising the franchise would be similar to those described in the context of IPA-1. The
franchises could then be offered as contracts to selected institutions, or could be put out to com-
petitive tender. In this way, institutions could bid for the franchises either individually, or in part-
nerships or as consortia, thereby pooling the necessary skills and expertise.
380. How the IPA-2 franchises are implemented would be left up to the host institutions, sub-
ject to approval and review by the IPA-2 governing body. In effect, IPA-2 would operate as a
range of SFM investment facilitation windows that could be added to the financial services al-
ready offered by existing institutions in both the commercial and public sectors.44 These institu-
tions could be focused at global, regional, or national scales, and might include:
• bilateral and multilateral public sector financial institutions – e.g., WB, IFC, MIGA,
etc.,
• regional development banks – e.g., IDB, AsDB, AfDB, etc.,
• commercial banks, investment funds / brokers, insurance companies, and
• national forest / environmental investment funds, e.g., FUNBIO, Fonafifo.
381. A small standing secretariat supporting the governing body could provide coordination
between the various IPA-2 franchises. This coordinating role would focus on exchanging infor-
mation and experience between the host institutions. In this way, the centralised informational
role of IPA-1 would be decentralised over a network, although it is likely that the benefits derived
from integrating synergistic investment promotion activities within one body would be lost. In
                                                
43 IPA-1 staff could be recruited from financial institutions in the private sector, such as commercial banks or in-
vestment funds, or alternatively seconded from appropriate multilateral organizations, such as the IFC.
44 Various institutions such as the WB and IDB already have experience of opening private sector-oriented windows
(the IFC and IIC respectively).
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addition, the secretariat could provide policy, investment or other guidance as and when re-
quested by a franchise.
382. IPA-2 would require an initial budget similar to that of IPA-1 to finance the development
of the franchise, the tendering process, and the setting-up of a small coordinating secretariat.
Once operational, the franchises would be run as commercial ventures by the host institutions and
would be self-financing according to each institution's preferred strategy. The coordinating sec-
retariat's small operational budget could be met by charging administrative fees to the franchise
host institutions for any services rendered. In this way, budgetary demands on the donor commu-
nity would again be principally confined to the initial capital startup costs.
8.4.3 Structure III
383. IPA-3's informational capacity, internal expertise, and role in managing the provision of
financial services (particularly investment packaging and financial structuring) would be compa-
rable to that of IPA-1. However, a more substantial initial capitalization together with a sustained
resource contribution from the donor community would allow for an expansion of its structural
development activities. The limited, reactive advisory role of IPA-1 in this field could become a
more proactive management role. IPA-3 could directly interface with national strategic planning,
market and policy reform processes in the forestry sector through its partner institutions. For ex-
ample, IPA-3 might coordinate or host investors fora within the context of an nfp process. But
IPA-3's expertise could also be made available on a more ad hoc basis through in-house or con-
tracted management teams, whose role would be to complement other IPA-3 activities by, for
example, developing institutional capacity for national forestry investment offices, or providing,
at concessionary rates, training, technical assistance, or other advisory services. The experience
and information gained by this type of activity would then feed directly into the work carried out
in the context of IPA-3's other core activities.
384. In carrying out such activities, IPA-3 would be serving as a conduit for bi- and multilat-
eral concessionary financing for sustainable forestry, ensuring foreign public sector resources
were disbursed efficiently for optimal leverage of private sector financing for SFM. The benefits
of such a coordinating role would include: avoided duplicated effort; channeled resources into
key areas; and streamlined ODA disbursement time and costs, etc.
385. Of the three proposed IPA structures, IPA-3 would most closely resemble that of a fi-
nancing facility. As mentioned, inherent to such a role are higher initial and operational budgets.
The initial capital outlay required for setting up IPA-3 would be in the order of hundreds of mil-
lions of U.S. dollars. In addition, resources would have to be guaranteed by the donor community
over the long-term to sustain IPA-3's expanded structural development role and other activities.
Operating revenue would still be generated, as in IPA-1, through administrative charges and suc-
cess fees.
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Figure 8.3 Three Options for the IPA's Structure
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8.4.4 Comparative Assessment of IPA Structures
386. Table 8.2 summarises the differences in the scope of activities carried out under each of
the three proposed structures (see also Figure 8.1). The IPA-1 structure is used as the point of ref-
erence. Table 8.3 provides a brief comparative assessment of the three proposed structures
against a range of criteria, which are grouped under:
• Operational – relating to how the IPA carries out its activities / day-to-day manage-
ment; and
• Administration and governance – relating to the administrative requirements of the
IPA and the relationship between the IPA and its governing body.
387. It is inappropriate to assess in detail three optional structures for a proposed hypothetical
institution. The comparative assessment presented in Table 8.3 is therefore only an initial step. A
proper assessment can only be made when viable options have been further conceptualised.
8.5 Conclusions
388. To summarise, the IPA's primary purpose is to leverage global private sector financing by
carefully targeting public sector resources at removing structural and operational barriers to pri-
vate sector investment in SFM. To this end, the IPA would provide a range of information-based
and financial services, which include investment packaging and structuring of finance, identifi-
cation of investment opportunities and information dissemination, and risk mitigation. In terms of
the IPA's institutional arrangements, these “investment brokerage” services could either be
housed in an existing or new institution, or could be delivered through decentralised “franchises”.
389. It should be stressed that the IPA constitutes but one component of a comprehensive fi-
nancing strategy required at the international level. This strategy is laid out in detail in Chapter 7.
As such, the IPA should not be read as a panacea to the problems of forest financing. In particu-
lar, its successful functioning is conditional or even dependent on appropriate investment envi-
ronments being in place at both international and national levels. In turn, this entails addressing
an array of outstanding market and policy failures in the forestry sector, for which the potential
direct contributions of the IPA would likely be limited (although this is less so of the proposed
IPA-3 structure with its expanded structural development activities - see Sections 8.2.5 & 8.4.3).
390. This logic raises the question of whether an international 'Forest Fund' is needed to
channel and co-ordinate the disbursement of existing or additional ODA in redressing sectoral
failings. This would be particularly pertinent were a legally-binding international agreement on
SFM to be signed (see Section 7.4.3). Such a fund would likely be conceived along the lines of a
multilateral financing institution (for which many precedents exist), and would be designed to
support ongoing national structural development processes embodied by the nfp (see chapter
7.5.2). The sources of financing for such a fund would have to be based on arrangements that are
sustainable and not subject to short-term political decisions related to ODA. Appropriate modali-
ties for such an arrangement are difficult to visualise.
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391. With regards direct involvement in project-level operations, the scope of such a fund
would likely be limited, as it is with the IPA. However, the fund might potentially focus on
countries and types of activity which are not likely to be covered through the proposed strategies
in this study, and the range of existing conventional and innovative financing mechanisms. Such
'niches' may include support to ensure that forest-dependent people are provided with alternative
livelihoods and sources of income when needed, the management of protected areas or other non-
commercial forests, adequate monitoring of SFM achievements at the national level, or the miti-
gation of various structural barriers to SFM (Ljungman, personal comment). Another potential
role might be to support the initial steps of predominantly privately funded ventures within the
framework of national forest utilisation strategies (Gordon, pers. comm.). In particular, such a
role could provide the necessary incentives for private sector take-up of those market and non-
market-based financing mechanisms which are designed to internalise forest externalities with a
view to boosting and stabilising the returns on SFM investments over the long-term.
392. In all these areas, the potential synergies of such a fund with the IPA are considerable,
especially in those countries where sufficient preconditions for private investment in SFM exist
or can be easily created. But such synergies apply more broadly to the existing multilateral fi-
nancing institutions, and particularly the World Bank group (pending the review of its forest pol-
icy - see section 7.4.3).
393. Indeed, the analysis within this report suggests that a traditionally-conceived forest fund
would largely duplicate the facilities and roles of institutions and financing mechanisms already
active at both international and national scales. As has been stressed throughout, there is a clear
need for better coordination and more careful targeting of available concessionary financial re-
sources, as well as institutional reforms such as those recommended in chapter 7. Whether a new
forest fund could add value to this process should be carefully considered with regard to its po-
tential role in mobilising additional funding and in addressing potential caveats.
394. In the same context, the complementary role that could be played by the IPA within the
comprehensive global forest financing strategy described in chapter 7 should be recognised. The
IPA's private sector orientation and horizontally-integrated financial and information-based serv-
ices represent a potential institutional innovation in terms of how concessionary finance can be
more effectively used. This in turn could serve to leverage significant private sector financial
flows into acceptable SFM activities and operations.
395. Finally, it needs to be recognised that, if the concept of IPA is further explored, a compre-
hensive assessment of actual and future private sector financing needs in SFM-based activities
should be carried out, taking into account the strong promotional effort which is needed to trans-
form current investments in UnSFM into SFM activities.
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Table 8.2 Comparison of the Scope of Activities within the Three Proposed IPA Struc-
tures
Structures !
"Activities IPA-1 IPA-2 IPA-3
Investment
Packaging
and Struc-
turing of Fi-
nance
investment brokerage,
packaging, and structuring
all managed in-house with
partner institutions con-
tracted to provide specific
services where necessary
(e.g., risk mitigation)
as IPA-1 but possibility
that investment brokerage
services are spread out
amongst franchises ac-
cording to host institu-
tions' fields of expertise,
and coordinated by over-
arching IPA Secretariat
as IPA-1 but with more
scope for development and
management of new in-
vestment vehicles to ad-
dress financing shortfalls
Information
Provision
comprehensive in-house
information gathering,
handling, and distribution
system encompassing the
full range of SFM and in-
vestment/financial data
as IPA-1 but scope of
data coverage probably
limited by terms of refer-
ence of host institutions –
possibility of specially-
designated information
resource bodies within a
franchise
as IPA-1 but with more in-
stitutional network & ca-
pacity building at national
and local levels (coupled to
structural development ac-
tivities)
Identifica-
tion of In-
vestment
Opportuni-
ties
investor-investment link-
ing service coupled with
information provision role
(see above) and invest-
ment presentation / mar-
keting – some scope for
technical assistance in
pre-investment feasibility
studies
as IPA-1 but may be lim-
ited to host institutions'
own fields of expertise
(e.g., in certain types of
SFM activity) – limited
technical assistance role
as IPA-1 but more exten-
sive bottom-up networking
(see above) allows expan-
sion of technical support
for pre-investment feasibil-
ity studies and investment
presentation
Risk
Mitigation
provided under contract
by partner institutions
as IPA-1 but possibility
that franchise holder
might offer some of the
required risk mitigation
services
as IPA-1 but also develop-
ment of sector specific in-
struments
Structural
Development
largely a reactive (as and
when requested) advisory
and consultancy role in
ongoing processes
contingent on host insti-
tutions' role (or mandate),
operational policies, and
remit
more proactive managerial
role – could involve using
technical teams to address
structural deficiencies
identified through other
core activities – possibility
of playing some coordi-
nating role in ODA dis-
bursement
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Table 8.3 Comparative Assessment of the Three Proposed IPA Structures
OPERATIONS IPA-1 IPA-2 IPA-3
Scope of activities Medium - focus on
score investment bro-
kerage services
dependent on host in-
stitutions (see Table
8.2)
medium/extensive -
structural development
through partner insti-
tutions
Potential for direct in-
vestments
low low/medium, though
IPA activities could
complement other di-
rect investments of
host institutions
medium - if necessary
through new financing
mechanisms targeted at
specific shortfalls
In-house capacity medium - predomi-
nantly financial exper-
tise
likely to be low for full
range of activities but
would benefit from
existing capacity of
host institutions
high - includes advi-
sory or management
teams as well as in-
vestment brokers
Capacity to develop
own financial mecha-
nisms
high high, but dependent on
host institutions
high
Capacity to manage
own financial mecha-
nisms
medium - more likely
to be outsourced
high, but dependent on
host institutions
high
Integration of IPA ac-
tivities (internal coor-
dination)
medium/high low/medium – depends
on the role of coordi-
nating Secretariat and
nature of the franchises
high - significant po-
tential synergies be-
tween structural devel-
opment work and in-
vestment facilitation
services
Outreach capacity low/medium medium/high high/medium if con-
strained by the man-
date of the host insti-
tution
Agility* high - small compact
institution
potentially high but
dependent on host in-
stitutions
medium/high if ad-
dressed in the statutes
Managerial autonomy high - within opera-
tional framework set
by governing body
dependent on host in-
stitutions
low/medium - due to
greater political sensi-
tivity some structural
development activities
and ODA disburse-
ment
ADMINISTRATION
AND GOVERNANCE
IPA-1 IPA-2 IPA-3
Startup budget (public
sector)
tens of millions of
dollars
tens of millions of
dollars
hundreds of millions of
dollars
Operational budget
(public sector)
low – intended to be
largely self-financing
through fees/charges
for services
low – mainly to sup-
port coordinating Sec-
retariat
medium/high – de-
pends on scope of
structural development
activities - could also
serve as conduct for
ODA resources
Internal costs (e.g. staff
requirements)
low/medium (see un-
der agility)
low medium/high
Table 8.3 (con't)
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ADMINISTRATION
AND GOVERNANCE
IPA-1 IPA-2 IPA-3
Direct influence of
governance on man-
agement / financing
decisions
low low but to follow the
rules of host institu-
tions
medium/high
Credibility** to be earned (though if
hosted within an ex-
isting institution, de-
pendent on its credi-
bility)
high (assuming fran-
chises are granted ap-
propriately)
to be earned (though if
hosted within an ex-
isting institution, de-
pendent on its credi-
bility)
* Agility refers to the IPA's effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with its private sector clients and in-
cludes,  for example, the speed of response or disbursement of funds.
** Credibility refers to the way in which the IPA is regarded by the investor and investee communities,
and whether it is seen as a viable or favorable institution with which to become involved or do busi-
ness. Credibility is usually earned, but can also be bestowed by virtue of a new institutions' associa-
tions (as is the case with the IPA).
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LIST OF GEF PROJECTS ANALYZED
Country Project title Focal area Operational program GEF allocation
(US$)
Allocation to
SFM (US$)
GEF phase
Albania,
FYROM
Lake Ohrid Conservation Project International
Waters
Water Body-Based OP 4,100,000 450,0001 GEF-1
Argentina Biodiversity Conservation Project Biodiversity STRM 10,389,000 02 GEF-1
Bangladesh Biodiversity Conservation in the Sundar-
bans Reserved Forest
Biodiversity Coastal, Marine and
Freshwater Ecosystems
12,200,000 500,0003 GEF-1
Belarus Biodiversity Protection Project Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 1,000,000 0  Pilot
Benin Village-Based Management of Woody
Savanna and the Establishment of Wood-
lots for Carbon Sequestration
Climate Change STRM 2,500,000 2,500,0004 Pilot
Bhutan Trust Fund for Environmental Conserva-
tion
Biodiversity Mountain Ecosystems 10,000,000 05 Pilot
Bhutan Integrated Management of Jigme Dorji
National Park
Biodiversity Mountain Ecosystems 1,500,000 06 GEF-1
Bolivia Biodiversity Conservation Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 4,500,000 100,0007 Pilot
Botswana,
Kenya, Mali
Management of Indigenous Vegetation for
the Rehabilitation of degraded Rangelands
in the Arid Zone of Africa
Biodiversity Arid and Semi-Arid
Zone Ecosystem
9,054,000 4,050,0008 GEF-1
                                                
1 Under “Participatory watershed management” component: pilot projects and catalytic measures: Albania: US$180,000 and FYROM: US$270,000.
2 Although the “Buffer Zone Biodiversity Activities” component’s activities (GEF: US$743,000) may include some SFM.
3 “Biodiversity and forestry” subcomponent under the component “B.” Incorporation of biodiversity conservation consideration within sustainable productive
activities”.
4 This unusual project can be classified completely under SFM.  However, it was a GEF Pilot Phase project, and similar projects would not be eligible now (car-
bon sequestration is not yet eligible for GEF financing.
5 Although the trust fund revenues may be used in the future for SFM related activities in buffer zones
6 GEF inputs to SFM are zero, although some US$300,000 of UNDP co-financing goes to SFM
7 “Alternative management of natural resources in buffer zones” component
8 Components “Establishment and strengthening of appropriate indigenous management systems” (US$1.5 million), and “Rehabilitation of indigenous vegeta-
tion” (US$2.55 million)
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Country Project title Focal area Operational program GEF allocation
(US$)
Allocation to
SFM (US$)
GEF phase
Brazil National Biodiversity Project (PROBIO) Biodiversity STRM 10,000,000 Asked from task
manager: no reply
Pilot
Brazil Brazilian Biodiversity Fund Project
(FUNBIO)
Biodiversity STRM 20,000,000 Asked from task
manager: no reply
Pilot
Burkina Faso,
Côte d’Ivoire
West Africa Pilot Community-Based
Natural Resource and Wildlife Manage-
ment Project
Biodiversity Arid and Semi-Arid
Zone Ecosystem
7,000,000 09 Pilot
Cameroon Biodiversity Conservation and Manage-
ment
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 5,960,000 3,756,00010 Pilot
Central Africa
Region
Regional Environment Information Man-
agement Project (REIMP)
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 4,077,000 206,00011 GEF-1
Central African
Republic
A Highly Decentralized Approach to
Biodiversity Protection and Use: The
Bangassou Dense Forest
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 2,500,000 2,500,000   GEF-1
Central America Central American Fund for Environment
and Development: Account for the Global
Environment
Biodiversity STRM 15,000,000 012 GEF-1
China Nature Reserves Management Project Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 17,900,000 7,078,00013 GEF-1
Comoros Island Biodiversity and Participatory Con-
servation in the Federal Islamic Republic
of the Comoros
Biodiversity Coastal, Marine and
Freshwater Ecosystems
2,442,000 290,00014 GEF-1
Costa Rica Biodiversity Resources Development
Project
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 7,000,000 900,00015 GEF-1
                                                
9 Some references to “assisting communities to make better use of secondary forest products” and “ possible investments in…agroforestry.” However, it is not
possible to identify specific components or inputs for these purposes.
10 All “local components”: GEF contribution to those
11 “Forestry” components: CAR: US$4,000, Congo: US$34,000, the Democratic Republic of Congo: US$160,000, Equatorial Guinea: US$8,000, in addition the
project may have impact on SFM policy development
12 The Fund is not yet operational: three projects pre-selected for financing, none of them for SFM, although SFM could qualify for financing
13 (i) Under “Nature reserves” component, subcomponent “Community participation” (US$2,265,000), (ii) project component (Forest) Enterprise Restructuring
(US$4,813,000)
14 “Economic development alternatives” component.
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Country Project title Focal area Operational program GEF allocation
(US$)
Allocation to
SFM (US$)
GEF phase
Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Guinea,
Liberia, Sierra
Leone
Conservation Priority-Setting for the Up-
per Guinea Forest Ecosystem, West Af-
rica
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 742,000 0   GEF-1
Czech Rep. Biodiversity Protection Biodiversity STRM 2,000,000 250,00016 Pilot
Democratic Re-
public of Congo
Rehabilitation of Protected Areas in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 6,332,441 0   GEF-1
Ecuador Biodiversity Protection Project Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 7,200,000 350,00017 Pilot
Georgia Georgia Conservation of Forest Ecosys-
tems
Biodiversity Georgia Conservation of
Forest Ecosystems
9,050,000 2,000,00018 GEF-1
Ghana Natural Resource Management Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 8,725,000 019 GEF-1
Global Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Pro-
gram
Multiple Focal
Areas
4,300,000 Asked from IFC:
no reply
Pilot
Global Small and Medium Scale Enterprise (re-
plenishment)
Multiple Focal
Areas
16,500,000 Asked from IFC:
no reply
GEF-1
Global Alternatives to Slash and Burn Climate Change STRM 3,000,000 3,000,000   Pilot
Global Global Environmental Benefits from Al-
ternatives to Slash and Burn Agriculture
(Phase II)
Climate change STRM 2,941,000 2,941,000   Pilot
Guyana Program for Sustainable Forestry (Iwok-
rama Rain Forest Program)
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 3,000,000 3,000,000   Pilot
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
15 Sustainable uses of biodiversity – component (US$0.9 million): although only indirect links with SFM
16 Restoration of forest ecosystems (US$170,000) & Preparation of sustainable development strategies (US$80,000)
17 Activity No. 35: TA and pilot studies for Chachi indians and other communities located in buffer zone…
18 Rough estimate: the available information does not permit more detailed assessment: there are activities like “2.1 Preparation and adoption of integrated plan
for forestry and protected areas in the Central Caucasus” in collaboration with the Forestry Development Project”, and “2.3 Forest management agreements to
wildlife corridors and appropriate management regimes in place”.
19 GEF contribution to SFM is zero, although co-financing components include US$18.7 million for SFM
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Country Project title Focal area Operational program GEF allocation
(US$)
Allocation to
SFM (US$)
GEF phase
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Rep.,
Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan
Aral Sea Basin Program: Water and Envi-
ronmental Management Project
International
Waters
Integrated Land and
Water Multiple Focal
Area OP
12,200,000 0   GEF-1
Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda
Lake Victoria Environmental Manage-
ment Project
International
Waters
Water body-based OP 35,000,000 020 GEF-1
Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda
Reducing Biodiversity Loss at Cross
Boarder Sites in East Africa
Biodiversity N / A 12,899,000 6,574,00021 GEF-1
Latin America Terra Capital Fund Biodiversity STRM 5,000,000 N.A.22 GEF-1
Madagascar Priority Setting and Strategic Identifica-
tion & Design of Interventions for Biodi-
versity Conservation: A Multi-sectoral,
Consensus-based, Scientific Approach for
Madagascar
Biodiversity N / A 170,000 023 GEF-1
Mauritania and
Senegal
Biological Diversity Conservation
through Participatory Rehabilitation of the
Degraded Lands of the Arid and Semi-
Arid Transboundary Areas of Mauritania
and Senegal
Biodiversity Arid and Semi-Arid
Zone Ecosystems
7,996,000 7,996,00024 GEF-1
Nicaragua Atlantic Biological Corridor Project Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 7,100,000 1,190,00025 GEF-1
Panama Atlantic Mesoamerican Biological Corri-
dor Project
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 8,400,000 2,980,00026 GEF-1
                                                
20 The afforestation component US$2.5 million is financed by IDA
21 Project still under planning. SFM includes the component “Balancing Resource Demand & Supply” (US$6,574,000)
22 The Fund became operational only in October 1998.
23 Pre-Investment Feasibility (PRIF) Funding; project preparation; based on the available documentation it is not likely that the project would include SFM
24 This is a rare example of a GEF project that can be said to focus completely on SFM which is noticeable in the type of ecosystem the project is operating in
25 Under component E (priority biodiversity areas), subcomponent 2 (sustainable use): US$1.19 million
26 (i) Under project component 1: Subcomponent 2 (local & regional planning in priority areas) US$1.03 million, (ii) Under component 3, subcomponent 1
(strengthening at the community level) US$0.63 million, (iii) Under project component 4: subcomponent 1 (support for conservation and sustainable use of biodi-
versity) US$1.32 million
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Country Project title Focal area Operational program GEF allocation
(US$)
Allocation to
SFM (US$)
GEF phase
Papua New
Guinea
Papua New Guinea Forestry and Conser-
vation Project
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 17,300,000 2,000,00027 GEF-1
Peru National Trust Fund for Protected Areas Biodiversity Forest ecosystems 5,000,000 0   Pilot
Romania Danube Delta Biodiversity Biodiversity Coastal, Marine and
Freshwater Ecosystems
4,500,000 132,00028 Pilot
Romania Integrated Protected Areas and Conserva-
tion Management
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 5,300,000 700,00029 GEF-1
SADC Southern Africa Biodiversity Support
Program
Biodiversity STRM 4,482,000 4,482,00030 GEF-1
South Africa Cape Peninsula Biodiversity Conservation
Project
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 12,300,000 0   GEF-1
Sri Lanka Conservation and Sustainable Use of Me-
dicinal Plants
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 4,700,000 4,700,00031 GEF-1
Tanzania Conservation of Forest Biodiversity Re-
sources in the Eastern Arc Mountains
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 24,308 24,30832 GEF-1
Tanzania Conservation of Coastal Forest Biodiver-
sity in East Africa
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 22,969 22,969   GEF-1
Tanzania Critical Wildlife Corridors in Tanzania Biodiversity Arid and Semi-Arid
Zone Ecosystems
5,000,000 033 GEF-1
Uganda Conserving Biodiversity in the Western
Rift Valley Forests
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 24,720 24,72034 GEF-1
                                                
27 GEF contribution to subcomponents “Forest management and conservation education” (US$0.9 million) and “Land-group-based conservation and resource
management areas” (US$1.1 million).  Furthermore, there may be additional contributions to SFM from the Conservation Trust Fund to be established (GEF con-
tribution US$10 million), however, GEF does not provide any contribution to the “Sustainable Forest Management” component of the project.
28 Under component 4 (ecosystem restoration): (i) establishment of village woodlots (US$9,900), (ii) willow planting (US$123,000)
29 GEF contribution to “Sustainable natural resource management” component
30 Available information did not permit more detailed assessment; however, as the executing agency is SADC FSTCU and because of the description of the proj-
ect components, it may be appropriate to assume that the whole project can be classified to support SFM
31 Available information did not permit more detailed assessment, however, it appears that the whole project can be classified as NTFP / SFM
32 PDF-A Status only. The project focuses on a high priority forest sector issue identified also in the Tanzania TFAP. The actual SFM components remain to be
seen.
33 PDF-B status only, according to the documentation available, no SFM components.
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Country Project title Focal area Operational program GEF allocation
(US$)
Allocation to
SFM (US$)
GEF phase
Vietnam Creating Protected Areas for Resource
Conservation Using Landscape Ecology
Biodiversity Forest Ecosystems 6,011,840 420,00035 GEF-1
Total 364,343,278 65,116,997   17.9%
Subtotal Pilot Phase 92,901,000 16,029,000   17.3%
Subtotal GEF-1 271,442,278 49,087,997   18.1%
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
34 PDF-A Status only. The project focuses on a high priority forest sector issue. The actual SFM components remain to be seen.
35 Forest management and rehabilitation
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FACT SHEETS ON INNOVATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS
A/1. PORTFOLIO EQUITY INSTRUMENTS
OVERVIEW
Type
Direct financial: equity
Objective
Channel traditional sources of portfolio equity capital from institutional investors into
environmentally and ethically sound companies publicly traded on capital markets.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
operational (lack of local
investment capital*)
private commercial Private commercial Late stage Global
National
* This can be due to structural barriers such as lack of capital market infrastructure, but these are not
addressed by this mechanism.
See also: Private sector forestry investment funds
DESCRIPTION
The financial resources managed by institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance
companies, commercial banks, and other mutual investment fund managers, represent a vast
source of equity capital. Developing new portfolio investment vehicles that tap this resource by
channelling it into environmental or environmentally efficient companies that are publicly traded
on local stock exchanges is therefore a priority. The main example of such vehicles are the
“ethical investment” funds which screen their chosen investments against a range of social,
ethical or environmental criteria. Currently, such funds are based almost exclusively in the
developed world. Their aim is to provide their shareholders with returns comparable to other
investment funds through long-term capital growth, but only from environmentally acceptable
investments. Indeed, recent evaluations suggest that some ethical funds have met or beaten the
performance of established indices such as Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index.
There is also some evidence that long-term concerns about risk and environmental liabilities are
increasingly stimulating traditional investors’ interest in emerging environmental markets, and
particularly in cutting-edge environmental technologies, as the best place for high returns in the
medium and long-term, irrespective of any shareholder-driven ethical concern.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
Ethical funds (in their broadest sense) control in the order of US$ 40 billion in assets worldwide
(ballpark figures only), predominantly in the European Union and the United States. The
estimated proportion of these resources in forestry is unknown.
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These funds are well established in the U.S. (e.g., Ventana North American Environment Funds)
and Europe (e.g., Friends Provident & Jupiter in the United Kingdom, various Green Fund
initiatives in Holland). Equity portfolios are dominated by companies listed on developed
countries’ capital markets. However, several examples exist of comparable developing world
funds (for example, in Thailand), or of funds in developed countries that are dedicated to
investing in the developing world. One example of the latter is Progressive Asset Management
(PAM), a U.S. investment firm, which now handles US$350 million (1996 figures) of
environmental investments in developing country enterprises.
Replicability for forestry
Although SFM companies present their own unique characteristics to the investor in terms of
risk: return profiles, liabilities, capital requirements, etc., there is no intrinsic reason why
companies engaged in SFM activities should not be included within the portfolios of institutional
equity investors, provided sufficient information is made available to overcome prevailing
negative perceptions (see Chapters 3 & 8). Similarly, no specific types of SFM activity should
inherently be excluded, although in practice the range and financial performance of publicly
traded companies involved in activities such as conservation might not match fund managers’
requirements. Conversely, industrial plantations and vertically integrated NFM companies have
been identified as potential targets for fund managers.
One major constraint is that there are still very few large (established) listed companies engaged
in SFM, particularly in the developing world. Certified forestry companies tend to be small and
often under private ownership. One solution proposed by Gullison et al. (1998) is through the
creation of a forestry fund which could take on ownership and management of many smaller
companies, but would itself to be large enough to be publicly listed.
On the more positive side, ongoing processes in the forestry sector like certification, due
diligence, or the incorporation of ISO management standards, could neatly dovetail with
environmental screening methodologies used by ethical fund managers. Appropriate SFM
principles and criteria could be suitably adapted for use in screening.
Funding potential
Medium (see above constraints), but likely to be focused (at least initially) on well-established
high-profile companies in the forestry sector whose engagement with SFM is both easily verified
and uncontroversial. Moreover, both the fund portfolios’ equity investments tend to be focused in
developed countries with established capital markets, or in TNCs. Smaller publicly traded SFM
companies in the developing world are unlikely to be targeted.
Issues
There are a range of prerequisites before environmentally-oriented portfolio equity capital can be
accessed by SFM companies in developing countries, not least of which are established local
stock markets. There are also numerous informational barriers that need to be overcome if
investment opportunities in the developing world are to be linked to large-scale institutional
investors. One such is the negative environmental perceptions of the forestry sector, and
particularly NFM, amongst potential developed world shareholders and fund managers. This is
compounded by the poor track record of natural resource investment (the worst performing sector
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in the US in 1998) which has created entrenched negative perceptions of the performance of
forestry-based equity on the capital markets.
Although, information on poor environmental practice appropriately wielded by shareholders can
be a powerful tool for influencing portfolio fund managers’ investment priorities, in practice,
major institutional investors who dominate the shareholdings of ethical funds tend to be quite
passive. More vociferous smaller investors and consumers, however, have been known to
leverage changes in investment priorities. Government regulation is the other main driver.
The screening procedures of ethical investment funds are information-intensive. However, the
provision of sophisticated analyses of companies’ environmental performance to the financial
sector is currently a growth area both within fund management infrastructure, and independently
from rating bodies (e.g., Eco-Rating International in Switzerland, Investors Responsibility
Research Center in the U.S., etc.). Increasingly, environmental performance analyses are being
integrated into standardised investment ratings based on a more systematic consideration of the
financial risks posed to a company’s operations by current and future environmental requirements
and liabilities. The Centre for Study of Financial Institutions (UK), for example, produces a
bond-style rating which takes into account both the financial strength and environmental
performance of a company using a credit-rating scale of AAA to C.
Small-scale SFM operators are unlikely to be able to access portfolio equity capital due to the
informational and other requirements mentioned above. However, there are examples of
investment funds, such as DevCap in the United States, that seek to create a link between capital
markets of the U.S. and the capital needs of micro-entrepreneurs in the developing world.
Lack of capital is but one of a host of barriers to SFM. Moreover, attractive SFM investment
opportunities for portfolio equity capital are likely to remain scarce while underlying policy and
market failures persist in making forest mining more profitable.
The possibility of a multilateral environmental agreement on portfolio investment has also been
suggested (based on the reactions against the OECD’s proposed Multilateral Agreement on
Investment) which would provide a framework for linking flows of portfolio equity capital to the
stipulations of international environmental agreements.
References
Richards 1998, Gentry 1996, Crossley, et al. 1996, Gullison, et al. 1998
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A/2. PUBLIC-PRIVATE INSTRUMENTS
OVERVIEW
Type
Direct financial: equity, debt
Objective
Use of public sector resources, either financial or in kind, to remove key barriers to private sector
involvement with activities for which social benefits generally outweigh private benefits; one
result is often the leverage of significant levels of financial resources from the private sector both
as direct investments and through the capital markets.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Operational (e.g., lack of
capital, risk)
Public
Private commercial
Public
Private commercial
Early stage
Mid-stages
(also late stage)
Local
National
Global
See also: Biodiversity venture capital funds; Sector-defining investment funds
DESCRIPTION
There are a range of mechanisms and instruments that facilitate or embody public-private joint
ventures. They share the common objective of using public sector resources, either directly or in
kind, to leverage private sector financing into activities which, by virtue of identifiable barriers to
investment, fail to attract the interest of the private sector investor community (and particularly
the capital markets). Such activities can include what are traditionally regarded as “public works”
such as building hospitals or roads.
Selected examples of such mechanisms include:
• Seedcorn equity capital– generally from public, or mixed public-private sources; typically
invested in emerging enterprises which require debt or equity financing to scale-up to the next
level of commercial activity; such enterprises could be too small to guarantee profitability and
security, or could require specialist knowledge that major players in the capital markets do
not have and might not want to acquire; alternatively, investors may have an interest in the
later stages of a project, and so commit venture capital to pre-operational requirements such
as feasibility studies or carry out market evaluations;
• Project-based capital funds – differ from seedcorn equity investments in targeting more
immediate returns and thus more suited to providing debt or equity financing for removing
mid-to-late stage operational barriers; generally capitalised exclusively from private sector
resources;
• Public-private partnership arrangements – can be mediated by equity investments in joint
venture companies designed to carry defined projects through the pre-profitability early stage
using public or concessionary capital (cf. seedcorn capital); public sector cofinancing can
have specific objectives such as buying down risk insurance or providing regulatory
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oversight; private sector involvement can ensure managerial expertise, operational efficiency,
further access to capital markets, etc.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
Widespread across a range of sectors. Well documented examples include:
• UNDP-BCSD Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environment programme provides
technical assistance and seed funding through the Project Development Facility to identify
and develop investment projects in which both public and private sectors have a stake and
managing role.
The Global Environment Fund Inc. (GEFI) holds three funds with total managed assets of over
US$140 million, one of which is the Global Environment Emerging Markets Fund, backed by
OPIC, the export promotion arm of the US State Department. This Fund invests 75% of its
capital in private firms, targeting investments between US$1.5-5 million with returns in
excess of 40%. OPIC provides a credit guarantee which lowers GEFI’s risk profile when
issuing bonds on the institutional debt market.
• The Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO) was capitalised by ECU 40 million
from 5 Nordic countries, under the auspices of the Nordic Investment Bank . It operates a
venture capital programme involving equity joint ventures (and some loans) as a minority
investor with generally less than a 35% stake.
• The Environmental Enterprises Assistance Fund Inc. (EEAF) manages various venture capital
funds capitalised by a mix of private and public money. It provides loans or equity capital (or
in combination) to small and medium sized environmental projects that might be excluded by
large institutions and traditional capital markets.
Replicability for forestry
Public-private instruments are on the ascendant throughout many sectors, particularly transport
and construction, as well as environment. This global trend which is largely forced by shrinking
state roles and revenues is likely to continue. There are no apparent constraints to such
instruments being applied in the forestry sector, and indeed, some of the conditions that
characterise SFM (such as long time-scales, initial capital investments, high risk, etc.) lend
themselves to public-private joint ventures.
The prevalent global system by which the management of forest resources under state ownership
is carried out under concession or contract by the private sector can in fact be seen as a loose
form of public-private arrangement. Moreover, more specific types of joint public-private
mechanisms are being developed for the forestry sector. One example are “tax-exempt
environmental performance bonds” which are based on the large U.S. market for long-term
(15-20 years) tax-exempt bonds which can be issued by local governments or private not-for-
profit groups. Such groups could issue such a bond and buy a forest with the proceeds, paying
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back the low-interest debt over time using revenues from the sustainable management of the
forest.
Funding potential
Venture capital funds, capitalised either by public or mixed public-private sector resources, have
a very significant potential role to play in SFM. This is particularly the case for early stage debt
or equity investments in enterprises incurring incremental costs of the transition away from
unsustainable forest management.
Issues
Considerable doubt still remains as to whether public money should be used to effectively carry
private ventures through their pre-profitability stage.
Joint ventures are often designed to support activities for which, given existing policy and market
failures, social returns are much higher than private returns, which themselves may therefore be
lower than normal capital market requirements.
References
Pearce 1996, Gentry 1996, Crossley et al. 1996, Gentry et al. 1997, UNDP 1998, Crossley 1998,
Ruzicka et al. 1998.
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A/3. PRIVATE SECTOR FORESTRY INVESTMENT FUNDS
OVERVIEW
Type
direct financial: equity, debt
Objective
Mobilise institutional and other private sector capital for emerging sector investments; define and
promote new investment by targeting funds to unexploited opportunities whose risk-to-return
profile matches that of specific investors.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely Scale
Operational (lack of capital flows
into new investment areas)
Private commercial
(public)
Private
commercial
Mid-stage
Late stage
National
Global
See also: Public-private instruments; Portfolio Equity Investments; Early Stage Venture Capital
Funds; Biodiversity Venture Capital Funds
DESCRIPTION
Private-sector forestry investment funds function like other sectoral investment funds, matching
forestry’s characteristic investment profile to the needs of potential investors. The attractiveness
of forestry as opposed to other sectoral investments includes: protection against inflation;
possible tax advantages; and the insulation of stock growth from market fluctuations. In
particular, the risk return profiles of forestry investments can be tailored to serve as asset and
liability management tools.
Sector-defining investment funds are a specialised type of private sector forestry fund, generally
providing venture capital. They play a key catalytic role in mobilising financial flows into new
investment areas by targeting funds at specific investors whose requirements match those of as
yet unexploited opportunities. To take an example, the longer-term financial returns that
characterise sustainable NFM might be matched to the investment requirements of pension fund
managers. A sector-defining investment fund might then provide debt or equity financing for
scaling up projects or enterprises approaching profitability in the mid-to-late stages of the
business cycle. Such financial interventions can be complemented by information provision and
streamlined access to any additional financial services required, particularly the mitigation of
risk. If successful, such an investment would:
• inform the capital markets of the new investment opportunities,
• mobilise new or existing funds to provide similar services but over a larger scale, and
• catalyse new capital flows to the sector and activity in question.
In this context, private-sector forestry investment funds are assumed to operate at commercial
rates. Those that rely on catalytic concessionary public sector resources to leverage private sector
institutional capital are addressed under public-private instruments.
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ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
Private sector forestry investment funds are relatively common in the developed world,
particularly in the US, Australia, and New Zealand. Increasingly, opportunities are also being
realised in the plantation estates of temperate developing world countries such as Chile, and
Argentina.
One specific example is Xylem Investments Inc., an international timber investment management
firm, which makes private equity investments in international publicly-traded plantation-based
forestry companies based on expectations of a significant appreciation of forest assets (generally).
Nominal rates of return are 15%. Xylem complements its investments with a strategic
management role, seeking to develop vertical integration among 'investee' companies along the
value chain.
Replicability for forestry
Forestry investment funds are likely to focus on plantation establishment and management, and
the downstream wood products industries. In this regard, the short rotations with associated cash
flows attainable in the tropics make such funds potentially highly replicable in the developing
world. However, this assumes that other structural preconditions are in place such as efficient
capital markets, available information, political and macroeconomic stability, etc.
Funding potential
Medium (at least in the short-term). Although new investment opportunities in SFM abound,
there are a range of “preconditions” (mostly structural or risk-related) needed before forestry as a
sectoral investment can break into the mainstream objectives of the private sector investor
community.
Issues
Precedents of forestry investment funds have tended to downplay the environmental and
highlight the financial. This is perhaps exactly as it should be, for the leverage potential of such
funds relies on the awareness they raise of forestry among the wider investment community.
However, this does raise the question of the role environmental criteria play in influencing
investment decisions. For example, how do fund managers screen for SFM as opposed to
unsustainable forest management? And how effective are such screening procedures? There is a
risk that such concerns become subordinate to financial considerations. In such situations,
mobilising additional private sector capital is only likely to exacerbate the problems associated
with unsustainable forest management. [N.B. See also Portfolio equity investments].
References
Zinkhan et al. 1992, Crossley et al. 1996
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B/4. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL FUNDS (NEFs)
OVERVIEW
Type
Direct financial: grants, concessional credit
Objective
Create a stable source of financial resources for environmental conservation.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Operational
(potential for structural)
Public
Private
commercial
Public
Private commercial
and non-commercial
Early stage
Mid-stage
Late stage
Local
National
Sub-regional
See also: Conservation trust funds; Debt-for-nature and development swaps
DESCRIPTION
NEFs refer to a variety of mechanisms including national level trust funds, foundations, and
endowments. Funds can be single-issue, targeted at a specific area or activity, or multi-issue,
addressing environmental management and sustainable development in a broader sense. The
following features are typical of NEFs: (1) governed by boards representing different sectors of
society, (2) capable of receiving and managing money from a variety of resources, and (3) able to
make grants to beneficiary organisations. Most successful funds tend to operate like independent
foundations, investing their assets and using the interest for fund programmes (endowment
funds). However, such funds often require very large initial capital that is not easily available.
Sinking funds face the problem of long-term continuity of financing. Revolving funds enable
sustainability of operations. They require, however, high profitability from individual investment
in order to be able to pay back the invested capital.
Trust Funds have two primary benefits in that they stabilise recurrent cost financing, and they
moderate the volatility of funding. Indirect benefits include the flexible use of funds for a wide
range of objectives, improved flow of funds by matching trust fund disbursements to
expenditures as their arise, leveraging additional resources, enabling private-public partnerships,
and empowering local communities to design and implement small-scale alternative livelihood
projects.
The main sources have been GEF contributions, and other multilateral and bilateral aid funds but
they also include NGOs and host country contributions, often through debt swaps or debt
conversion.
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ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
NEFs have been set up in more than 30 countries, including most of the countries in transition in
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Only five countries in Africa and two in Southeast Asia have
a NEF. Thirteen African and twelve Asian countries are in the process of preparing a NEF. About
ten countries have more than one environmental fund.
Replicability for forestry
Several NEF supported activities can be linked with SFM, particularly to finance conservation
components. However, it is apparent that NEFs could be better geared towards SFM.
Funding potential
NEFs have been particularly successful in Eastern Europe and Latin America and there is a
considerable interest among donors to expand the experience to other areas as well. The volume
of financing raised is measured in hundreds of millions but only a small share is apparently used
for forest-related activities. By 1994, total commitments amounted to US$850 million.
Considerable leverage on additional public and private sector funds have been achieved through
NEFs. If multilateral development banks start serving as brokers and facilitators of debt swaps
designed to capitalise NEFs, the funding potential could be substantially increased.
Several national sources have been tapped for raising funds for NEFs including “polluter pays”
taxes, tourist taxes, and airline ticket taxes.
Issues
The key issues to consider in the establishment of any Environmental Fund are (1) the source of
funds, and particularly the possibilities to harness in-country resources (user fees, taxes and
levies, donations, etc.) to ensure long-term financial sustainability, (2) the Fund’s long-term plan
(areas of focus, type of activities, criteria of fund uses, etc.) (3) fund governance including the
level of representation and decision-making power of NGOs in the board and the relationship
between the board and the secretariat, (4) asset management (investments, risks, rates of return
and the use of the fund’s capital base), (5) grant-making criteria which should be jointly
established building on local participation in project preparation and assessment, and (6) fund
monitoring and evaluation. Management must also be transparent and responsive.
Economic efficiency has been a cause of concern and the guaranteed sources of finance can result
in wasteful management and poor expenditure choice. It has been therefore proposed that NEFs
should address the specific market and institutional failures that hinder environmental
investment.
Close relations with donors is essential. The donor base should also include local sources to
complement external financing and increase the degree of ownership.
References
Asad 1997, Bayon & Deere 1998, Crossley et al. 1996, Richards 1998, OECD 1995, Panayatou
1997a, Resor 1997, UNDP 1997.
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B/5. DEBT-FOR-NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT SWAPS
OVERVIEW
Type
Direct financial: transfer payment
Objective
Transfer of financial resources from industrialised countries in recognition of the global
externality values of forests, seeking to redress the inequitable market distribution of the costs
and benefits of forest conservation, in which most (opportunity) costs are incurred at the local
and national levels, whereas most benefits accrue at international level. Debt reduction.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Operational (structural can
be included in
conditionalities)
Public (bilateral)
Private
commercial
Debtor
government
NGOs
Mid-stage
Late stage
Local (site-specific
projects)
National
See also: Conservation trust funds
DESCRIPTION
Debt-for-nature swaps involve an agreement between a donor or environmental NGO, and a
debtor country, on the cancellation of debt in exchange for environmental commitments by the
debtor country. Usually the donor or an NGO acting as an intermediary purchases a debt from
secondary debt markets. The debtor provides local currency counterpart funds either at the face
value of the debt or any negotiated amount. The counterpart funds, together with possible
additional donor TA funds are used to carry out agreed conservation or development investments.
The rate of debt conversion reflects a WTP for biodiversity conservation by the international
community. The debt-swap formula can also be used to promote developmental investments,
carbon sequestration (debt-for-carbon), or indeed anything else relating to forest services.
Several bilateral debt reduction facilities exist. An interesting recent example is the modality
created by the U.S. Congress through an Act on Debt Reduction for Developing Countries with
Tropical Forests. The Act recognises the values received by U.S. citizens from the protection of
tropical forests as the justification for re-channelling existing resources into debt reductions to
facilitate their protection. The eligibility criteria for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
are listed and it is required that they have put in place major investment reforms. However, the
final decision on eligibility is maintained by the U.S. Government. The authorised appropriations
will increase from US$25 million in 1999 to US$75 million in 2000 and further to US$100
million in 2001.
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ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
The first debt swap in 1987, in Bolivia, led to the establishment of the Beni Biosphere Reserve.
This initial experience was followed by improved mechanisms in Ecuador, Peru, Bulgaria, and
the Philippines.
Replicability for forestry
There are no constraints in applying debt to nature for development swaps for sustainable forest
management but in practice most projects have been oriented towards conservation or protection.
It is also possible to extend the use of debt swap instrument to promote reforestation, sustainable
use,  other development, and carbon sequestration, etc. The replicability for forestry depends on
the priority given to the sector by the ministry of finance in the debtor country as well as by the
donor. The income generation and employment effects of sustainable forestry provide priority
justification for the debtor government.
Funding potential
Significant funds can be generated in national currency for forest conservation and protection.
There is also some potential for leverage but it often appears limited.
The main sources in the past have been commercial private debt and official bilateral debt.
Official debts can be sold to a converter under the 10%-clause. The clause does not say anything
about pricing which is freely negotiable and donors are also free to donate the debts for nature
conservation or development. The potential could expand if multilateral development bank debts,
which are currently exempt from cancellation, could be drawn on. This has been suggested, e.g.,
by COICA in the Amazon Basin and the scope would be extended to cover debt-for-indigenous-
territory swaps in which national governments agree to restore and protect indigenous land rights
in return for debt reductions.
Recently, it has been proposed in the media that at least some of the debts of the countries
affected by Hurricane Mitch (Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala at least) could be cancelled or
converted into development and conservation commitments, including commitments for
upstream reforestation.
Issues
Discounted debts have been less available in the 1990s and limited discounts offered, but the
current financial crisis may change the situation again.
Inflationary impacts should be controlled, particularly if large projects are involved. Purchasing
second-hand debt tends to increase the price of remaining debt, thereby increasing the
macroeconomic burden for debtors and thus the pressure on natural resources.
Organisational capacity and strategic planning of conservation organisations, combined with an
unstable economic and political situation has reduced effectiveness and increased transaction
costs.
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Other issues concern the lack of local participation in land-use decision-making and in enforcing
property rights, which may cause inefficiency and inequality.
References
Anderson 1994, Kaiser & Lambert 1996, Keipi 1998, Resor 1997, Richards 1998, 105th
Congress of the USA 1998, Wells 1992.
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B/6. CONSERVATION TRUST FUNDS (CTFs)
OVERVIEW
Type
Direct financial: transfer payments, concessional credit
Objective
Provision of long-term financing for biodiversity conservation. The purpose of GEF-supported
funds is to finance the incremental costs of protecting globally significant biodiversity resources.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Operational
(potential for structural)
Public
Private
Government
agencies, NGOs,
CBOs
Early stage
Mid-stage
Late stage
Local
Sub-regional
See also: National Environmental Funds; Debt-for-nature and development swaps
DESCRIPTION
The governance structure, scope of activities, priorities, and procedures of trust funds vary
according to their purposes and the situation of the country. Two general categories are
distinguished: (i) “parks” funds supporting specific protected areas within a national protected
areas system; and (ii) “grants” funds channelling resources to target groups (typically NGOs and
CBOs) for a broad range of conservation and sustainable development projects. In addition to
financing, CTFs are often key actors in the development of national conservation strategies and
providers of technical expertise to private and public agencies in development of effective
management approaches. “Parks” funds have contributed to the establishment of “resource
security” for protected areas. Several “grants” funds have applied a programmatic or geographic
approach to achieve maximum impact. Most of the funds were set up as non-governmental
institutions with mixed public-private governing bodies.
Many of them have proved to be effective in supporting protected areas, generating and
managing financial resources, enabling participation of the civil society institutions in resource
conservation, increasing the level of scientific research, and increasing public awareness of
conservation issues.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
There are more than forty CTFs. Seven have received GEF support and assistance. About fifteen
new funds are under design or active consideration.
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Replicability for forestry
Many CTF-funded activities are already closely linked with the promotion of SFM in natural
forests, including buffer zone management, alternative livelihood projects, etc. However, the
emphasis is by definition on conservation-oriented activities.
Funding potential
Based on several recent positive evaluations on CTFs it is expected that they will receive
increasing support from GEF, bilateral donors, multilateral development banks, the private sector,
and NGOs. The leverage impact is important as, e.g., six GEF funds have raised more than
US$32 million in non-GEF contributions. However, if the impact is measured in terms of
endowment funding, it has remained limited. GEF supported funds have successfully applied an
asset management and asset manager selection model developed by the World Bank. CTFs offer
excellent opportunities to attract additional funds such as self-generating national funding
sources, given appropriate policy changes (e.g., park user fees), with the resulting income
channelled to conservation and social development programmes.
Issues
Successful CTFs have good financial management systems and skills, high-quality technical staff
and necessary technical support. They are accountable and they support participatory approaches
to conservation and sustainable development.
Long-term biodiversity impact has been difficult to demonstrate.
Cost-effectiveness is constrained by the operating (non-programme) costs, which tend to be in the
25-30 percent range.
Except the largest countries, there is a limited pool of national talent available to be tapped for
governance, asset management, and policy oversight, and a limited pool of potential financial
supporters for whom multiple funds would compete.
References
Bayon & Deere 1998, GEF 1998, Mikitin 1995, Report of ... 1994
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B/7. BIODIVERSITY VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS
OVERVIEW
Type
Direct financial: equity and debt
Objective
To provide risk capital for emerging biodiversity-based businesses
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Operational (risk
reduction)
Public
Private commercial
and non-commercial
SMEs in biodiversity-
based businesses
Early stage
Mid-stage
Local
National
Regional
See also: Public-Private Instruments
DESCRIPTION
Biodiversity investments are generally considered to be inherently high risk and innovative
reduction of the risk barrier is their main justification. Therefore, sector investment programmes
or funds have been designed to address the special need of biodiversity-based businesses. Two
recent examples are summarised: The Terra Capital Fund in Brazil is being set up to bring
together investment management expertise (Banco Axial, Environmental Enterprises Assistance
Fund, Sustainable Development Inc. and IFC), advanced sector know-how, and local and foreign
capital. Funding (US$20-50 million) is made available to businesses operating in sectors of
interest to GEF, i.e. sustainable forestry (including non-timber forest products), agriculture and
ecotourism. In addition to GEF and IFC, funds are raised from the private sector, multilateral and
bilateral institutions, as well as other investors.
Expected returns are 18-22% (ROI), i.e. high but commensurate with risks taken. The ROI target
of projects is 30%. The return requirements are lower than in more traditional venture capital
funds because of the GEF grant of US$5 million. Target companies include private SMEs under
start-up or expansion in Latin America. Instruments are (preferred) equity up to 49% of
ownership, convertible debt and subordinated loans as well as warrants and options. The Fund
contribution can range from US$0.5 million up to 15% of the total capital.
The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF/TNC) Environmental Enterprise Fund of US$4 million
will help establish an NGO Enterprise Development Fund which will promote and support
conservation ventures of micro-enterprise and small businesses in Latin America and the
Caribbean. The financing consists of US$3.25 million in risk capital and a technical assistance
grant of US$1.75 million. The project is sponsored by The Nature Conservancy and IDB but
other donors are expected to join. Eligible projects include those in organic agriculture,
sustainable forestry, and ecotourism.
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The role of these sector funds is catalytic: encouraging follow-on investments by defining the
investment opportunities, educating investors, and helping to channel new capital flows to the
target activities and geographical area.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
Terra Capital is not yet in operation. It is expected to provide funding to established enterprises,
rather than early stage ventures. Neither is the MIF/TNC Fund is operational yet.
Replicability for forestry
Both sector investment funds are expected to fill a much needed void in the provision of risk
capital to emerging biodiversity-based business, including SFM as one of the priority sectors.
Priority given to forestry will be highly dependent on the expected return of projects. The funds
are likely to finance natural forest management and utilisation, including non-timber forest
products.
Funding potential
Regional sector investment funds can be expected to raise funding in the order of tens of millions
of dollars for SFM projects in the private sector. Leverage potential is significant, estimated at
five to twelve times the initial investment.
Issues
The principal reasons for Terra Capital Fund taking more than three years to establish have been
the difficulty on identifying willing and able investors familiar enough with the fund’s investment
focus; finding qualified and knowledgeable partners and management; developing a high quality
pipeline of potential investment objects; and the establishment of host country support to the
regional fund. The “market test” of country/regional demand needs to be passed before the funds
can become operational. Cost effectiveness may be jeopardised if the funding volume remains
small.
Companies in the start-up phase may have difficulties in receiving priority for reasons of risk.
Carefully designed investment guidelines would be required to ensure both profitable investments
and contribution to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.
Due to high risks, grant funding is necessary to initially capitalise the funds.
References
Asad 1997, GEF 1998, IUCN & TransGlobal 1998.
Annex 4
Page 18 (41)
FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY
B/8. SMALL AND MEDIUM SCALE ENTERPRISE CREDIT LINES
OVERVIEW
Type
Direct financing: concessional loans
Objective
To leverage funds for environmental SMEs
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Operational (access to
capital)
Public
Private
SMEs Structural
(early / mid / late
stages)
Local
National
See also: Micro-credit; Small targeted grants
DESCRIPTION
The ventures financed by the World Bank Group credit lines should help demonstrate that SME
projects can benefit the environment and be commercially viable. Their purpose also includes
development of a track record for leveraging private capital flows into environmental
investments, and the increase of the involvement of financial intermediaries to build financing
capacity for environmental ventures. Intermediaries are necessary for a number of reasons: (i)
tapping into their broad client networks, (ii) a larger number of SMEs can become involved (iii)
risk assessment is best carried out at local levels, and (iv) possibility to draw on existing local and
national arrangements to support such ventures.
The IFC SME Programme for Biodiversity and Climate Change was designed to stimulate the
development of commercially viable projects with global environmental benefits. Due to
uncertainties involved, the Programme is still in the pilot phase. Sustainable forestry is one of the
applications of the programme. The instruments are low-interest loans, credit enhancement
(guarantees), co-financing, and technical assistance. GEF grant acts as a lever for risk capital and
helps make these projects viable by reducing the costs of financial intermediaries.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
There is substantial international and national experience to provide financing through targeted
credit lines to SMEs. However, adapting this approach to environmental investments is still in
very early stages. The IFC SME Programme had financed more than 20 projects by mid-1997.
Replicability for forestry
Targeted environmental SME credit lines can prevent biodiversity loss by creating new value
from ecosystems and genetic resources, diverting pressure from critical areas, and practising low
impact methods for sustainable yields. Certification can be used as a complementary instrument
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for SMEs that sustainably produce timber and NTFPs, ecotourism, and other activities,
particularly if environmental niche markets can be targeted.
Funding potential
Theoretically, the potential is large, but there are various barriers that must be breached before
large-scale implementation becomes reality. Leverage potential is obviously high.
Issues
Most projects are small and therefore financial intermediaries are required if funding comes from
multilateral sources. This is a constraint and, therefore, only a few projects have been funded.
Multi-Project Facilities (MPFs) have been successfully implemented by some multilateral
financial institutions (thought not the World Bank). Management costs tend to become high if
efficient arrangements are not in place.
Creditworthiness tends to be a common problem. Traditional corporate and project financing use
a project’s fixed assets as collateral for a given loan. Environmental ventures do not always have
physical assets with sufficient commercial value to secure debt financing, which is also the case
in many forest-based projects, where a lack of clear ownership rights may be an additional
constraint. Performance contracts, accrued payments (e.g., under long-term sales contracts of
plantations), letters of credit and guarantees (e.g., if there is a World Bank country risk guarantee
programme) can be allowed as additional collateral for support. IFC has developed a unique
private-sector oriented guarantee facility to 'collateralise' a co-financing facility in Hungary that
has a potential for replication in other environmental investments.
The stability of a venture’s cash flow to repay financing or provide a return on investment,
whether actual, contractual, or performance-based is critical to a project’s viability.
Non-typical credit structures easily emerge in environmental projects that involve complicated
transaction structures with multiple parties and stakeholders.
There also tends to be a bottleneck where supply of credit lines do not meet demand. The
programmes should be designed to be more demand-driven, and which can be supported by
appropriate promotion and technical assistance. Lack of experience of market participants in this
kind of ventures is still very limited.
Finally, economic policy or political constraints, such as subsidies that favour large-scale
industries, may limit the access to credit by SMEs. The issues related to property rights and
collateral are particularly serious for many forest-based enterprises that seek to meet both
commercial viability and environmental sustainability.
References
Asad 1997, McClellan 1997.
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B/9. MICRO-CREDIT
OVERVIEW
Type
Direct financial: grant, concessional loan
Objective
Provision of capital for profitable small-scale forestry or related investments for farmers and
other (small-scale) landowners.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Operational (access to capital; risk)
Structural (inadequate financial
institutions in rural areas)
Public ODA &
locally generated
private savings
Private small-scale
farmers and other
land owners
Early stage Local
See also: Small and medium scale enterprise credit lines; Small targeted grants
DESCRIPTION
Micro-credits (also called rural micro-financing) have been developing rapidly during the past ten
years. They can be hailed as a true success story in many countries’ rural development strategies,
particularly in Asia. Well-known examples are the schemes of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh,
the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand, and the Bank
Rakyat of Indonesia, Unit Desa (BRI-UD). There are, however, possibly thousands of schemes
all over the world, many of them supported by bilateral and multilateral ODA, development
banks and NGOs.
The micro-credit concept is based on the assumption that individuals and families know best how
to improve their own well-being. All that is lacking is access to the necessary capital (for
structural reasons and because traditional financing institutions often consider small-scale rural
farmers not creditworthy). Once provided with capital, farmers and families can make profitable
investments, which allow them to pay back the loan and raise their net income. Other innovative
elements include:
• new approaches to accessing capital reducing the costs on potential loan takers for taking a
loan;
• reducing risks relating to bad debts by using social and financial pressure through “credit
groups” instead of collateral which small-scale farmers often do not have; and
• linking extension on technical issues and family-level financial management with the loan-
taking (such extension is usually financed by an additional ODA component within the credit
scheme).
Micro-credit schemes are often self-financing and as such, financially sustainable. Interest rates
charged are “market” rates, though lower than the interest rates charged by individual money-
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lenders. Administrative costs, inflation, and risk are covered by the interest earnings. Loan
repayment rates are usually very high, in the order of 95-97%.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
All developing countries where traditional rural financial institutions are weak and access to
loans by small scale farmers is poor. Particularly well suited to cultures where local social
pressure is strong (e.g., East and South-east Asia).
Replicability for forestry
There is a major theoretical problem in restricting or directing micro-credit schemes to specific
types of investment. The essence of micro-credit’s success lies in the commitment and ownership
of borrowers, which stems from their feeling fully in charge of their own investment. If the scope
of micro-projects eligible for credit was limited to forestry projects, the sense of genuine
commitment and ownership could be eroded.
However, there are successful examples of micro-credit schemes targeted at the forest sector
(e.g., in Vietnam). In some of these schemes the reduced decision-making power of the borrower
is compensated by a slightly subsidised interest rate, with the subsidy justified by the
environmental externalities associated with forestry activities. In one such micro-projects
scheme, the following eligibility criteria apply:
(i) afforestation for timber production
(ii) planting of fruit trees, trees producing spices, oils, tannin, or other marketable extracts
(iii) agroforestry (permanent or semi-permanent inter-cropping)
(iv) silvo-pastoral activities (animal husbandry in open forests)
(v) live fences
(vi) bee-keeping
(viii) sericulture (production of silk)
(ix) production of sticklac
(x) production of non-wood forest products (from natural sources or semi-cultivated:
medicinal plants)
(xi) sustainable management of existing natural (primary or secondary) forests
(xii) conservation of forest resources
(xiii) small-scale processing of the products from points i-xi.
Forestry targeted schemes also require monitoring of the use of loans (which the non-tied
schemes do not need) which can increase administration costs. However, monitoring can and
should be linked with extension thereby providing additional training and motivation to the target
group.
Funding potential
For individual micro-projects, the funding potential is extremely small. For individual schemes, it
is usually quite small. However, as the potential for replicability is enormous, the overall funding
potential is quite large. Applicable only in areas where forest and land ownership is fairly well
defined, and preferably based on individual or family tenure.
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Issues
Targeted schemes are theoretically somewhat controversial (see above). They also compete for
the same ODA & local resources (financial & human) as non-tied and thus more attractive micro-
credit schemes.
Recently many field forestry projects have included some kind of micro-project or micro-credit
schemes. This kind of arrangement (linking micro-credit with broader agroforestry, community
forestry, or farm forestry projects) allows adequate technical backstopping for the small-scale
investments. In some cases project-based credit schemes can be mainstreamed to become national
schemes managed by national forest authorities. Such schemes often include subsidised credit
components in order to attain specific forest policy goals. Policy incentives, including
(subsidised) micro-credit schemes for farm forestry should be integral components in any NFP.
References
Johnson 1996, Salmi et al. 1997, Yaron et al. 1997, Zapata 1996.
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B/10. SMALL TARGETED GRANTS
OVERVIEW
Type
Direct financial: transfer payment
Objective
Provision of financial support to NGOs and CBOs in activities related to sustainable livelihoods
and environmental conservation.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Operational Public
Private (mostly non-
commercial)
NGOs, CBOs,
communities,
research groups
Early stage
Mid-stage
Local
See also: Micro-credit; Small and medium scale enterprise credit lines
DESCRIPTION
Targeted grants programmes provide direct financial support to target groups bypassing inherent
implementation inefficiencies of central government delivery systems. Examples include
Alternative Livelihood Grants and NGO/Small Grant Funds. The former are typically established
as part of integrated conservation and development programmes to provide incentives to
communities to participate and offset their potential economic losses as a result of implementing
conservation activities.
NGOs/Small Grant Funds address institutional constraints resulting from overly centralised
administration of environmentally sustainable development activities. This has improved
effectiveness and efficiency in implementation and disbursement. In particular, participation and
ownership have contributed to the quality of implementation. Local NGOs and CBOs invest their
own time and energy and local collective action can be mobilised. Keeping the interventions
small means they are flexible in responding to the needs of real life.
Some highly innovative projects and activities have been started and implemented by small-
grants programmes.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
The GEF Small Grants Programme allocated US$16.6 million to country programmes from the
US$17.95 million provided for the Operational Phase. By June 1998, 45 national programmes
had been set up and grants had been provided to more than 1,100 projects at a total cost of US$42
million over 6 years. The share of biodiversity is 71%, climate change 17%, international waters
3% and projects with multiple focal areas 9%.
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Replicability for forestry
Targeted grants are applicable in most NGO and CBO based activities related to forest utilisation
and conservation. The high share of biodiversity related projects within this mechanism is
probably due to the NGO/CBO interest in such activities.
Funding potential
The available experience is positive, but limited. Targeted small grants often provide the missing
link between the local recipient group and the external source of financing. Systematic
information on leverage is not available but in kind contributions are assumed to be significant.
The GEF Small Grants Programme has not yet developed a strategy for attracting matching, non-
GEF funding for its projects.
Issues
Quality of local organisations to manage this kind of financing is a key constraint. The
implementing NGOs and CBOs should have adequate technical knowledge, a legitimate measure
of political and financial independence, and a clear link to local communities. The lack of
attention to financial management often misses the opportunity for capacity building and for
teaching the business and finance skills needed to manage and attract financial investments for
environmental conservation. Partnerships with government organisations, international NGOs
and the private business sector may often help fill the gaps.
Monitoring and evaluation methods are still evolving and there have been limited identifiable
measures of success and impacts, partly because funds are relatively new.
High apparent administrative costs remain a challenge to be tackled. The GEF Small Grants
Programme aims to keep them below the 25% limit. National variations are wide in the efficiency
of managing small-grants programmes.
The small size of grants and their short duration (1-2 years) do not often allow sustainable
impacts. Project income-generating components intended to promote sustainability are generally
unconvincing. The often lack adequate feasibility studies and business-oriented management.
More technical guidance is needed to help select sites and technologies.
References
Asad 1997, Glaessner et al. 1994, Wells et al. 1998.
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 C/11. FORESTRY-BASED CARBON OFFSETS
Due to their high estimated potential to influence private sector financial flows into SFM,
forestry-based carbon offsets are considered in greater depth in Annex 5.
C/12. BIOPROSPECTING FEES
OVERVIEW
Type
Commoditisation: creating market for biodiversity use value
Objective
Generate and recover revenue for landowners and forest users for the production of biodiversity
protection services
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Structural (market
creation)
Private commercial
Some public research
bodies
Non-commercial private
landowners and forest users
Some public sector bodies
Structural
(early / mid /
late stages)
Global
See also: Water resource use charges; Forestry-based carbon offsets
DESCRIPTION
Bio-prospecting is based on the potential value of natural biological materials to facilitate the
development of commodities such as pharmaceuticals, genetic strains of crops, or food
supplements. Charging bio-prospecting fees is the mechanism by which this value is recognised
by the market, by capturing the actual use or economic value of biodiversity (N.B., not the non-
use or existence value). Such fees are paid by interested parties, principally pharmaceutical or
agrochemical companies, to landowners or intermediary institutions for the rights to access, study
and potentially commercialise genetic and other biochemical information stored in indigenous
plant, animal, insect and microbial species.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
The most well-known example of a transaction within this emerging market is the Costa Rica –
Merck agreement under which INBio, Costa Rica’s national biodiversity institute, collects and
processes plant, insect and soil samples from Costa Rica’s national park forests and supplies them
for assessment to the pharmaceutical company, Merck. For the service, Merck pays US$1
million, as well as a share (probably between 1-3%) of the royalties from any successful drug
developed from the material supplied. All patent rights remain with Merck. Pfizer tried to
negotiate a similar arrangement with Ecuador, but was unsuccessful. Shaman Pharmaceuticals in
the U.S. has raised US$100 million in capital to bio-prospect in cooperation with indigenous
Annex 4
Page 26 (41)
FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY
peoples in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. Patents on 2 drugs have been established thus far.
Andes Pharmaceuticals seeks to build host countries’ own capacity to screen biological materials
through technology transfer agreements with universities or NGOs.
However, the general consensus among professionals in the field is that the bio-prospecting boom
expected at the beginning of the decade has failed to materialise and is unlikely to do so.
Replicability for forestry
As an estimated 40-90% of the world’s species live in tropical forests, bio-prospecting is
potentially highly replicable in forest systems, particularly those with biodiversity hotspots, and
in general, any species-rich forest types. Thus natural tropical forests are favoured; temperate and
boreal forests less so. Conservation areas are most eligible, through perhaps also protected areas
within managed forest concessions. Bio-prospecting is unlikely to apply to industrial plantations.
An interesting criteria for and possible constraint to bio-prospecting is the coincidence of
biodiversity-rich forest areas and indigenous knowledge stored in local forest-living or forest-
using communities (see Issues).
Funding potential
Funding potential has proved controversial. Global revenue has been estimated to be in the region
of US$1 billion annually, but market demand has failed to meet expectations by a substantial
margin. This is largely because success rates are minuscule: in the order of one sample in every
250,000 directly yields a commercially-viable pharmaceutical product. Moreover, drug
development lead-times are usually 5-12 years, and can cost US$250-350 million to bring a drug
to market. Net present value of bio-prospecting rights to pharmaceutical companies is therefore
low.
Potential for bio-prospecting for genetic improvement of industrial tree crops is also uncertain,
given the well-established alternative techniques. Moreover, exploitation of natural genetic
material (as opposed to other chemical and biological information) is still an incipient field, with
revenue streams likely to be decades rather than years away.
Issues
Biodiversity values – both use and non-use – are difficult to evaluate. Use values in tropical
forests range from US$0.01-21 per hectare per year, though most studies tend towards the
US$1/ha/yr mark. The social value of genetic material has been estimated at over 50 times this
private use value, but society’s WTP is difficult to recover.
Laboratory synthetic techniques and technologies (“combinatorial chemistry”) are improving
rapidly. Biochemical molecules can be made en masse, systematically screened using automated
bioassays, and then, where appropriate, subjected to in vitro and then in vivo testing. The net
result of such advances is likely to be that random sampling of natural biodiversity will diminish.
Researchers might however focus on sampling based on local knowledge of medicines, food
stuffs, successful crops, etc. However, the most important natural source of testable compounds
are from microbes, which are much less forest-specific, and do not involve local populations.
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Bio-prospecting has significant and complex implications for and requirements from intellectual
property rights regimes, both nationally and at the global level (e.g., through the TRIPS
agreement). The patenting of genetic material is particularly controversial. Various policy and
legal frameworks have been established at national and regional levels (e.g., Andean Community,
Organisation of African Unity, U.S. International Cooperative Biodiversity Group Programme) to
regulate future bio-prospecting contracts, and to avoid further problems with 'bio-piracy', the
unauthorised exploitation of a country’s biodiversity resources by foreign companies or
researchers. A focus of such frameworks has been to ensure any benefits are shared with local
communities, often repositories of the knowledge that enabled successful bio-prospecting in the
first place. A Biotic Exploration Fund has also been proposed to develop standardised contractual
arrangements between biodiversity providers (or “custodians”) and users wishing to screen
organisms for biochemical activity. Such arrangements would constitute de facto intellectual
property rights over plants and animals in situ.
There are also questions of enforcement, as it is extremely difficult to trace a chain-of-custody
from any given organism to a marketed drug, thus creating scope for abuse by buyers in awarding
royalties to biodiversity providers. As precedents suggest significant revenue from bio-
prospecting will only come from royalties generated by “blockbuster drugs,” and not initial
payments, enforcement issues as well as payment time-scales are key issues.
Distribution mechanisms need to be in place to link bio-prospecting payments to those whom
provide and facilitate access to the biodiversity, often small-scale forest dwellers, and users.
Strong scientific (institutional) capacity is also required.
References
Macilwain 1998, Pearce & Steele 1997, Chomitz et al. 1998, McNeely 1997, Southgate 1997.
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C/13. WATER RESOURCE USE CHARGES
OVERVIEW
Type
Commoditisation: creating market for watershed protection services of forests
Objective
Generate revenue for forest users and managers for the production of watershed protection
services.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Structural (market
creation)
Private and
public water
users
Upstream
landowners
Structural
(early / mid /
late stages)
Local
Sub-regional (e.g., pan-
national river basins)
See also: Bio-prospecting fees; Forestry-based carbon offsets
DESCRIPTION
Water resource use charges are designed to correct market failures in order to make upstream
farmers choose environmentally desirable investments to protect the water supply to downstream
populations. Compensation is provided to induce environmentally benign practices. Water fees
and tariffs are adjusted to pay for watershed management.
In Colombia, a law requires the electric power companies to transfer 2% of their gross sales to
direct investment in watershed management, or to environmental authorities. In Costa Rica, the
water company is charged US$6 million and the power company another US$3 million per year.
The fees will then be used to finance the conservation of some 1.3 million ha of forest in the
watersheds supplying water to the city.
A recent example is the Watershed Protection Fund established in Quito, Ecuador by the
municipal government and the private sector with the assistance of The Nature Conservancy.
Funding is raised from water charges to electricity companies and private water users and from
the public water authority. Grants and loans are then provided to individuals and communities
upstream to help them conserve the watershed via measures such as tree planting, protection, and
erosion control, and develop alternative livelihoods.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
Widely applied in the United States. The recent example of Quito is creating a lot of interest for
similar projects in Latin America. Thailand charges user fees at centralised waste-water treatment
plants.
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Replicability for forestry
Several studies have pointed to the successful and effective use of these resources in forest
conservation and restoration of degraded areas in Colombia, and reforestation in Quito. In
addition to watershed management (tree planting, protection, and erosion control), funds can be
used for other activities related to SFM as a means of creating alternative sources of income to
local populations. As this mechanism becomes more established, it might shift its focus (in terms
of SFM activities) from being reactive (e.g., reforestation to address upstream water flow
degradation or soil erosion) to being more active (e.g., incorporating watershed buffer zones in
forest management plans).
Funding potential
Significant funding potential to be measured in tens of millions of dollars for areas adjacent to
major cities. Leverage potential is expected to be moderate. A large number of internationally
financed water projects could be adjusted for the concept of creating a market for watershed
services through water charges, particularly as unclear property rights over water and the
consequent lack of allocated responsibility for watershed protection and water use are
increasingly seen as threatening water-based environmental conflicts (tragedy of the commons
argument). This mechanism can contribute towards SFM in watershed areas by providing the
incremental costs of incorporating watershed protection into forest management.
Issues
Several issues need to be addressed in the design of the financing arrangements including the
collection of revenues from users and raising funding from other sources, the valuation and
pricing of the watershed services, the  market mechanism targeted at producers, particularly at the
small-scale, and monitoring and supervision. Environmental awareness among the public helps to
establish such schemes and to create a real WTP. Effective organisation of farmers and
landowners would help to mobilise demand for financing.
The potential for wide application of this or similar mechanisms has been highlighted by the
dramatic flooding this year in China, Central America and Italy, all of which have pointed out
upstream deforestation as a major contributing factor.
References
Curtis, personal comment, Gaviria 1997, Heindrichs 1997, Hueth 1995, Keipi 1998, McNeely
1997, TNC 1998.
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C/14. TRADEABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (TDR)
OVERVIEW
Type
Commoditisation
Objective
Domestic TDR (domestic buyer) provides a financial means of compensating restricted or
“attenuated” property rights. International TDRs (international buyer) represent potential way of
capturing and internalising global externalities.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources1 Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Structural (legal and policy
failure)
public
private non-
commercial
private commercial
private non-
commercial
structural (early /
mid / late stages)
National
Global
1 Likely to include: local and international NGOs, governments, research / scientific institutions.
See also: Marketable forest protection and management obligations
DESCRIPTION
TDRs are marketable rights to development in areas reserved for conservation that can be sold to
public and private sector conservation interests, or exchanged for development rights on land
outside the “restricted use” areas. Land itself is not sold, only the development rights. The
exchange value of TDRs should reflect a balance of buyer’s WTP for the public good values
(conservation), and the seller’s estimation of their foregone development benefits (opportunity
costs), plus a profit margin.
In international TDRs the equilibrium price should lie between the WTP of the rest of the world
for a nation’s conservation benefits, and a supply price based on the opportunity costs of
conservation or forgone development benefits. International Franchise Agreements (IFAs)
represent a contractual structure for TDRs on state-owned land in which national sovereignty is
respected, conflicts are minimised, and appropriate land use incentives are promoted.
A conservation easement is a special type of TDR, in which landowner and conservation
organisation enter into a voluntary agreement, in which the former is compensated for restricted
use of the land in order to protect a specific habitat.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
Only a few applications in North America, most notably in Virginia where the impetus has come
from land use zoning regulations in which land has been divided into conservation and
development areas. Conservation easements have been applied in North America and proposed
for the Amazon.
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Replicability for forestry
Replicability is unproblematic, particularly as TDRs can specifically address the opportunity
costs associated with SFM. It is likely to be limited to conservation or non-extractive forest uses.
Funding potential
Funding potential is difficult to estimate though probably low. Some argue domestic TDRs would
only take off if purchasers could set them off against a general conservation tax that requires a
high (and therefore unlikely) level of political and financial commitment.
Issues
Markets for TDRs have to be developed. Allocation of yet more property rights over forests
could provoke further reaction from local communities and NGOs. Also, legal reform would be
required to recognise TDRs.
Significant levels of capacity are also required, including:
• capacity to assess WTP for public goods;
• monitoring / enforcement capacity, as payment for TDRs is conditional on performance;
• long-term strategic development plans / visions to determine the division of land between
development and conservation
The distributions of benefits should be based on clear principles. All this requires local capacity
building to plan and implement TDRs.
Three main advantages have been suggested:
• TDRs can be established on a bilateral level and no international convention is needed;
• the market place determines the value; and
• national sovereignty issues can be avoided as countries can retain control.
References
Richards 1998, Panayatou 1992 & 1997a.
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C/15. MARKETABLE FOREST PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT OBLIGATIONS
OVERVIEW
Type
Commoditisation
Objective
To provide a multilateral financing mechanism for forest protection and SFM.
SFM barriers
addressed
Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely
Scale
Structural Public
(possibly private)
Governments with large forests
and small protection obligations
Structural (early / mid /
late stages)
Global
See also: Tradable development rights
DESCRIPTION
A global system of marketable forest protection and management obligations has been suggested
by Sedjo, et al. (1991). Under a voluntary global forestry agreement the aggregate or global
requirement for protecting or sustainably managing forests could be distributed to the signatories
according to a formula based on the mix of their forest areas and national incomes. Holders of
obligations must either fulfil them on the ground or induce another agent to assume them by
means of a payment. Countries with large obligations (based on income levels) and small forest
areas would have an excess of obligations, while countries with small obligations and large forest
areas would have excess forest, providing a clear basis for negotiation and trade. The system has
the advantage that countries would comply with conservation and SFM obligations from self-
interest, and less-forested countries would have relatively higher costs.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
Not applied at present.
Replicability for forestry
Theoretically it is widely replicable, but a political feasibility assessment would be necessary.
Funding potential
Cannot be assessed at this stage; theoretically large.
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Issues
The difficulties lie in negotiating a comprehensive international agreement to establish the
system, the need for an international institution or clearing house to allocate the certificates, and
regulate international trade in them, and the common monitoring and enforcement problems.
Similar problems are being observed with regards the trading of carbon offsets.
References
Barbier et al. 1994b, Richards 1998, Sedjo et al. 1991
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 D/16. FISCAL INSTRUMENTS
OVERVIEW
Type
structural
Objective
Objective-led restructuring of tax and subsidy regimes to provide financial incentives for socially
desirable activities, and disincentives for undesirable ones.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Structural (policy failures /
perverse fiscal incentives)
Private
commercial
Public
Private commercial
and non-commercial
Structural
(early, mid, late
stages)
National
See also: Water resource use charges; National forest funds
DESCRIPTION
There are numerous different ways of using tax and subsidy regimes to encourage environmental
behaviour. Increasingly, for example, fiscal policy is used to ensure:
• that the private costs of environmentally harmful activities are brought nearer to their social
costs (the “polluter pays” principle); and
• that the costs of supplying environmentally beneficial services can be recovered by those who
provide them from those who benefit from them (e.g., see fact sheet on Water resource use
charges).
In the latter case, direct “transfer payments” rather than fiscal incentives can also be used (e.g.,
Costa Rican PFP programme; the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy Agenda 2000 reform).
Differential land use taxation also aims to internalise the non-market social benefits of different
land uses or potential uses by establishing tax gradients between environmentally “good” (low
tax) and “bad” (high tax) activities. Such land use tax reform is designed to compensate land
users for providing environmental services, and for lost opportunity costs. However, it is also
needed to redress the historical tendency to fiscally favour productivity, associated with intensive
monoculture agriculture. Such “perverse incentives” or subsidies activities such as forest
conversion pervade most country’s tax systems and are beginning to be studied and addressed
within the context of moves towards “full-cost pricing” (e.g., de Moor et al. 1998).
Other fiscal instruments, both general and specific to the forestry sector, include: ecological VAT
(e.g., Brazil), tree-planting subsidies or subsidised credit (e.g., Chile), tax breaks for reforestation
(e.g., Panama), concession taxes, logging taxes, C/energy taxes (e.g., EU), etc.
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It should be noted that the use of the tax system to encourage socially-desirable behaviour is
clearly not innovative. However, recently-identified environmental “goods” are throwing up new
and innovative ways of using fiscal instruments – hence their brief inclusion here. As a final
point, although incentives are most commonly associated with tax and subsidy regimes, there are
also abundant non-monetary incentive mechanisms such as input financing, food for work, wage
payments, directed credit, etc.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
Universal. All countries have fiscal regimes that in some way affect environmental behaviour.
However, the marriage of environmental objectives and fiscal/market structures is comparatively
recent, although the number of precedents is rapidly growing, particularly in Europe.
Examples specific to forestry are less known. Differential land use taxation to guide fuel wood
collection appears to have been successfully implemented in Niger and is being replicated in
Mali, Chad, and Senegal (and of a different form in Germany). Brazil has introduced an
ecological value-added tax (VAT) in 4 States, and re-allocated tax revenue to municipalities
according to environmental criteria such as forest conservation. Panama’s 1994 Reforestation
Law created a variety of fiscal incentives to promote forest protection, reforestation and at the
same time, the country’s cultivated wood industry. For example, all investments in reforestation
projects are 100% tax deductible.
Replicability for forestry
There are no fundamental constraints for using fiscal instruments to encourage all types of SFM
according to each country’s priorities. there are numerous requirements, however, that may limit
their widespread application including: institutional and fiscal capacity; effective tax collection
and enforcement system; stakeholder consensus; detailed information on impacts, marginal costs
of compliance, social costs of different activities; distribution mechanisms, etc. (see 'Issues').
Funding potential
Potentially large, but subject to fiscal traditions, attitudes, and capacity.
Issues
New taxes can be raised on activities that are effectively subsidised by other indirect components
of the fiscal regime. Although disentangling perverse incentives from complex tax structures can
be more laborious, the full private cost pricing that should result is generally a necessary first step
before new targeted taxes or charges can be effectively used to internalise environmental
externalities that carry social costs.
Taxes have multiple objectives, which often conflict with making the tax workable or effective.
The two principal objectives are to raise revenue (generally requires a low tax with a broad base),
or to provide incentives/disincentives for desired/undesired behaviour (generally requires a high
tax with a narrow targeted base). Comprehensive programmes of “green tax reform” aim to
combine both these objectives by raising environmental taxes but reducing labour taxes, the net
result being net revenue neutrality. Other fiscal objectives include the redistribution of land and
income.
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New taxes are usually resisted fiercely by electorates and companies who stand to be affected.
Accusations of tax-obsession are cheap and effective weapons in the political arsenal. Ceding
exemptions to key affected parties can often undermine the objective of the tax (as happened with
proposed EU C/energy tax). Opposition to environmental taxes can be mitigated by earmarking
tax revenues to specific synergistic spending or reinvestment plans. However, hypothecation is
deeply unpopular with treasuries, and subject to future hijacking (as happened with the Costa
Rican fuel tax). In some cases, devolution of tax responsibilities can offer better guarantees of
reinvestment.
Fiscal instruments often need other legal, economic and policy frameworks to be in place.
Examples include: privatisation, land-use zoning, structured markets, established property rights,
enforcement and compliance regimes etc. Lack of complementary capacity can undermine fiscal
effectiveness.
Fiscal reform is information-intensive. Tax-setting needs both accurate valuations of the social
costs of given activities, which are controversial at best, and knowledge of the marginal private
costs of abating harmful activities or making the transition to beneficial activities, which is often
closely-guarded industry information. Flexible taxes can offer some scope for trial-and-error.
New incentives should be temporary so as to avoid long-term dependencies and intractability of
reforms.
Distribution mechanisms are needed for fiscal incentives or transfer payments intended to reach
smallholders who don’t pay income, land-use, or property taxes.
References
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D/17. NATIONAL FOREST FUNDS
OVERVIEW
Type
Structural (though can also be direct financial through targeted payments)
Objective
Provision of capital for forestry operations
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Structural1
Operational (e.g., risk
reduction, incremental costs of
SFM)
Internally-
generated income
ODA grants
Government forest
departments
Private farmers & land
owners
Early stage
Mid-stage
Late stage
Local
National
1 assuming government forest department has some degree of financial autonomy
See also: Fiscal instruments; National environmental funds
DESCRIPTION
In many countries, the government forest department (FD) is in charge of managing state-owned
forests. However, the FDs are rarely allowed to keep the income received from forest
management (timber sales, sale of licenses, etc.), as they are required to submit all receipts to the
central state treasury. In turn, the FDs receive annual budget allocations like any other
government department for development and recurrent costs. Due to chronic budget deficits and
low-ranking political priorities, these budget allocations to FDs are generally insufficient for
effective SFM of state forests. Consequently, the FDs have little incentive in carrying out forest
management operations in a way that would generate net income.
National Forest Funds have been recently established in some countries such as Tanzania to
enable the FDs to withhold at least some part of the revenue generated from forest management
activities. Rules have been defined for the use of these funds (e.g., reforestation, staff training,
local travel). Such a mechanism provides a degree of financial autonomy for the FDs, and
incentives to carry out SFM efficiently and profitably. In some other countries such as Nicaragua,
the fund is mainly aimed at providing incentives for SFM to private farmers or land owners
(usually afforestation or reforestation). In both cases, national inputs to the fund can be topped up
by ODA grants.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
All countries where state-owned forests are managed by ordinary government departments (i.e.,
not by autonomous or semi-autonomous agency or authority, etc.). The National Forest Fund of
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Tanzania provides recurrent and development funds for FD itself. Fondosilva in Nicaragua
provides incentives for private farmers and other land owners, mainly for tree planting.
[The Forest Renewable British Columbia (FRBC) is a sub-national equivalent, set up by the
Ministry of Forestry in British Columbia, as a not-for-profit corporation to manage funds (about
US$310 million per year) earmarked from increased stumpage royalties. The FRBC’s principal
objective is to assist its forest sector in making the transition to SFM (although much of the funds
disbursed are invested in restocking and reforesting degraded forest lands).]
Replicability for forestry
This mechanism is well-suited for the full range of SFM activities, as determined by the
respective FD or fund managers. It can provide a strong incentive for national forestry staff to
streamline operations under a business-oriented framework.
Funding potential
Funding potential is substantial, though it depends on the commercial potential of state forests.
Leveraging potential of ODA grants can also be significant.
Issues
The major barrier for the application of this mechanism includes the reluctance of Finance
Ministries to allow individual sectors or departments to gain financial, and by extension, political
autonomy. Consequently, the setting up of such a mechanism usually requires lengthy
negotiations between ministries. In many cases, such negotiations produce some kind of
compromise income-sharing between the FD, forest fund, and the treasury.
There can also be prejudices and worries (particularly among donors) relating to the potential
mismanagement of funds, financial discipline, transparency of use, and corruption. Some kind of
jointly agreed regular external auditing system may be useful in this regard.
In many cases, national forest funds reflect the separation of normative and operational functions
of state forest authorities, a trend that is becoming increasingly evident globally.
Most FDs have neither adequate business experience nor the capacity for fund management.
Necessary training, and possibly external recruitment, are thus necessary when starting a National
Forest Fund. Otherwise, organisational overheads may be too high with too little of the funds
being used for their intended purposes.
Some schemes (e.g., Fondosilva in Nicaragua) suffered from high dependence on ODA grants
from single donor agencies. It is very important that schemes generate most of their income from
internal sources (i.e., revenue from forest operations). This allows for the necessary financial
independence and sustainability.
References
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D/18. ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE BONDS
OVERVIEW
Type
direct financial: incentive for good environmental performance
Objective
To tie companies to predetermined environmental performance standards over the long-term by
requiring a pre-operational deposit that is only refunded if the agreed standards are adhered to.
The bonds entail a shift of responsibility for enforcing good environmental practice from the
public sector to the private producer.
SFM barriers addressed Main sources Main recipients Timing Likely scale
Structural (high discount
rates, high opportunity costs
of SFM)
Large private
commercial
operators
Public sector Early stage (payment)
Late stage (payback)
Local
National
See also: Fiscal instruments
DESCRIPTION
Environmental performance bonds consist of up-front financial payments by a company or
operator prior to the commencement of project activities. These “bonds” or guarantees are then
returned to the company at the end of the project if certain predetermined environmental
performance standards are met. If not, the performance bond can be used to fund appropriate
environmental mitigation measures, or other environmental schemes. Such bonds are generally
held on deposit by appropriate government departments or agencies.
Various elaborations can be added to this basic formula. For example, performance bonds could
be used to capitalise endowment funds whose interest is used to finance environmental projects
over the short-term. Alternatively, interest from the performance bonds can be used to fund field
inspections of the bound company’s activities, which, if favourable, could result in periodic
partial refunds of the bond over the length of the project cycle.
ASSESSMENT
Extent of application
Environmental performance bonds have been implemented in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippine’s’ forestry sectors. Their use was largely unsuccessful, largely because their value was
set too low. More successful precedents come from other sectors, such as mining. Further
examples can be found in Papua New Guinea, Chile, and Finland. India has applied performance
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bonds in some states for NTFP leases such as bamboo. Their potential use in Ghana, Honduras,
and Cameroon is also being considered.
Replicability for forestry
In forestry, environmental performance bonds can be most effectively used to encourage long-
term multiple-rotation management of natural forests by overcoming what has been called the
“bogey” time problem caused by high discount rates applied to 30-60 year rotations. Gradual
payback of the performance bond over the second rotation provides a continuous income stream
to the forest manager, and reduces the opportunity cost of not moving to another un-logged area.
Indeed, evidence from bio-economic modelling simulations by the World Bank suggest that
relatively small performance bonds can be used to induce loggers to adopt reduced-impact
logging practices. However, much larger bonds are needed to induce compliance with minimum-
diameter cutting limits.
Environmental performance bonds could also be used in a range of other SFM scenarios, for
example to encourage replanting (in plantations) or enrichment planting (in natural forests) at the
end of a rotation. Other applications include requiring verifiable implementation of
environmental management systems, training, dissemination of information, soil protection
measures, etc.
Funding potential
If structured appropriately, performance bonds have significant potential to ensure SFM activities
in the long-term. Moreover, some of the interest from the performance bonds could provide
valuable income for reinvestment in the forestry sector if the government department acting as
bond-holder is allowed to 'ringfence' the performance bond deposit account.
Issues
The value of the performance bond is crucial in determining whether it will encourage the desired
environmental behaviour. If it is set too low, such that even when included in a forest manager’s
calculations it still leaves the opportunity cost of a second rotation (for example) higher than the
NPV of moving into a new area, the company will likely forfeit its guarantee. Even though this
will raise some revenue for the bond-holder, the desired environmental performance will not have
been achieved.
Performance bonds can be valued either by auctions or based on some formula relating to likely
profitability. The former may result in the bond value being set too low; the latter requires often
unavailable information.
The environmental performance required by the bond should be clear, preferably simple and not
open to interpretation, easily verifiable, and ongoing rather than an “one-off” event. Ideally,
performance standards should be agreed consensually between the bond-holder and the bond
company.
Likely to be a viable instrument for large-scale operators only, due to the level of financial and
strategic commitment required. Performance bonds are likely to be deeply opposed by those
obliged to deposit them. There is also the risk that they may constitute a perverse incentive for
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natural forest conversion to monoculture plantations (not subject to the performance bonds) if
appropriate and enforced land-use zoning restrictions are not in place.
References
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al. 1998, Boscolo et al. 1998.
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FORESTRY-BASED CARBON OFFSETS
1. BACKGROUND
The term 'carbon offsets' embodies the concept of commoditisation of the carbon sequestration
and storage services provided by forests. The actual mechanisms for creating this market are Joint
Implementation (JI), and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). “Forestry-based carbon
offsets” is thus used as a generic term encompassing these specific financing mechanisms.
During the last ten years, forestry-based carbon offsets have evolved from a theoretical idea
towards being a market-based instrument for accomplishing the global environmental objectives
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), signed in Rio in 1992
during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).
A major step forward in this process was the signing of the Kyoto Protocol by 170 countries to
the UNFCCC in December 1997. The most important aspect of the Kyoto Protocol is the
adoption of legally-binding commitments by 37 developed countries and economies in transition
(collectively called the “Annex 1 countries”) to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by
an average of 5.2% below 1990 levels (the “baseline”) by the years 2008-2012. Crucially,
forestry and land-use change activities were included among the recognised strategies that
countries could use in meeting these GHG reduction commitments.
The Protocol also provides for the use of 3 “flexibility mechanisms” designed to facilitate the
attainment of these commitments, principally (in theory) by reducing the implementation costs of
the GHG reduction targets. These mechanisms are:
• QELRO trading – the international transfer of national allotments of emission rights or
Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Obligations (QELROs);
• Joint Implementation (JI) – creation of emissions reduction credits through transnational
investments between Annex 1 industrial countries and/or companies; and
• The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – a new mechanism resembling JI, which
allows for the creation of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits in developing
countries, regulated by a newly formed central authority.
The recent CoP to the UNFCCC in Buenos Aires, November 1998, agreed a timetable for
finalizing the necessary rules, structures, and methodologies for the implementation of these
flexible mechanisms. The deadline has been set for CoP6, which is scheduled for October 2000.
In relation to forestry, both JI and the CDM can be seen as important financial mechanisms based
on the valuation of an externality of global importance. Both, though particularly the CDM, have
the potential to mobilise vast financial resources for SFM activities.
2. JOINT IMPLEMENTATION (JI)
The concept of JI was originally proposed by Norway in 1991 in the negotiations leading up to
the Rio UNCED Conference. Until the Kyoto Protocol, the terminology of JI (and Activities
Implemented Jointly – see below) was virtually synonymous with the overall sweep of emissions
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trading possibilities. The Kyoto Protocol, however, narrows the scope of JI considerably. Article
6 of the protocol defines JI as the creation, acquisition and transfer of emission reduction units
(ERUs) between Annex I parties (developed countries and economies in transition) that result
from projects aimed at reducing GHG emissions at sources or enhancing GHGs removals by
sinks. JI is specifically based on the idea of international investments in specific projects.
According to the Kyoto Protocol, JI projects must:
• be approved by the parties involved;
• provide reductions in GHG emissions or enhancements of GHG removals that are
additional to any that otherwise would have occurred;
• be supplemental to domestic actions for meeting commitments that are required elsewhere
in the protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol also requires that countries and the FCCC develop the mechanisms (legal
structures, reporting guidelines, accounting procedures, etc) required to run a legitimate
emissions transaction regime. In the coming years, parties will need to:
• further elaborate guidelines for implementation, including for verification and reporting;
• establish rules for regulating legal entities under a party’s responsibility to participate in
generation, transfer, or acquisition of ERUs; and
• begin transfers and acquisitions of ERUs, while questions of implementation are resolved,
provided that ERUs are not used by a party to meet commitments under Article 3 of the
Kyoto Protocol until any issue of compliance is resolved.
As mentioned above, the recent CoP in Buenos Aires, Argentina agreed on a timetable for such
matters to be resolved, allocating different responsibilities to various bodies both within and
outside the FCCC structure. If the timetable is adhered to, all outstanding decisions relating to JI
should have been made by the end of the year 2000.
It should be noted that since the early 1990s, a variety of terms have been used to refer to
different climate change mitigation mechanisms, and in particular, JI. At CoP1 of the FCCC, held
in Berlin, March 1995, developing country dissatisfaction with the JI model introduced was
voiced as a formal refusal of JI with crediting against the GHG emission reduction objectives set
by the convention. A compromise was found in the form of a pilot phase, during which projects
were called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). During the AIJ Pilot Phase, projects were
conducted so as to establish protocols and experiences, but without allowing carbon credit
transfer between developed and developing countries. At CoP4 of the FCCC, held recently in
Buenos Aires, it was agreed to continue this pilot phase. For the purposes of this report, all AIJ
activities are included within the term “JI”.
3. THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (CDM)
The creation of the CDM is contemplated in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM evolved
out of an idea presented by Brazil called the Clean Development Fund. This fund is based on
taxing industrial countries that are non-compliant with their emission reduction commitments,
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and use the proceeds to engage in sustainable development projects with emissions reduction
capacity in developing countries. The CDM’s purpose is to assist non-Annex I parties
(developing countries) in making progress towards sustainable development and contribution to
the FCCC objective, and to assist Annex I parties (developed countries and economies in
transition) in achieving their QELROs. Non-Annex I parties will gain the economic,
developmental and environmental benefits from implemented projects that generate Certified
Emission Reductions (CERs) for export. Annex I Parties may use the certified reductions to
contribute to compliance with part of their emission reduction targets, as determined by the
convention. It has been proposed that there should be restrictions regarding the percentage of a
national obligation that can be met through CDM credits as opposed to internal domestic actions
(the so-called “supplementarity” rule). A recent study by the World Bank and MIT, however, has
shown that such restrictions both reduce developing country gains, as well as increase industrial
countries’ costs (Ellerman et al. 1998).
The CDM will act as an international body to oversee emission reduction projects that take place
in developing countries not under emission restrictions. Like JI, projects must be shown to be
additional to what would have occurred otherwise and to have the express approval of the host
government. In addition to the JI requirements, projects must also be certified by an independent
third party. In effect the CDM is a hybrid mechanism that brings together JI and emissions
trading with voluntary developing country participation.
One important facet of the CDM is that its resulting CER credits will apparently be bankable
from inception (probably 2000). What that means is that credits granted by the CDM up until the
first reporting period (2008-2012) will be cumulatively available for “spending” during the
reporting period (though project credits may also continue throughout the reporting period). This
creates a strong incentive to engage in CDM projects as early as possible, as each year of
emissions reductions adds to the transaction value at the point of “spending” (i.e., 2008-2012).
Other major components of the CDM include:
• project activities must be additional to policy actions that may cause the same outcomes;
• the CDM is open to participation by either private or public entities, or combinations of
the two; and
• the CDM also has a mandate to use a portion of its proceeds to assist countries that are
particularly vulnerable to climate change.
It is becoming apparent that a flexible CDM is important to future acceptance of the Kyoto
Protocol by many countries. At this stage, however, the CDM remains poorly defined and it
seems clear that a large number of countries and interest groups. Each has its own interpretation.
Developing country governments want to use it to improve financial flows in their direction;
certain social and environmental advocates see it as a redistribution mechanism against historical
development inequity; other environmental groups see it as a way to enhance capital flows to
forest conservation and sustainable forest management.
A further question involves the operational structure of the CDM. While some see it as a fairly
simple regulator of emission transaction projects, others view it as a direct financing participant
in projects, much along the lines of the Global Environmental Facility. While some industrial
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countries clearly prefer the former model, many developing countries prefer the latter, as it would
seemingly give them far greater control in spending priorities. The nature of the institutions(s) or
organization(s) that will be in charge of the CDM is also under debate. As noted above, the CDM
has a mandate to use a portion of its proceeds to assist countries particularly vulnerable to climate
change. it remains to be seen, however, how the CDM will make priorities, how the transfers will
occur, and the degree to which added transaction fees (the presumed source of proceeds for
vulnerability abatement) may impair market efficiency.
4. CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN FORESTS – THE OPTIONS
Before considering the potential of forestry projects under the CDM or JI, it is necessary to step
back and consider the nature of carbon sequestration by forests as a GHG mitigation option.
“Positive carbon flows” can be generated by forestry-based carbon offsets projects1 through two
different approaches:
• active absorption2 in new vegetation, and
• avoided emissions3 from existing vegetation (e.g., from fire or decomposition).
The first approach encompasses two main activities: “sink creation” through the planting of new
trees (e.g., afforestation, reforestation, agroforestry, etc.); and “sink enhancement” through
increasing growth rates of existing forest stands (e.g., silvicultural practices such as thinning,
weeding, liberation treatments, or fertilization).
The second approach can be accomplished through the prevention or reduction of deforestation
and land use change (e.g., through conservation projects), or reducing the damage inflicted on
existing forests (e.g., through uncontrolled logging, fire), etc. Since substantial amounts of carbon
are stored in soils, management practices that promote an increase in soil organic matter can also
have a positive carbon sequestration effect.
Although the first approach is equivalent to an “end-of-pipe” technology while the second seeks
to avoid GHG emissions at source, both have the same effect of reducing the net accumulation of
GHGs in the atmosphere. However, different analytical tools are required for the evaluation of
their merits as carbon offsets (i.e., whether they differ from an ongoing baseline) and for the
calculation of their offset potential.
5. ELIGIBLE SFM ACTIVITIES
Discussions thus far on forestry projects in the context of the Kyoto Protocol have generally been
polarised around the ‘conservation versus plantations’ debate. What tends to be ignored is that
carbon offsets can be generated from an extremely wide range of forestry activities. Some of
these are discussed in this section.
                                                
1 Also referred to as carbon emissions mitigation projects, carbon sequestration projects, etc.
2 Also referred to as carbon fixation, sink creation, sink enhancement, etc.
3 Also referred to as sink protection, pool protection, emissions reduction, etc.
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Traditional financial cost/benefit calculations weigh heavily against all types of reforestation.
Carbon offset payments, however, could help change forest plantation economics. There is
growing recognition that the economic challenges of plantations – which generally yield little in
the way of cash flow for many years – have inhibited investment in this activity. Additionally,
high capital costs and delayed returns tend to favor the establishment of high-yield species
monocultures, short rotations, and minimal cost management policies -  all of which can be
environmentally problematic. Risky locales (without track records) are also negatively weighted
in such financial calculations. While the wood products industry is already increasing its reliance
on planted forests, most studies indicate that plantation development still comprises only a
fraction of annual primary forest cut, leading to fears that there is insufficient present investment
to ease market pressure on dwindling primary forests (FAO 1991). Joint Implementation
investments can, theoretically, make lower growth areas financially viable, make it possible to
choose longer rotations, or to use a wider range of species than the eucalyptus, pine and teak
varieties which account for 85% of all plantation investments in the tropics (FAO 1991).
Forest conservation can also serve as an efficient form of carbon offset. Despite substantial losses
in overall forest cover, remaining primary forests, both tropical and temperate, represent huge
pools of sequestered carbon. A large proportion of land under forest cover is threatened with
conversion to other land uses that have lower value as carbon sinks (Dixon et al. 1994). The
avoidance and mitigation of carbon releases from these pools provides the quickest, forestry-
based, opportunity to slow the accumulation of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere (Thailand
Environment Institute 1995). Some of the main pressures on natural forests are related to the
expansion of agriculture and pasturelands, logging operations, and urbanization (World
Resources Institute 1990). Conservation of forests plays a double role in relation to carbon sinks.
Firstly, it prevents the emission of carbon that would be caused by decomposition of the forest
biomass. It has been estimated that deforestation contributes to 30% of the current global
anthropogenic CO2 emissions (Brown et al. 1996). Secondly, conservation prevents the reduction
in areas with potential for active carbon sequestration.
Forest conservation for carbon sequestration purposes can be either direct or indirect. Direct
interventions essentially require the “locking up” of threatened land resources into untouchable
preserves. Indirect interventions comprise a far wider range of possibilities, including increasing
agricultural productivity (thus lowering the need for cyclical slash and burn cropping), the
development of agroforestry to meet fuel wood needs, the opening of markets for indigenous
forest products, and the promotion of wood waste and paper recycling.
Assessing how much deforestation is being “avoided” can be a complex and controversial
endeavour that relates to social and economic aspects of a particular region. Often government
policies induce pressure on standing forests by specifically encouraging forest utilisation. Some
countries view conservation as patrimonial and an affront against a nation’s sovereignty As such,
there has been some negative bias among potential funders, against the idea of resource “lock-
ups,” although several programmes have combined conservation with sustainable utilisation and
other economic activities.
Interventions that reduce ongoing rates of carbon emissions from forestry practices can also be
important. These include the introduction of techniques for controlled logging and improved fire
prevention. It is estimated that 15 million hectares of tropical forests are logged yearly throughout
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the world (Singh 1993), and the majority of logging operations in tropical countries are
considered unsustainable and damaging (Poore 1989). Implementation of reduced impact logging
(RIL) techniques that avoid unnecessary destruction of biomass and release of carbon has great
potential as a carbon offset technique (Marsh 1993, Putz & Pinard 1994, Moura Costa & Tay
1996). RIL is an attractive forestry offset option because approximately half of the eventual
greenhouse gains are realised over the first few years and are basically irreversible. This lessens
the risk factor of failure for carbon offset investments. Simultaneously, biodiversity values are
maintained, fire risks are lowered, and topsoil integrity is maintained. Furthermore, a
fundamental feature of this option is that forests continue to provide economic potential through
continued production of timber resources in an environmentally sustainable manner.
The suppression of forest fires is another option to reduce unnecessary carbon emissions. In the last
decade, fire outbreaks have destroyed millions of hectares of rainforests in Kalimantan and Sumatra
alone, and the incidence of forest fires is expected to increase in the next decade (ITTO 1994). In
1997, another massive series of fires began in Indonesia, releasing hundreds of millions of tons of
GHGs. Along with the crucial need to address the policy causes, a combination of ground-based
practices of fire prevention and control, and available remote sensing monitoring systems
(Malingreau et al. 1989, DSE 1991) has great potential for reducing the frequency and extent of
forest fires.
Finally, forestry can also be used to prevent carbon released by fossil fuels elsewhere. This can
be achieved either directly through fuel substitution or indirectly through material substitution. In
the first scenario, fuel wood can be used to replace fossil fuels, with associated carbon savings
resulting from the unburned fossil fuels. In the second scenario, wood-based materials can be
used to replace materials that require high levels of energy and/or fossil fuels for their production
(e.g., steel, cement, plastics). Similarly, carbon savings are made through avoiding the need to
burn fossil fuels.
6. QUALITATIVE CRITERIA FOR FORESTRY-BASED CARBON OFFSETS
In the context of forestry and conservation practices, however, it should be recognised that not all
projects which appear to have positive GHG effects are conceptually valid as carbon offsets. For
example, existing national parks may not be considered to generate carbon offsets; these forests
were already in existence when the concept of carbon sequestration arose. Therefore, simply
renaming them as “carbon offset projects” does not involve any active removal of CO2 from the
atmosphere. Conversely, the establishment of new forests with the primary objective of carbon
sequestration may be rightly considered an offset.
Carbon offsets are a notional commodity, based on a conceptual evaluation and scientific
calculations. There is no separable entity to a ton of carbon offset; a specific volume cannot be
created in one place and materially transported to another. The commodity is derived by
observing the difference between projected standard practices (known as the project baseline or
reference case) and the occurring practices (known as the project case). That behavioural
differential which proves “additionality” then translates into GHG savings, using quantitative
methodologies.
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By necessity, there is subjectivity in developing project baselines, because the baseline is a
prediction of the future which cannot be empirically tested or directly observed. Since
measurement is of relative differentials rather than of absolute quantities, it is very important that
the baseline be as accurate and thorough in its assumptions as possible.
Before a project gets to the point of creating and claiming carbon offsets, it must demonstrate that
the activities are occurring – or will occur – within the bounds of a set of subjective criteria.
These criteria involve issues of project design, financing sources, secondary environmental and
developmental impacts (Jones and Stuart 1994). There must be consistency with national and
local objectives. While these qualitative criteria are still evolving, there is sufficient concurrence
to synthesise a basic evaluation methodology (the objective of the joint implementation pilot
phase). Aside from additionality (discussed above), key components of such a methodology
include the consideration of:
• acceptability – at both national and international levels
• externalities – slippage and leakage, social and development effects, environmental
impacts
7. TROPICAL VS. TEMPERATE CARBON OFFSETS
For countries rich in forest resources, altering non-sustainable land-use patterns is likely to be a
prized greenhouse gas mitigation opportunity. Large expanses of under-utilised, degraded or
deforested land with a low current value as carbon repositories that could be either afforested,
reforested or rehabilitated, are available throughout the world (e.g., Nilsson and Schopfhauser
1994). However, because of better climate and faster tree growth rates, tropical forests are more
efficient than temperate forests in absorbing CO2 from the atmosphere. It has been estimated that
any particular target for carbon sequestration through forestry would require 25 percent less
overall land area, if planting was concentrated in tropical rather than temperate areas (Marland
1988). The attractiveness of tropical forests for GHG-mitigation projects is still greater given the
lower factor costs for land and labour than in temperate zones. This represents a direct
comparative advantage for tropical forest countries.
With this in mind, it should be noted that the CDM is currently the only mechanism that could
bring carbon offset financing to developing countries in the tropics – all the other Kyoto
mechanisms relate to capped Annex 1 countries only. As it is in tropical regions, where SFM is
most urgently in need of implementation (and financing), the importance of the CDM to this end
is paramount. This is returned to in Section 1.111.
As discussed above, tropical forestry carbon offsets can encompass a range of project-scale
interventions, including direct preservation, reforestation, and reduction of the negative impacts
of forest management and harvesting (Moura-Costa 1996a, Brown et al. 1996). There is also the
possibility of increasing the production efficiency of swidden agricultural systems or the end-use
efficiency of fuel wood resources, both of which can help take pressure off standing forests with
accompanying GHG benefits.
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Other less forested countries in the tropics may benefit through rehabilitation, stopping degradation,
establishment of new forest cover, including plantations and integrated agroforestry systems, as
well as (possibly) efficiency improvements in wood processing and manufacturing industries.
8. EXTENT AND EXAMPLES OF FORESTRY-BASED CARBON OFFSET
PROJECTS
Several million hectares of forests world-wide are currently under forest management regimes
related to GHG mitigation funding. To date, more than 25 forestry projects have already been
funded through joint implementation mechanisms (see Table 1). These projects have taken place
in more than 15 countries, financed by government, NGO or private sector concerns and
implemented by community organizations, NGOs, and private sector companies. Four case-
studies, including the well-known Costa Rican programme, are profiled at the end of this Section.
Table 1 Forestry-based Carbon-offset Projects to Date
Project name Start
date
Carbon
offset
(1000 tC)
Area
(ha)
Host
country
Investor
country
Project description
AES–Care 1990 10,500 186,000 Guatemala USA Agroforestry
Face Malaysia 1992 4,250 25,000 Malaysia Netherlands Enrichment planting
Face-Kroknose 1992 3,080 16,000 Czech Rep. Netherlands Park rehabilitation
Face Netherlands 1992 885 5,000 Netherlands Netherlands Urban forestry
ICSB-NEP 1 1992 56 1,400 Malaysia USA Reduced impact logging
AES–Oxfam–
Coica
1992 15,000 1,500,000 South
America
USA Forest protection
AES–Nature
Conservancy
1992 15,380 58,000 Paraguay USA Forest protection
Face-Profafor 1993 9,660 75,000 Ecuador Netherlands Small farmers plantation
forestry
RUSAFOR-SAP 1993 79 450 Russia USA Plantation forestry
Face Uganda 1994 6,750 27,000 Uganda Netherlands Forest rehabilitation
Rio Bravo 1994 1,300 87,000 Belize USA Forest protection and
management
Carfix 1994 2,000 91,000 Costa Rica USA Forest protection and
management
Ecoland/Tenaska 1995 350 2,500 Costa Rica USA Forest conservation
ICSB-NEP 2 1996 39 980 Malaysia USA Reduced impact logging
Noel Kempff M. 1996 14,000 1,000,000 Bolivia UK/USA Forest conservation and
management
Klinki forestry 1997 1,600 87,000 Costa Rica USA Reforestation with Klinki
Burkina Faso 1997 67 300,000 Burkina
Faso
Denmark Firewood community
forestry
Scolel Te 1997 15 13,000 Mexico UK/France Community forestry
PAP OCIC 1997 18,000 570,000 Costa Rica Norway,
USA
Forest conservation
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Project name Start
date
Carbon
offset
(1000 tC)
Area
(ha)
Host
country
Investor
country
Project description
Norway-Costa
Rica
1997 230 4,000 Costa Rica Norway Forest rehabilitation and
conservation
Tesco “green
petrol”
1998 n.a. n.a. Undefined UK Forestry
Green fleet
initiative
1997 n.a. n.a. Australia Australia Reforestation
AES-Ilha Bananal 1998 n.a. n.a. Brazil USA Forest rehabilitation
NSW + Pacific
Power + Delta
Electricity
1998 69 1,041 Australia Australia Reforestation
World Bank
Prototype Carbon
Fund
1998 n.a. n.a. Internationa
l
Internationa
l
Renewable energy and
forestry
TOTAL 103,310 3,970,171
9. CARBON OFFSETS AS A NEW INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY – THE ISSUES
Flexibility mechanisms provide a variety of opportunities for investments in pursuit of clean and
sustainable development. Most estimates indicate that a global market in emissions trading could
be in the tens of billions of dollars annually by the first commitment period,  2008-2012  (See, for
instance, a recent study carried out for the World Bank by, Ellerman et al. 1998). While a portion
of such theoretical sums will be transfers between industrial countries, particularly those of the
EITs of Eastern Europe, a substantial percentage will also flow to developing countries. How
these sums are apportioned, which countries will be best positioned to take advantage of these
new capital flows and the degree to which regulatory mechanisms can control emissions trading,
remains to be determined. It is vitally important, however,  that investment priorities be set by the
developing countries themselves rather than by outside buying parties who are less likely to
appreciate the secondary positive (or negative) values which different investment tracks can bring
in different socioeconomic situations.
In this light, it is good to see that it has become a de facto requirement that emission transaction
projects need to obtain the express approval of both the host and investor country governments in
order for future emission credits to be granted. In industrial countries, that approval may well
devolve to an entity level, allowing private concerns to import or export their portion of the
national quota, as they see fit. However, all emerging regulations from the AIJ phase for
developing countries have consistently emphasised the need for projects to be supportive of
national development objectives and to be socially positive. Many projects inherently provide
further environmental benefits beyond the quantified greenhouse gas achievements. For example,
sustainable forestry projects leading to emission reductions may also lead to a series of ancillary
benefits such as biodiversity conservation, water catchment protection, employment, and income
generation.
One of the major advantage of trading in carbon offsets through JI/CDM is that it could represent
a new source of capital which is targeted towards sustainable development ideals, but which is
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project specific. Potential capital flows to these types of projects could be very large, if industrial
nations make a concerted effort on climate change. With the continuing reductions in ODA from
the OECD to the G-77, this could be an important facet in encouraging investments down
environmentally appropriate paths.
Besides representing a new source of capital, extensive utilization of project-level carbon trading
mechanisms could lead to technological leapfrogging for developing countries. This could occur
by accelerating the adoption of clean and efficient technologies, particularly in the energy sector.
In this context, biomass energy could bring a new dimension to forestry. The opportunity for an
outside concern to earn Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) for providing or financing the best
available technologies (BAT) – rather than outdated or used equipment – could help overcome
the higher capital costs and lack of information which disadvantage such technologies in many
developing countries. Once in place, developing countries could begin to establish their own
competence with various new technologies or techniques, which could catalyse new service and
trade opportunities in their own right.
If structured properly, trading in carbon offsets through JI/CDM could be advantageous to both
public and private sectors in developing countries. Public sector advantages could include:
• Injection of new capital, additional to current aid funding and traditional trade sources;
• Access to new sources of funding, technology and expertise to assist in the
implementation of national priorities;
• In the forestry sector, carbon offset investment could be directed to: implementation of
national land use plans, forest conservation efforts, consolidation of national parks,
rehabilitation of degraded areas, development of plantations and farm forestry,
strengthening of forestry sector institutions and systems for improved management; and
• In the energy sector, investment could be directed to reduce dependence on fossil fuels,
including the utilisation of renewable biomass energy sources.
If such actions were carried out concertedly, increased employment generation and economic
growth would result. Countries might gain better access to external markets through the use of
BAT technologies, potentially associated with independent certification (through ISO, ITTO
2000 or FSC). Forestry initiatives to mitigate GHG emissions would also probably have positive
effects on the objectives of other UNCED commitments, notably the Biodiversity Convention
and Agenda 21.
Advantages for the private sector in developing countries include:
• Trade advantages in a new commodity which is likely to become increasingly valuable to
industrial countries as GHG restrictions from the FCCC come into force;
• This trade could leverage further investments, by increasing the attractiveness of
environmentally-friendly projects with marginal returns or high risks;
• In the case of commercial forestry activities, carbon benefits provide early financial
returns, before harvesting takes place; and
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• In the case of biomass energy, there are opportunities to gain positions of market
leadership (through increased experience and enhanced expertise), rather than being
strictly dependent on technology downflow.
Despite these potential advantages, there are systematic objections legitimately raised against the
concept of trading in carbon offsets through JI/CDM. Chief among these objections is the fear,
among developing countries, that agreeing to an emissions trading system will lead to mounting
diplomatic and economic pressure to undertake emissions commitments themselves. Many
developing countries would consider this unfair, given the historical responsibility of the
industrialised countries for dumping CO2 into the atmosphere. However, G-77 unity on these
equity considerations have been confused by the recently expressed wishes of South Korea and
Argentina to voluntarily take on GHG emission reduction commitments, thereby joining the list
of Annex 1 countries.4
Some of the other main objections raised against the concept of JI/CDM are outlined below
(Stuart and Moura Costa 1998, Stuart and Sekhran 1996).
(1) Potential aid reduction. There is a fear that CDM will provide industrial countries with
further excuses to reduce ODA, replacing it with “GHG emissions reduction” aid. It is argued
that ODA should not be replaced at all, and that emissions transaction funding should flow
from private sector sources in developed countries. However, reliance on such flows would
potentially compromise a country’s ability to control its own investment strategies.
(2) Emissions slippage. Currently, only industrial country emissions are likely to be restricted or
“capped”. Emissions trading between a capped country and an uncapped country creates the
possibility that no net emissions reductions will actually occur. This is because high emission
activities in a capped country can merely be transferred to an uncapped country without
penalty. This type of activity is termed “leakage” (USIJI 1994) or “slippage” (Moura-Costa
and Stuart 1997); in other words, emissions are displaced to another location without any net
positive effect. If leakage/slippage in this manner becomes a severe problem, developing
countries expect that industrial countries will pressure them greatly to undertake binding
emissions commitments. They would then be responsible for the displaced emissions, to their
competitive disadvantage.
(3) Reduced inward investment from carbon-intensive industry. Higher factor costs in industrial
countries, caused by energy taxes or the costs of emissions permits, would make investment
opportunities in developing countries more attractive to industrial concerns. This would
create economic development opportunities. If extensive emissions trading is allowed to
mitigate those costs, however, there will be less pressure to transfer profitable carbon
intensive industries to developing countries, thus keeping such industries (and the
concomitant economic benefits) in industrial countries.
                                                
4 The motives for such actions are many and complex. Therefore, while such commitments should clearly be lauded,
care must be taken to ensure that these targets are not inflated to allow excessive trade of surplus emission rights
with developed countries unable or unwilling to meet their targets through domestic action (the so-called “tropical
air” problem).
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(4) Industrial countries cornering the offset market. Industrial countries could lock up the most
advantageous carbon offset options in developing countries. This would reduce the long-term
capacity of these countries to reduce their net emissions when they need to take on
commitments. In this situation, all that would be available would be the higher cost options
that had not interested the industrial country participants.
(5) Low offset prices. Currently, the announced average price of offsets has been very low (less
than US$10 per ton of carbon in forestry), usually representing a portion of the marginal cost
of the intervention, without any rents accruing to the supplier. This overt lack of profitability
provides no commercial incentive for developing countries to supply offsets and reinforces
the notion that carbon offsets are “win-win” in name only.
(6) Eco-colonialism in emission rights. If in the future, emission targets are set for all countries,
these rights could be viewed as a potential form of eco-colonialism, under the “terms of
trade” argument. In this analysis, industrial countries could coordinate the purchase of
emissions rights from developing countries, thus denying developing countries the right to
industrialise using inexpensive fossil fuels.
(7) Increased conditionality on investments. Another form of this argument views carbon trading
as a mechanism by which industrial countries could impinge upon the sovereign rights of
developing countries by imposing various restrictive covenants on behavior as conditionality
terms on their investments. Since most analysts see carbon trading as being driven by the
private sector, developing countries will have even less recourse to object to that type of
conditionality.
(8) Industrial countries should get their own house in order. Many take the strong moral stand
that OECD countries should not be allowed to avoid their own emission reduction
responsibilities (and continue to use a disproportionate amount of the global atmospheric
resource) through the low cost options promised by transnational mitigation programmes.
These kinds of objections have been at the root of the continuous debate among the parties of the
FCCC. Proponents of the CDM, as a developing country-run regulatory body, have high hopes
that it will have an important role in avoiding abuses of the carbon trading concept, while
enabling acceptable compromises to be reached in relation to these issues.
10. FUNDING POTENTIAL OF FORESTRY-BASED CARBON OFFSETS
A recent MIT study for the World Bank about the market for carbon offsets estimated the market
for carbon offsets it to be around 15 billion dollars a year, if there were to be free trading with
developing countries, through the CDM (Ellerman et al. 1998). In order to better understand its
potential, it is worth looking at the evolution of the market for these credits and its underlying
policy framework, as follows.
The first transactions for CO2 emission mitigation took place in the early 1990s. These were
voluntary in nature, since there were no legislative requirements for polluters to reduce GHG
emissions. Projects were established in anticipation of changes in environmental legislation,
while capitalising on the public relations value of projects. This voluntary aspect was somewhat
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reflected in the assumed price paid for carbon sequestration, which averaged US$0.19 per ton of
carbon (see Table 2 below), based upon the costs to the investor.
In July 1992, representatives from 155 nations gathered in Rio de Janeiro for the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). At Rio, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was signed. This included a voluntary commitment by
Annex 1 countries (industrialised countries) to reduce their emissions to the levels of 1990 by the
year 2000 (Grubb et al. 1993). Embedded in FCCC was the concept of Joint Implementation (JI)
of activities between countries to collectively reduce GHG emissions or promote the absorption
of atmospheric CO2. The investing participants in these projects could presumably claim
emission reduction “credits” for the activities financed. These credits could then be used to lower
GHG-related liabilities (e.g., carbon taxes, emission caps, etc.) in their home countries. The
overall rationale of JI is that the marginal costs of emission reduction or CO2 sequestration can
vary dramatically, and that such costs are generally lower in developing nations than
industrialised countries.
The commitments and mechanisms proposed at Rio led to an increase in the level of investment
in this sector. An average of 3.3 new projects and US$50 million were committed yearly during
the two years between UNCED and CoP1 in 1995 (see Table 2). The average price (usually
equating to costs) paid for carbon sequestration during this phase is estimated to be around
US$1.97 per ton of carbon, a tenfold increase from the prices paid in the previous phase.
At CoP1 in Berlin, March 1995, developing country dissatisfaction about the concept of JI was
voiced as a formal rejection of this mechanism for achieving the GHG emission reduction
objectives set by the Convention. Subsequent negotiations led to a compromise in the form of a
pilot phase, during which projects were called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). During the
AIJ Pilot Phase, projects were conducted with the objective of establishing protocols and
experiences, but without allowing carbon crediting between developed and developing countries.
This was meant to simulate the process of JI, giving substantive information to decision-makers
in formulating the final system for emission transactions between countries and private entities.
The absence of credit transfer, however,  substantially dulled the appetite for participation among
private sector parties in particular. The direct statement from Berlin – that current JI projects
were not eligible for future crediting – meant that these were unrecoverable costs. Because of this
lack of real incentives for the private sector (which most observers believe must eventually drive
the trading system), the results of the AIJ pilot phase were generally considered poorly
representative of the full potential of JI.
In this new environment, where companies were faced with great uncertainty about the potential
value of projects for their respective balance sheets, a large reduction in the level of investment in
JI/AIJ-type projects was observed (Table 2). Only three new AIJ forestry projects were initiated
during this phase, with an average yearly committed investment of US$6 million (down from
US$50 million). The WTP for carbon also decreased, down to an average of US$0.59 per ton of
carbon.
In the year preceding the CoP3 of the Climate Convention that took place in Kyoto, December
1997, there was great anticipation that changes were imminent. Discussions during CoP2 in
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Geneva, 1996, determined that binding commitments were going to be a central theme at CoP3.
The consequences of these commitments were unknown but were likely to be manifested in the
form of carbon taxes, quotas, caps, etc., all of which would entail hard costs to be incurred by
industrialised economies. These factors led to an increase in the level of carbon offset investment.
Four new forestry projects were initiated in 1997. These included:
• two large national carbon offset programmes in Costa Rica, the Protected Areas Project
(PAP) and the Private Forestry Project (PFP) (see Case studies in Section Chapter 13);
• a 13,000-hectare community forestry project in Mexico, financed by the International
Automobile Association (Tipper 1997a); and
• a community forestry project for fuel-wood production in Burkina Faso, financed by the
Government of Norway through the World Bank.
Table 2 Evolution of Forestry-based Carbon Offset Investments
Pre-
UNCED
Pre-CoP 1 AIJ PP Pre-Kyoto Post-
Kyoto*
Number new projects per year 0.5 3.3 1.5 4 14
Area of new projects (ha/year) 93,000 628,467 501,740 893,000 2,002,082
Investment committed (US$ million per
year)**
1.00 49.25 6.05 4.48 347.00
Carbon price (US$/ton) 0.19 1.97 0,59 11.07 > 12.00
Source: (from Moura Costa & Stuart 1998)
* Based on value of contracts signed
** Figures for the post-Kyoto phase were based on unofficial data and were adjusted to give a
proportional idea of a one-year contribution. Some figures were based on press announcements and so
might contain inaccuracies.
While the level of investment remained low (US$4.5 million per year), the price paid for carbon
rose to an average of US$12 per ton of carbon.
The establishment of binding commitments for Annex 1 countries at Kyoto in December 1997
(see Section 1.1Section 1) has led inevitably to a more substantial demand for carbon offsets.
Sandor (1997) estimated that, for the U.S. alone, the costs of reduction of GHG emissions to
levels 10% below the 1990 baseline is in the range of US$32 billion a year. If these targets were
partially accomplished through GHG emissions trading, the resulting U.S. demand for GHG
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) would be in the order of US$6 billion a year, a huge increase
from the voluntary demand of the pre-Kyoto phase. Another change in demand specification
regards the quality of offsets. According to the Kyoto Protocol, all ERUs generated through the
CDM outside capped Annex 1 countries will have to be independently certified, creating a
potentially high demand for this type of service.
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These new conditions greatly increased the attractiveness (and reduced the risks) of investment in
forestry-based carbon offset projects, resulting in an immediate rise in the level of investment,
and in the price paid for carbon credits, which reached up to US$20-25 per ton of carbon, in the
case of the World Bank prototype carbon fund. Less than a year after the Kyoto Protocol, a
variety of initiatives were announced. These include: the creation by BP of a voluntary cap on its
internal emissions associated with an internal trading system; the investment by BP in forestry-
offset projects in Bolivia; the development of a forestry conservation project in Brazil, by AES;
the creation of a variety of consumer-based schemes in UK and Australia (Greenhouse Issues
1997); a carbon trading transaction between New South Wales State Forests and Pacific Power,
in Australia.; and UNDP’s carbon offset forestry programme in Guyana (still in the planning
stage).
A recent study by the World Bank and MIT estimate that the global demand for carbon credits
will reach tens of billions of dollars yearly, once the trading mechanism necessary for these flows
is in place. This brief look at the evolution of the carbon offset market highlights the importance
of the signals which emerge from policy-makers and the wider international community. From
now until October 2000, the deadline agreed at CoP4 in Buenos Aires, outstanding issues related
to the CDM’s policy, legal, and institutional settlements are to be resolved. If the resultant CDM
market is designed and developed appropriately, it will likely have a great potential for
channeling new and additional funding for forestry into developing countries and economies in
transition.
11. CARBON OFFSET MARKET CONDITIONS
While we are still a long way from an organised market with prices defined according to forces of
supply and demand, the initial voluntary schemes and bartering transactions that characterised the
early 1990s have already given way to more sophisticated market mechanisms. If this trend
continues, it seems very likely that forestry offsets will play a part in accomplishing the legally
binding emission reduction commitments agreed in 1997 in the Kyoto Protocol of the FCCC.
Moreover, if the trading regimes are properly structured, a sizeable proportion of the proceeds
from the international market for carbon projects, credits, and allowances, could flow to
developing countries.
For carbon offsets to succeed in attracting the expected large financial flows into the forestry
sector, however, more mature markets must develop. We are still a long way from a price
denominated CO2 credit market determined by equilibrium of supply and demand. Significant
transactions will never occur if the model remains that of emitters putting forth calls for
proposals, which are answered haphazardly by a combination of environmental, social
development and business interests. The direct linkage between supply and demand must be
broken and the commodity must become more homogenous. It can no longer be the case that
production of this novel commodity only occurs when a downstream client makes a direct
investment in the “factory,” thus creating the good.
For forestry professionals, the next steps in this process require that they formally recognise the
potential of emission reductions in their planning process. They can then develop verifiable
volumes of emissions reduction outputs through the capital allocation process. Forest output
optimisation will eventually develop a new production possibility boundary, based on relative
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values of the main output (forest products) together with the associated carbon sequestration
potential (e.g., Boscolo and Buongiorno 1997). Once a more detailed understanding of the
production process is available, more sophisticated emissions reduction services will emerge and
there will likely be a bloom of structured financial instruments based on this value. For this to
occur, however, policies must emerge – sooner, rather than later – that better define the
acceptable quality range of the commodity. That said, the forestry community would be
immediately benefit through more active participation in the current debate, so that the most
rational policies from a SFM perspective are the ones that ultimately emerge.
In large part, this futuristic model reflects an expansion of the current mechanisms within the
Costa Rican national programme (see case studies), which provided the first true break between
supply and demand, reduced transaction costs and the development of standardised
instrumentation regarding carbon flows. Smaller and private organizations, however, are less
likely to be able to dedicate similar internal resources to invent similar products. The emergence
of a new class of forestry investors is thus expected, who will speculate in the environmental
performance of new varieties of forestry projects, according to anticipated markets for verifiable
GHG commodities. In this way, emitter-based or internal financing may give way to venture
capital financing – all based on perceived future carbon offset market evolution. Forestry
professionals need to prepare to meet this brave new world, armed with information and a
recognition that they may control a valuable commodity in a GHG-concerned world.
12. THE CDM AND SFM
To conclude, it is worth drawing together some of the points and arguments made throughout this
section annex in the context of the CDM and SFM in the tropics. It has been made abundantly
clear that developed country demand for forestry-based carbon offsets from project-level
activities in the tropics could be highly significant, an order of magnitude higher than total
current ODA flows into forestry. If the CDM is structured so as to facilitate and appropriately
channel this demand, the leverage potential of an additional carbon-derived funding stream for
SFM operations in the tropics is considerably vast. Of course, there is a whole range of
preconditions (see Section 1.10) for this potential to be realised. Not least of these is the level of
engagement by host country institutions, and the transaction costs under the CDM compared to
similar costs of project-level GHG mitigation within developed countries.
There is little doubt, however, that the demands of SFM in the developing world should be a
determining factor in the ongoing policy debates on the CDM. As mentioned above, these
debates are supposed to be resolved by the end of the year 2000. Indeed, in the Buenos Aires Plan
of Action that emerged from CoP4 of the FCCC (see Section 1.1), priority was given to finalizing
arrangements for the CDM.
Nevertheless, it is appearing increasingly likely that forestry might not be included within the
initial CDM remit, which instead will focus on less controversial energy sector projects. The
negotiators at CoP4 bought time on forestry issues by effectively deferring them until after the
report, due in late 2000 of the specially convened IPCC Working Group on forestry. Of course,
such a deferment made good sense as many of the issues are complex. However, there is a danger
that the particular characteristics and requirements of forestry projects will be excluded from the
formative discussions on the CDM, perhaps making it difficult for them to be included at a later
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date. In this regard, it is vital that synergies are exploited between ongoing international policy
processes on climate change, and on forestry.5 UNDP and the IFF are ideally positioned to
mediate such interactions.
It is also worth mentioning that the benefits of including forestry-based carbon offsets within the
CDM are potentially widespread, not just in terms of SFM, but in terms of the small and large-
scale forest users and operators who may see additional financing streams for implementing
sustainable forestry practices come on stream. In this regard, one notable but overlooked event in
the run-up to CoP4 in Buenos Aires was the so-called “Letter to Brasilia” addressed to the
Brazilian government and co-authored by a myriad of small Brazilian NGOs involved in forestry.
The thrust of the letter was akin to the thrust of this section include forestry within the CDM.
13. CASE STUDIES
This chapter includes four selected case studies on forestry-based carbon offset projects in
developing countries which are summarised in Table 3.
                                                
5 Forestry-based carbon offset projects can also provide support for the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) by
promoting direct preservation, sustainable forestry practices, or reforestation.
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Table 3 Selected Case Studies of Forestry-Based Carbon Offset Projects in Developing Countries
Summary matrix of case studies (see below for more detailed descriptions)
Case Study
Name &
Location
Objectives /
Activities
Forest type
and area (ha) Partners
Investment
committed &
price of carbon
Impacts expected Current statusand future plans
1
INFAPRO
Innoprise-Face
Foundation
Project
Sabah, Malaysia
Enrichment
planting and
forest
rehabilitation
25,000 ha of
selectively
logged
dipterocarp
forests
Innoprise Corporation (forestry
arm of the Sabah Foundation)
and the FACE (Forests
Absorbing CO2 Emissions)
Foundation (a foundation of the
Dutch Electricity Board)
US$15 million,
over 25 years
(US$3.52/t C)
The project will fix 4.3 million t C, and
generate US$800 million in timber
revenue to be used in the social
programmes of the Sabah Foundation. At
least 25,000 ha of degraded logged
forests will be improved. Indirect impacts
of the project include training,
information dissemination, etc.
The project is in the 7th year
of its planned 25 year
implementation phase.
There is a threat that without
the CDM, the
implementation of this
project may be halted.
2
ICSB-NEP
Reduced Impact
Logging Project
Sabah, Malaysia
Reduce the
impacts of
uncontrolled
selective
logging
operations
10,400 ha of
primary
dipterocarp
forests
Innoprise Corporation and New
England Power, an American
electricity power company
US$3 million,
over 8 years
(US$7.6/t C)
The project will avoid the emission of
58,000 t C, and prevent unnecessary
damage to 10,400 ha of forests. It is also
expected to have a catalytic effect in
other operations in the region (including
other operations of Innoprise).
The project is in the last
year of implementation. It is
unclear if it will be renewed.
Long- term monitoring and
research of logged areas is
to be done by CIFOR.
3
Rio Bravo
Conservation &
Management
Area Carbon
Sequestration
Pilot Project
Belize
Forest
conservation
and
sustainable
forestry
87,000 ha of
tropical forests
(to be
protected) and
degraded land
(to be reforested
with broad leaf
plantations)
Project implemented by
Programme for Belize (a
private conservation and
development organisation) and
The Nature Conservancy (US
NGO), financed by a
consortium of U.S. electric
utilities.
US$2.6 million
(US$1.90/t C)
The project will sequester 1,3 million t C.
It will have additional positive effects on
biodiversity, soil stability, water and air
quality. It will also result in the creation
of local jobs and long-term improvements
in the local economy through the
development of minor forest product
industries.
The project is half way
through its implementation
phase, and will be continued
for a total life time of 40
years.
4
Costa Rican Joint
Implementation
programme
Costa Rica
Forest
conservation,
reforestation,
and selective
logging
Approximately
1,2 million ha
of primary and
secondary
forest, and
pasture land
OCIC (Costa Rican Joint
Implementation Office), other
government agencies, local
NGOs and farmers.
Project costs
unknown
(confidential to
OCIC). Carbon
offsets sold at
US$10/ t C and
higher.
This programme will fix and/or avoid the
emission of at least 30 million t C, and
consolidate a forest estate of at least 1
million ha. It will also provide an
important example of a Joint
Implementation project wholly conceived
and implemented by the host country in
accordance with its national priorities.
Carbon savings from the
forest protection component
have already been
independently certified, with
some carbon credits sold to
Norway. If funds become
available, the project will be
continued for at least
another 25 years.
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Case Study 1. Enrichment planting and forest rehabilitation in Sabah, Malaysia
The logging of dipterocarp forests accounts for about 50-70% of Sabah’s state revenue (Sabah
Forestry Department 1989). In order to maintain the economic returns derived from this sector,
forest regeneration must be managed for sustainable yields. The high densities of natural stands
in Sabah allow extraction rates of up to 120 m3/ha (Silam Forest Products, timber extraction
figures). However, this results in substantial disturbance to the residual stand (Nussbaum et al.
1995; Appanah and Weinland 1990). In some areas the residual stocking and seedling bank of
timber species is much reduced and artificial regeneration needs to be employed (Primack et al.
1987; Appanah and Weinland 1990). Enrichment planting is a technique for promoting artificial
regeneration in which seedlings of preferred timber trees are planted in the under-story of
existing logged-over forests and then given preferential treatment to encourage their growth
(Lamprecht 1989). However, the costs involved in artificial regeneration are often prohibitive,
and in some cases funds are not available from local sources.
Energy supply in the Netherlands is mainly provided by coal-fired power stations, leading to high
levels of CO2 emissions to the atmosphere. However, it is not possible to find large enough areas
in the Netherlands to offset this level of emissions, since most of the land is already under
agricultural or urban use. The problems faced by Malaysia and the Netherlands were combined to
generate practical solutions for both parties.
The Innoprise-FACE Foundation Rainforest Rehabilitation Project (INFAPRO) is a cooperative
venture between Innoprise Corporation, a semi-government forestry organisation which has the
largest forest concession in the state of Sabah, Malaysia, and the FACE Foundation of the
Netherlands. This was the first large scale forestry-based carbon offset project in the world. The
objective of the project is to rehabilitate 25,000 ha of logged forests by enrichment planting and
reclamation of degraded areas using indigenous tree species such as dipterocarps, fast growing
pioneers, and forest fruit trees, over a period of twenty-five years (Moura Costa et al. 1996). The
total investment committed by the FACE Foundation amounts to US$15 million over twenty-five
years.
In the pilot phase (1992-1994), 2,000 ha of logged-over forests were planted as an initial trial of
the effectiveness of this system. The planting phase will be extended for twenty-five years and
the forests maintained for ninety-nine years. The long term nature of the project should enable the
maintenance and silvicultural treatments required to sustain growth rates during the project life. It
is expected that at the end of the first sixty-year growth cycle, these forests will be exploited for
timber, which belongs exclusively to Innoprise. However, timber harvesting will have to be done
in a careful way so that a healthy residual stand can again regenerate a well-stocked forest in
order to maintain a carbon pool for the FACE Foundation, which has the exclusive rights to the
carbon sequestered through the ninety-nine years of the project. It is expected that the project will
sequester at least 4.25 million tons of carbon (15.6 million tons CO2) during its lifetime (Stibbe et
al. 1994) at an average cost of US$3.52 per ton of carbon (US$0.95 per t CO2).
It has been estimated that the project will also produce over four million m3 of hardwood sawn
timber, worth close to US$800 million, which belongs to Innoprise Corporation. Given that
Innoprise is fully owned by the Sabah Foundation, a semi-government organisation with the
mandate of improving people’s welfare in the state of Sabah, it is expected that the project will
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generate considerable social spin-offs. Additionally, during its initial twenty-five year planting
phase, the project will directly generate 230 jobs per year, for various activities such as field
planting, silviculture, nursery work, mapping and GIS (geographical information systems),
computing, financial control, and research. It is important to note that 90 percent of the project’s
budget is spent on personnel.
A key feature of the project is the integration of a substantial research and training component
with the main operation. Ten percent of the total budget is to be directed towards research and
training with the objective of developing strategies for rehabilitation of logged forests. Training is
provided at all levels, from Ph.D. level, to practical training provided to field crews. The project
has also been very active in disseminating its findings through various means. During the last six
years, it has yielded fifty-three research papers, two Ph.D. theses, three B.Sc. reports, two
training videos, ten journalistic reports (published in Malaysian and international magazines and
newspapers) and more than twenty conference communications.
The project is in its sixth year and, to date, over two million seedlings have been planted on 5,000
hectares of degraded rainforests. Seedling survival and growth rates have been satisfactory
(Moura-Costa et al. 1996). The project has also generated general knowledge on a variety of
subjects from plant propagation, silviculture, nutrition, large scale planting, and GIS. The
contract for the next five-year phase of the project has just been signed.
Case Study 2. Reduced Impact Logging in Sabah, Malaysia
In the process of extracting eight to fifteen trees (80 m3, with approximately twenty-two tons of
carbon per hectare) from a hectare of forest in East Malaysia, often as many as 50 percent of the
remaining trees are damaged and up to 40 percent of the area is crushed by bulldozers (Sabah
Forest Department 1989). The effect of uncontrolled logging on biodiversity and ecosystem
function is also severe: soil erosion, weed infestations, and incidence of fire all increase in
logged-over forests. These effects combine with the disruption of much of the pre-existing
regeneration of commercially valuable trees to make such logging extremely detrimental to long-
term ecological and economic productivity.
Damages incurred during conventional timber felling and extraction also result in reduced forest
biomass and substantial releases of carbon dioxide (Houghton 1996) and possibly other
radioactively important gases (e.g., methane). It is possible therefore, to reduce the release of CO2
from logging by adoption of less destructive logging techniques. Carbon dioxide sequestration in
tropical forests through controlled logging has a number of benefits. Immediate carbon benefits
are realised at low expense as native species are maintained on site, and soils are less likely to be
degraded or eroded. Post-logging carbon accumulation rates are also likely to be elevated and the
future potential for production of timber and non-timber forest products enhanced. These benefits
derive from the reduced likelihood of vine infestations as well as from the retention of many
undamaged trees with the capacity to grow to be very large.
The ICSB-NEP Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) Project is a cooperative venture between
Innoprise Corporation Sdn. Bhd. (ICSB), a semi-government organisation which has the largest
forest concession in the state of Sabah, Malaysia, and the New England Power (NEP) Company,
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an American utility trying to address the challenge of reducing its net CO2 emissions. The
objective of the project is to introduce the use of reduced impact logging (RIL) techniques in
order to lower the level of damage caused by selective harvesting operations, reducing the release
of CO2 from decomposing vegetation and soil loss.
In an initial phase, 1,400 ha of forests were logged according to the RIL techniques from 1992 to
1994. The project managed to reduce logging damage by 50%, thus saving approximately 40 tons
of carbon per hectare and a total of 58,000 tons of carbon (212,860 tons of CO2, Pinard and Putz
1996). Given the project cost of US$450,000, the cost of carbon saved was US$7.60 per ton of
carbon (US$2.00 per ton CO2) at two years after logging (Moura-Costa and Tay 1996, Moura-
Costa 1997). Higher savings are expected in the longer term. All the incremental costs of training
and implementation of the project were paid by NEP, which has full rights to the carbon savings.
At the same time, ICSB benefits from improved management of its forests, and a better residual
stand after logging.
Apart from the direct benefits to the forest derived from RIL techniques, the project has had a
broader impact. The initial phase of the project included a substantial training component aimed
at all levels in the ICSB hierarchy, including the senior management, foresters, forest rangers,
tree-fellers, and tractor operators. The training of a few logging crews has triggered positive
attitudes among loggers around the region. Professional pride and competition has led to an
unexpected improvement of the performance of other logging crews operating in the ICSB’s
concession, with an overall improvement in logging efficiency beyond the project’s boundaries.
Another positive effect of the project is in the raising of awareness. The project has received
substantial attention by local and international media, has served as a demonstration area for
better logging practices, and attracted hundreds of local and international visitors since its
inception. It has also been the target of research projects conducted by foreign and local
scientists. The project has also attracted the attention of institutions such as CIFOR and ITTO,
which became interested in using the project as a basis for spreading the use of RIL techniques
throughout the region.  Another similar carbon offset project based on RIL has already been
approved by the USIJI.
The first phase of the ICSB-NEP RIL project demonstrated that the technical impediments to
better logging practices can be overcome without major difficulty. A second phase was initiated
early 1996, consists of 9,000 ha of RIL during a three-year period. In 1996, NEP placed the
project into the EEI Utilitree Carbon Company (the financing entity of the Utility Forest Carbon
Management Programme), which will pay for 1,000 hectares of RIL.
The Innoprise RIL CO2 offset offerings are substantially different from those provided by the
Project for Belize (see next case study). First of all, it is an explicitly commercial contract for
services between two huge private sector entities. While there has been some modest assistance
from third parties in developing the quantification methodologies, this project is comparatively
“unleveraged”; the cost of the contract truly reflects the cost of the emissions savings. The project
was initiated well before the development of the USIJI and other JI programmes, and its
contractual nature – involving arbitration, defined credit assignment, credit re-sale clauses,
insurance and the like – points to a more business-like carbon offset arrangement. The project
also has great potential to be scaled up, given that Innoprise harvests between 10,000 and 20,000
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hectares of its own concession holdings each year, and could easily transfer the techniques to
other concessions which it is managing (though the costs and carbon estimates would clearly
change). This is substantially different to project level investments that tend to have much more
defined parameters and are not necessarily able to expand quickly in the event of market demand
for the CO2 offset service.
Case study 3. Conservation areas and sustainable forestry programme, Belize
The Rio Bravo Conservation and Management Area Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project
(RBCMA) located in north-west Belize, combines land acquisition with a sustainable forestry
programme to achieve carbon sequestration. RBCMA is run by the Programme for Belize (PfB),
a private conservation and development organisation. The project is financed by various U.S.
electric utilities, namely the Wisconsin Power Company (WEPCO), Cinergy, Detroit Edison,
PacifiCorp, and the EEI Utilitree Carbon Company. The participating utilities will contribute
US$2.6 million to The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and PfB to fund the first component of the
project (USIJI 1995).
PfB owns the RBCMA in perpetual trust for the people of Belize. PfB was established in 1988 by
private citizens to promote conservation of the natural heritage of Belize and the wise use of the
country’s natural resources, and to conserve a representative area of natural forest. With 86,928
hectares of forest land, RBCMA is PfB’s flagship project. The primary hardwood stock of the
RBCMA and its environs had been seriously depleted through almost a century of unsustainable
harvesting. PfB has undertaken extensive biological surveys of RBCMA’s lands and, by 1994,
had developed a preliminary land use plan which included a sustainable forestry operation in the
eastern part of the parcel while the western portion was to be set aside for conservation, scientific
and educational purposes. Had it not been for PfB’s acquisition of the land that is now the
RBCMA, it is likely that the forested portions would have been converted to farm land.
RBCMA has two components. Component A involves the purchase of an area of endangered
forest land, thereby expanding RBCMA’s existing protected forest areas. Under Component A,
PfB would exercise its option to purchase 6,014 hectares of endangered forest land that intersects
the eastern portion of the RBCMA. If not protected, this property will be converted to agricultural
use, permanently dividing the RBCMA ecosystem. Component B involves the development of a
sustainable forestry management programme that will increase the level and rate of carbon
sequestered within approximately half of the RBCMA, including the purchased parcel. The
remaining RBCMA lands will be left undisturbed as experimental control areas, as well as for
conservation and research purposes. Component A is expected to yield 767,681 t C after five
years. Component B is expected to yield 541,814 t C after twenty years. The cost estimates
outlined in the proposal were US$1.91 per ton of carbon (US$0.52 per ton CO2), with benefits
projected over the forty-year life of the project (USIJI 1995).
The project was designed from the outset as a USIJI project. It also conforms to requirements for
carbon offset registration under Section 1605(b) of the 1992 U.S. Energy Policy Act and to PfB’s
sustainable development mandate. The RBCMA project was developed in conjunction with the
Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO), to demonstrate a model carbon offset project
case. After screening more than twenty potential projects being planned by The Nature
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Conservancy’s (TNC) Latin American and Caribbean partner organisations, TNC presented five
candidate projects to WEPCO, of which it was agreed that the Rio Bravo in Northwest Belize
was the most suitable. TNC and WEPCO approached PfB to sign a Memorandum of
Understanding agreeing “to develop a joint proposal for a pilot carbon sequestration project” for
submission to the USIJI.
The Memorandum includes the participants’ explicit intent to develop a model project that
conforms to the requirements of the USIJI, the FCCC, and the U.S. Department of Energy
Section 1605(b) offset registry requirements. When approved by the USIJI Evaluation Panel,
WEPCO pledged to fund up to 25 percent of the project costs and to seek the additional financial
participation from other private concerns, a task which it has completed with the inclusion of
Cinergy, Detroit Edison and PacifiCorp. On 17 October 1994, in response to the Rio Bravo Pilot
Project, the Government of Belize ratified the FCCC and issued a letter endorsing the project and
the concept of carbon offset trading (USIJI 1995).
One of the goals of the Rio Bravo Pilot Project is to demonstrate that environmentally sustainable
forest management practices can become more economically sustainable when the value of
carbon offsets is factored into the equation. If successful, the project will demonstrate the optimal
balance between conservation, economic development and environmental protection. A total of
25,866 hectares of the RBCMA eastern area is zoned for forestry development. The land in this
zone has a limestone base with a broadleaf forest cover. It has no slope, soil moisture,
biodiversity or cultural characteristics warranting special conservation considerations. This
development programme would require a forty-year annual rotation regime, with the annual
working area of the broadleaf forest limited to 640 hectares. To be economically sustainable, the
programme would have to integrate forest extraction, with milling and woodworking capabilities,
the latter being used to add value to the logged timber before sale.
An additional 10,010 hectares of the total area has poor, sandy soils with open woodland
savannahs. The area has been damaged by uncontrolled seasonal wildfires and fires set by
poachers. Some 2,500 hectares of this area will be managed to improve pine stocks through
regeneration. The remainder of the area is zoned as protected for environmental and conservation
management reasons. Forested portions of the area, totalling 5,308 hectares, will be allowed to
regenerate (USIJI 1995).
In addition to GHG, the project can potentially generate a number of other benefits. These include
the protection of biodiversity, improvements in soil stability, water and air quality, the creation of
local jobs, and long-term improvements in the local economy through the development of minor
forest product industries.
Case study 4. Direct payment to farmers for environmental services, Costa Rica
Costa Rica has a history of innovative approaches to development. In the 1950s, in the middle of
the cold war, the army was abolished releasing 15% of the country’s gross national product for
use in development and social programmes. In the 1980s, Costa Rica was the first country to
carry out a “debt for nature” transaction, which has subsequently attracted tens of millions dollars
for conservation of its forests (Watson et al., 1998).
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Costa Rica is now launching three national level carbon sequestration programmes, two in
forestry and a third in renewable energy. Commercialisation of CO2 reduction credits is achieved
through the system of Certified Tradable Offsets (CTOs), which are issued by the recently
created Costa Rican Office on Joint Implementation (OCIC – Executive Decree N. 25066 Minae,
1996). These CTOs are credits of carbon fixation based on the amount of CO2 fixed in forests.
The first batch of CTOs (200,000 tons of carbon) was sold to a Norwegian consortium at US$10
per ton of carbon (US$2.70 per ton of CO2), for a total of US$2,000,000.
The Private Forestry Programme (PFP), encourages land owners to opt for forestry-related land
uses by providing direct payment for environmental services. Environmental services include
CO2 fixation, water quality, biodiversity, and landscape beauty [Forestry Law N. 7575, April
1996; La Gaceta (1996)]. The monetary incentives aim at increasing the attractiveness of forestry
compared to higher impact forms of land use. Incentives are paid to land owners over a period of
five years following the signing of a contract to keep their land under a specified type of
utilisation for a minimum period of twenty years. Farmers who receive these incentives assign the
rights of to the environmental services to the government, which bundles them for potential sale.
The resources for initiating the PFP programme were raised by a domestic 15 percent tax on
fossil fuels, which is expected to raise US$21 million per year (Franz Tattenbach, personal
comment). It is hoped that future payments to farmers will be based upon successful sales of
resultant CTOs.
The value of PFP incentives varies. There are three main areas of interest: conservation of
existing forests, selective harvesting for sustainable wood production, and reforestation or natural
regeneration of degraded pasture or agricultural land. In the case of private forest conservation,
farmers receive U$56 per hectare a year for to a total of US$280 per hectare. They are also
waived payment of land tax. Those opting for natural forest management receive US$47 per
hectare a year, to a total of US$235/ha, in addition to the revenue derived from timber harvesting.
In order to enforce compliance with low impact logging guidelines, the law requires that any
harvesting operation must be supervised by a trained forester. Farmers who choose to reforest
part of their agricultural land receive a series of payments related to the costs of plantation
establishment, to a total of US$558 per hectare.
Beyond CTOs, Costa Rica is also working on ways to charge the economic sectors that most
benefit from these services. One example is the creation of a system to charge hydroelectric
plants for the conservation of their water catchments, at a rate of US$10 per hectare a year. A
similar mechanism is being created for remunerating farmers in ecotourism regions. In the case of
biodiversity, genetic prospecting contracts have been signed between INBio (the Costa Rica
institute of genetic resources) and international chemical companies. The first of these contracts
was signed with Merck, the large American pharmaceutical company, and stipulates that Merck
will pay the Costa Rican government ten percent of the  profits from any product derived from
Costa Rican forests.
The institution coordinating the administration of the private sector incentives is called
FONAFIFO (Fondo Nacional de Financiamento Forestal – Forestry Financing Fund), an office
created by the MINAE (Minister del Ambiente y Energia – Ministry of Energy and
Environment). FONAFIFO has the role of receiving and analysing applications, conducting field
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verifications, carrying out the payments, and monitoring field implementation of forestry
projects.
Costa Rica is also working on a second national level land use project, called Protected Areas
Programme (PAP), with the objective of reducing deforestation rates by consolidation of its
national parks network. The programme aims at consolidating 570,000 ha within twenty-eight
national parks, and claim the carbon savings derived from avoided deforestation, which
historically has averaged three percent per year. Costa Rica expects to avoid the release of about
18 million tons of carbon (66 m t CO2) through the implementation of the PAP. These savings
will be independently verified by the international certification company SGS Forestry, and
CTOs will be issued accordingly. At a projected price of US$10 per ton of carbon, Costa Rica
expects to raise US$180 million through the PAP. The sale of CTOs from the PAP will be done
with the assistance of the Center Financial Products, possibly through the Chicago Board of
Trade transactions. In conjunction with the Earth Council, which is providing some of the
catalytic finance for the PAP, Costa Rica will use a portion of those proceeds to finance
construction of the Earth Center, which is envisioned as a research/demonstration project
highlighting various aspects of sustainable development and environmental values.
The Costa Rican Renewable Energy Export Programme, bundles a group of geothermal,
hydroelectric, biomass and wind electricity generation projects to export energy to neighbouring
countries in Central America that would otherwise use electricity generated from fossil fuels.
Money from the Greenhouse Gas Fund will contribute to the renewable energy projects’ overall
profitability, to regional marketing and to benefit sharing within Central America.
Project participants are the Costa Rican Association of Independent Power Producers (ACOPE);
the Costa Rican Investment and Trade Development Board (CINDE); the Free Zone Corporation
and ICE (Instituto Costaricense de Electricidad). The projects are a fifty MW geothermal plant; a
five MW electricity plant that burns biomass from a sugar mill; a twenty MW wind facility; and
seven hydroelectric facilities of twenty MW each. These projects will generate a total of 215 MW
of capacity to offset 1,300 gigawatt-hours of fossil fuel generation in the importing countries for
an estimated saving of 1.3 million tons of CO2 per year. OCIC will certify that the GHG savings
have occurred – using external verification – and bundle those savings into CTOs to be assigned
to the external financing participants.
All of these Costa Rican programmes provide good examples of how JI could be utilised by
developing countries to attract international investment. The whole programme has been
conceived by the Costa Rican government and, consequently, conforms to government priorities.
While Costa Rica managed to secure catalytic funding for the initial phase of the PAP (provided
by the Earth Council and the World Bank), all other costs are borne by Costa Rica itself, which is
also responsible for determining the sale price of CTOs. In this way Costa Rica maintains full
control of the production costs and profits associated with the commercialisation of CTOs, which,
it is hoped, will be redirected into priority areas within the country.
